Gary Li on Economic Prosperity as the Driving Force to Stability

One or even a few sweeping generalizations cannot explain China and its dynamic and radical changes over the past several decades. Today, a prevailing Western position on why the Communist Party has endured stems from a belief in three key factors – “state-led economic development policies; market forces relate to late industrialization; and socialist legacies.” These factors are valuable but ultimately incomplete.

In the past three years, China has hosted three major international events: the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the 2010 Shanghai World Expo, and the 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games. For each event, the government subsidized mass urban reconstruction in the host cities, constructed mammoth and extravagant facilities. The events themselves were bookended by lavish opening and closing ceremonies featuring spectacular performances. On the surface this may appear to be a mighty public staging of great nationalism, but in reality, is nothing more than a facade. In reality, the Communist Party of China is highly paranoid, and it uses nationalism as a means to obscure the issues that threaten to undermine its authority. In Beijing, the subtler yet still visible symbol of Communist control manifests itself in “increased police patrols, roundups of dissidents and tapped phones.” In Wild Grass, Ian Johnson writes: “The signs are not always obvious, but once they are known, they are unmistakable: the triple-teamed soldiers that cordon off diplomatic compounds, late-night police roadblocks, roving patrols on trains heading for Beijing, the sealing off of the cavernous Tian’anmen Square, accessible only to those who present their identity cards for inspection…the message is clear: we are nervous, possibly even weak, but do not meddle; we can still crush you” (6-8).

A common Western misconception exists regarding Chinese foreign policy: China has become a worldwide military threat interested in asserting its dominance in Asia and pursuing foreign invasion, thereby threatening worldwide stability. In reality, however, the CCP has always been inwardly focused, prioritizing the preservation of internal order and stability within its borders. The issues surrounding Taiwan and Tibet demonstrate that China is most interested in protecting its internal sovereignty and territorial integrity. After all, China’s military is named the People’s Liberation Army: its primary interest is in the people it serves. However, the prevalent belief that the military’s first and foremost interest is actually in promoting the Party’s interests probably holds more veracity.

In fact, China is a country of walls and prohibition. It is ironic that a great civilization’s two most distinguished icons are symbols of defense and exclusion: the Great Wall, a fortification of fear and paranoia of those outside; and the Forbidden City, an imperial palace designed to keep those who belonged in and those who didn’t out. Before Beijing’s redevelopment (or gutting as some may put it) an immense city wall stood to keep outsiders at bay.

Today, the government maintains this inward focus by preserving stability. Stability, most notably social and economic stability, is a value universally held by the state, the Party, and the society. The predominant belief that each body shares, however, is that economic prosperity is the vehicle by which other avenues of stability are achieved. This belief has a significant, albeit fairly flawed historical basis. Following the turbulent and tumultuous Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping decided that economic reform and an opening up of the then-isolated China were essential to restore order within the country. In 1978, Deng initiated a series of economic reforms called “Gaige Kaifang”, or Economic Reforms and Openness, which did away with several of the socialist institutions that Mao had implemented during the Cultural Revolution, and paved the way towards the economic reforms we see today. Market reforms were put in place gradually, and the state eased its control on several economic fronts, leading to an economic boom as China opened itself up to opportunities of the outside world. Many were hopeful that political reforms would follow closely behind. Standards of living increased; however, they brought along inequality and inflation. Incidentally, one motive of the infamous Tian’anmen protests of 1989 was that inflation was devaluing the currency of the people. Citizens took to the streets to protest “rising inflation that eroded real incomes, anger at corruption and arbitrary privilege, and rising expectations about political and economic change.” Their calls for change were met with shells and tanks.

The violent crushing of the Tian’anmen protests still has an immensely profound impact on today’s society. Many Chinese today consider politics to be a “fool’s poison;” they avoid an active involvement in it at all costs because of the terror that June 4 instilled. Thus, they go about their daily lives focusing on making money by venturing into entrepreneurship and business. In the dog-eat-dog society that is China today, making money is the only way to shelter one. Furthermore, the state discourages people to organize in groups. After all, the Communist Party itself started as a small group, and as a revolutionary party, is highly paranoid that a small group today could evolve into a mass movement. This creates a severe isolation among individuals and polarities within the society, resulting in an abstinence from collective responsibility. The only responsibility an individual possesses is to look out for himself, those he knows, and for no one else. Chinese citizens oftentimes feel alone, without categories or communities; lacking any organization they harbor fear. Oddly enough, this insecurity holds the society together, causing for the most part a temporary stability.

China operates under an economic system known as “socialism with Chinese characteristics” as a means to promote prosperity to achieve social stability. Consequently, the Party and the people remain highly paranoid and suspicious of one another. This is what I’d call “psychological stability with Chinese characteristics,” which, loosely defined, means no psychological stability at all.