Civilization as Disciplinization and the Consequences for Religion and World Politics

Jocelyne Cesari

To cite this article: Jocelyne Cesari (2019) Civilization as Disciplinization and the Consequences for Religion and World Politics, The Review of Faith & International Affairs, 17:1, 24-33, DOI: 10.1080/15570274.2019.1570753

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2019.1570753

Published online: 20 Feb 2019.
CIVILIZATION AS DISCIPLINIZATION AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR RELIGION AND WORLD POLITICS

By Jocelyne Cesari

It has been the work of Samuel Huntington, first presented in a 1993 article in *Foreign Affairs* and subsequently elaborated in a 1996 book, which has dominated the discourse on culture as an element of international conflicts (Huntington 1996). Huntington argues that Islam is uniquely incompatible with and antagonistic to the core values of the West (such as equality and modernity). This argument resurfaces in most current analyses of international affairs and globalization, notably in terrorist studies since 9/11. However, as abundantly proven by the social sciences, civilizations are not homogenous, monolithic players in world politics with an inclination to “clash,” but rather consist of pluralistic, divergent, and convergent actors and practices that are constantly evolving (Grim and Finke 2011; Katzenstein 2009). Thus, the “clash of civilizations” fails to address not only conflict between civilizations but also conflict and differences within civilizations. In particular, evidence does not exist to substantiate Huntington’s prediction that countries with similar cultures are coming together, while countries with different cultures are coming apart.

The cultural divide is thus envisaged as the primary cause of international crises. Admittedly, the “Huntingonian” position is based on a premise that cannot be simply dismissed: that identity and culture play a decisive role in international relations. Additionally, Huntington’s argument can be situated within the current trend of researchers attempting to understand the scope of the political revolts against the Western-dominated international order (see Bozeman 1984). But what culture and what Islam are being spoken about here? The idea of a monolithic Islam leads to a reductionism in

Abstract: This article argues in favor of Norbert Elias’s historical and relational sociology to rehabilitate the notion of civilization in the study of international affairs. Elias’s approach has two major advantages. First, it avoids the use of de-historicized models of political development that project a Western-centered approach as universal. Second, it brings into focus the central role of the nation-state in the shaping of the contemporary religious dimension of politics at the national and international levels. This relational and historical perspective will be applied to the case of postcolonial nation-states to explain the rise and expansion of political Islam from national to global forms of political expression.

Keywords: disciplinization, relational and historical sociology, Islam, nation-state

© 2019 Institute for Global Engagement
which the conflicts in Sudan, Lebanon, Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan are imagined to stem collectively and wholly from the domain of religion. It is, moreover, ironic that the role of religion, so long ignored or neglected in terms of international politics, is now exaggerated and decontextualized in an ahistorical perspective, which has elicited its fair share of criticism from scholars of Islamic cultures.

Seen in this light, the clash of civilizations thesis represents an attempt, albeit a consistently inadequate one, to shift international politics away from an exclusively nation-state-centric approach, only to immediately re-create and legitimate the view of a fixed world of cultural agents participating in predetermined conflicts of interest (Rubenstein and Crocker 1994). This is to say that any attempt at an analysis of culture and global cultural conflict is an admirable one, but it must not be done through a reification of both culture and civilization.

This ahistorical approach to Islam’s global role extends to all religions in world politics. It is exacerbated by the taken for granted similarity between on one hand the Western values of progress, individualism and secularization and the international system on the other hand. This association between western values and international system is an obstacle to a diverse and plural approach to culture and religion in international affairs which I contend, can be overcome by Norbert Elias’s conception of civilization.

The Civilizing Process: Norbert Elias’ Civilization Corrective

Interestingly, Norbert Elias’ work on civilization has been largely ignored by scholars of international politics interested in rehabilitating civilization in IR (Katzenstein 2009; Petito 2016), with the notable exception of Andrew Linklater (2017). According to Elias, and in stark contrast with Huntington, civilization is the result of the historical transformation of social structures and changing formations of personality toward self-regulation or individuation.

The theoretical benefit of such a theory lies in the synthesis of insights from Freudian psychoanalysis and historical sociology, which takes into account long-term processes of development and analyzes the continuous interactions between individual and social structures. In other words, civilization is the outcome of unplanned processes of the concentration of power and changes in human psyche, behaviors, and emotions that happen in any cultural context. One can wonder why such an approach has not made inroads in the IR discussion of civilization.

There are several reasons for that neglect. Let’s start with the obvious. Elias is victim of the “white western male” syndrome. His magnum opus, The Civilizing Process, is seen as the normative perception of civilization because it analyses the social, historical, and psychological dynamics that led to the self-definition and the related self-glorification of the Western “civilized” person. Saying that one form of higher moral existence for humanity was created in France is one thing. Supporting this movement by claiming that “civilized” people are really superior, is another one that Elias does not endorse:

There is no zero-point of civilizing processes, no point at which human beings are uncivilized and as it were begin to be civilized. No human being lacks the capacity for self-restraint. No human group could function for any length of time whose adults failed to develop, within the wild and at first totally unrestrained little beings, as which humans are born, patterns of self-regulation and self-restraint [sic]. What changes in the course of a civilizing process are the social patterns of individual self-restraint and the manner in which they are built into the individual person in the form of what one now calls ‘conscience’ or perhaps ‘reason’. (Elias 2000)

It remains that the term is politically, emotionally, and culturally loaded, which explains the scholarly critiques of Elias for using it, even without “quotation marks” (Liston and Mennell 2010).

Secondly, the critiques of Elias reject his approach as teleological, i.e. seeing civilization as an ongoing and irreversible path toward progress,
even if he has always been adamant to point out the opposite trends of decivilization at work at the same time as the civilizing ones. Nevertheless, his critiques are onto something due to the fact that, by focusing on “civilizing” processes in terms of self-control/pacification, Elias dismisses the conditions for violence that occur even in civilized spaces. In other words, in Elias’s work, it appears as if the “civilizing” process refers mainly to pacified spaces of social relations where there is no (or less) violence. One of the problems here can be formulated in this way: in one way or another, by keeping this quasi-Hobbesian (and Freudian) duality in his analysis, Elias became almost an anti-Hobbesian (and anti-Freudian) by excluding (or reducing) violence from the “civilizing” process (or human psyche) rather than seeing it as one of its main dimensions. Beyond Hobbes (and Freud), the main point is that the ambiguity of the relationship between modern social order and violence is lost. As Burkitt said, this problem becomes evident when he [Elias] refers to “barbarity” emerging only after “civilized” social organization has broken down, implying that far from the “civilizing process” being ambiguous, it is resoundingly unambiguous in its exclusion of “barbarity” (Burkitt 1996).

Keeping these critiques in mind, I nevertheless argue that Elias’ conception of civilization has heuristic value to understand today the role of religion within international relations. More specifically, socio-economic transformations and their influence on the disciplinization of individuals to fit into the new configuration of power, cannot be dissociated from the feeling of superiority of the people who undergo such a disciplinization. For example, Elias describes in great detail the changes in table manners at the court of the kings of France that were part of the disciplinization of the subjects, starting with the aristocracy class and diffusing to the other classes in the following decades, reinforcing the legitimacy of the king. Eating like the king with a knife and fork was civilized, and hence desirable for everybody. It became the norm across Europe and was exported everywhere as the western civilization. The exportation of the western civilization was of course motivated by material interests, but sufficient historical evidence attests the deep engrained conviction of the people engaged in colonization at all the levels of class and political decision. This sense of superiority is the unplanned consequence of the structural and psychological transformations started in Europe a few centuries ago. Therefore civilization is relevant as the unplanned process of the political transformations and as the narrative of cultural superiority that is associated with it.

Besides the structural changes in institutions and social conditions, Elias focuses on the role of emotions in the acceptance and even desirability that people experience in changing their behaviors to fit the new norms and structures. The role of emotions in the production of knowledge and identities, in the path opened by Durkheim, is central to Elias. In contrast with Durkheim however, Elias bases his understanding of emotions on the Freudian theory of the disciplinization and regulation imposed on the psyche by society. But unlike Freud, Elias strives to apprehend the formation of the individual and of society on the basis of their interrelationship. In other words, in the figurational theory of Elias, individual and society are complementary rather than opposing terms and realities.

In sum, Elias’ relational sociology focuses on the transformation of institutions in the longue durée and actors’ efforts to control, change, or oppose them. It shed a different light on the expansion of the international system beyond the West. No doubt, the “Mission Civilisatrice” of imperialism was a decisive factor in the expansion of the Westphalian system. But it should not obliteterate the fact that beyond the normative rhetoric, structural transformations were put in motion with the active involvement of local elites and institutions. In other words, civilization does not refer to westernization, but rather to the internationalization of western concepts of nation, state, and religion and their grafting in
different cultural milieu. This grafting usually happens with the shaping of a sense of superiority for each political community even under condition of subjugation.

I have shown, for example, that the politicization of Islam has been the consequence of the recalibration of the Islamic tradition to fit into the nation-state framework (Cesari 2018). This civilizing process has entailed disciplinization and regulation of religious institutions, doctrines, and beliefs. It has also created the conditions for religiously-based hostility and violence, as part of this civilizing process. In sum, civilization is disciplinization and adjustment of individuals’ behaviors and psyche to fit into national communities while forging the sense of superiority of their respective cultures. Such a perspective allows the overcoming of the false dichotomies (individual/society, agent/structure, ideational/material, domestic/international, and so forth) that limit our understanding of religion and politics. In David Scott’s view, then, rather than approaching modern power as a force that blocks the expression of native agency, it is more helpful to understand modernity as a form of power that, altered not merely the balance of forces in the struggle between colonizer and colonized, but the terrain itself on which that struggle was engaged; that altered not merely the rules of the game of social, political, and cultural life among the colonized, but the game as such in which social, political, and cultural life was organized. (Scott 2014)

For example, the building of nation-states in Muslim lands led to the concentrations of power in the hands of state rulers, to changes of social structures and to the Islamic tradition. More specifically, it translated into hegemonic forms of Islam, unknown to pre-modern Muslim polities and empires.

Nation, State, and the Disciplinization of Islam

With the advent of the nation-state, a congruence was created between Muslims of a certain obedience (for example, Maleki School versus šafī‘i) and bounded territory. This congruence led to the illegitimation of all other religious groups present in the bounded territory (for example, the Alevi in Turkey). This territorialization of Islamic belonging went hand-in-hand with elevating certain Islamic prescriptions as rules for the new nation, such as the Islamic procedures for marriage and divorce folded into civil law. This is a major break away from the modernization process of Europe, where the separation of the state authority from religious institutions and ideas was the crucial condition for modern citizenship.

In other words, these deep-rooted attitudes are the result of parallel political and religious reforms starting at the end of the Ottoman Empire, which occurred separately but became inextricably enmeshed. It is important to bear in mind that these changes came with the inclusion of the Muslim Empire within the Westphalian order in the 19th century. Until then, concepts of territory and statehood were not central to the definition of Muslim polities as they were in European states. Additionally, territorial claims in these polities were often in a state of flux due to the movement of people and the multiplicity of ethnic loyalties. It is worth noting that I do not use the term “state” to refer to any form of political governance, but specifically to the hyphen of nation and state that emerged from the breakdown of Christendom at the end of the War of Religion, and was then exported everywhere through colonialism and trade. To say it differently, there is a tendency nowadays to loosely use the term state to refer to political power at all times, like for example, the Ottoman state. Political power is indeed as ancient as human kind, but this does not mean that all forms of political power qualify as a state. Historically, the state hyphenated with the nation is a modern construction that implies concentration and monopoly of the use of violence over a territory aligned with a population (defined by culture/language or both). This type of political power emerged in Europe and became the international norm of political power with the collapse of Empires and the decolonization processes.
Although exported, the nation-state is not simply a duplicate of the European ones. In fact, in most Muslim countries national identity was forged by state leaders through different procedures and religious and cultural choices, to the extent that it is more relevant to speak of a “state-nation” rather than “nation-state.” The preeminence of the state can be observed throughout all nation-building processes, but what is specific to the colonial and postcolonial ones is the extremely rapid changes initiated by the state elites. There was no Turkish or Pakistani nation before their independences; they were literally created overnight. New identities were forged in less than two generations and irremediably altered the relation of Turks and Pakistanis to Islam.

When it comes to evaluating the postcolonial nation-states, it is often argued that some, if not most, are failed states. This diagnosis is accurate when it comes to the efficiency and legitimacy of the state institutions, but much less so when it comes to national identities. In fact, the success of the postcolonial states has been in the shaping of national identities with Islam at its center. The changes toward the building of state-nations were put in movement in the Ottoman Empire by two events: the 1798 expedition of Bonaparte in Egypt and the 1856 Treaty of Paris. The former set the parameters for the never-ending debate on Islam and modernity with the rise of the modernist-reformist movement (Salaﬁyya), and pan-Islamism (a political project of social cohesion based on Islamic belonging). The latter event refers to the Ottoman Empire’s symbolic inclusion in the Westphalian order when for the first time at the end of the Crimean War, a representative of the Ottoman Empire was invited to the diplomatic negotiations. The former set the parameters for the never-ending debate on Islam and modernity with the rise of the modernist-reformist movement (Salaﬁyya), and pan-Islamism (a political project of social cohesion based on Islamic belonging). The latter event refers to the Ottoman Empire’s symbolic inclusion in the Westphalian order when for the first time at the end of the Crimean War, a representative of the Ottoman Empire was invited to the diplomatic negotiations. In the aftermath of this symbolic inclusion, three disparate factors contributed to the adoption in Muslim lands of the Westphalian State system in the first half of the 20th century: the fall of imperial governments in the region; the rise of local nationalist movements in urban centers such as Cairo, Tunis, Baghdad, and Damascus; and the emergence of states with demarcated territorial boundaries that pursued self-interests and experienced hostile territorial disputes with neighboring states. Pro-Western, liberal “civilizationalism” also became the dominant paradigm of the Ottoman modernists and reformists, despite strong internal resistance against Western imperialism. This opposition stemmed from the population’s objection to the Western critique that the Caliphate was not “civilized” enough to gain the loyalty of its Christian subjects. This resistance subsequently led to two different movements: pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism.

The ultimate objective of pan-Islamism was the political unity of the Muslim population under Islam rather than race or nationality (Lee 1942). Pan-Arabism, on the other hand, recognized the cultural and linguistic affinity among Arabs and aimed to establish a single state for a united Arab nation (Reiser 1983). Despite divergent political goals, these two movements developed in close proximity in the last period of the Ottoman Empire and were both influenced by European political principles.

Starting in the mid-19th century, with the rise of the Young Turks movement, constitutionalism and parliamentarism were championed as prerequisites for imperial revival, and for their reconciliation with Islamic norms, such as the consideration of the concept of shura (consultation). The Young Turks did not envision a secular regime; rather, they conceptualized shari’a as the foundation for reform and freedom. The pinnacle of this movement’s achievements, the Ottoman Constitution of 1876—which was modeled on the Belgian constitution of 1831—established an appointed upper house of parliament and an elected lower house with legislative authorities. This development signified a shift toward a civic Ottoman identity, but did not challenge the traditional structure of the political system. The Sultan was not accountable to the elected assembly, and was authorized to dissolve it and to suspend the constitution whenever he wanted, which is indeed what Abd al-Hamid II did in February 1878 when he was convinced that the democratic experiment weakened his position. Egypt’s more prolonged and turbulent experiments with representative assemblies served as the main scene for the modernist Islamic
conceptualizations of politics, and therefore merit particular attention. None of the advisory institutions established in Cairo during the 19th century involved rulers who conceded their monopoly on decision-making. However, they signal the linkage between political freedom and social progress as well as the use of Islamic terms to justify Western forms of government. In September 1829, Muhammad Ali (reigned 1805–1848) convened, for the first time, an appointed consultative council (Majlis al-Mushawara) that consisted of 156 members and was presided over by his son, Ibrahim. It gathered once a year to carry out its advisory role on matters of administration, education and public works (Landau 1953, 7). Such an institution indicated that the rulers saw certain formalized forms of public participation as a way to enhance their political standings. Ali’s official bulletin, al-Waqa’i al-Misriyya, compared the Council to the British Parliament and the French National Assembly; while Rif’a al-Tahtawi (1801–1873), head of Egypt’s language school and of the state’s translation department, invoked the term shura to describe the American Congress (Ayalon 1987, 110–126). However, it is not clear whether the terminological confusion between elected councils with legislative and supervisory authorities and an appointed council without any actual power was deliberate.

In the path opened by Ali, Sa’id Mohammed Pacha (reigned 1854–1863), created an appointed State Council that also remained purely advisory. After him, Isma’il Pacha (ruled 1863–1879) established an assembly of 75 delegates (Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab) elected by Egypt’s male population in November 1866. This initiative was seen as the equivalent of the French legislative bodies by European journalists at the time. Similar to its predecessors, the assembly possessed only advisory authority. Isma’il was under no obligation to accept its advice, and he alone had the authority to convene, adjourn, or dissolve it. However, to impress his European creditors with his constitutional aims, he consulted with the assembly on various matters, particularly those related to finance and infrastructure.

These political changes were paralleled by reformist religious thought—known as Salafiyya—although it is not proven that the term was endorsed as such by the modernists of the time. Salafiyya, which takes the Salaf (early Companions of the Prophet Mohammed) as reference, has garnered confusing meanings because of its current use by the followers of Abd al-Wahhab’s doctrine, or Wahhabism, which greatly differs in its orientation and goals from the modernist reformist movement of the 19th century (Lauzière 2016). The former rejects the teachings of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence or madhab and advocates the imitation of the Prophet Mohammed by emphasizing the Hadith (accounts of the words and deeds of the Prophet). The latter also rejects the consistent observance of the schools of jurisprudence but unlike Wahhabism, encourages new interpretations. The reformist-modernist movement is understood as an attempt to resist the cultural influence of the West and therefore presented as the paragon for religious authenticity by turning inward to Islamic heritage to compete with Western cultural input. For example, the Salafiyya entry in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World (1995) reads:

In its inception however, Salafiyya did not involve direct opposition to European imperial rule over Muslims. Rather, the intellectual figures of the movement saw it as internal Islamic reform to compete with the scientific and economic leadership of the West, through education and scholarship.

What is often downplayed in this kind of description, as noted by Talal Asad in the Formations of the Secular (2003), is that this revivalism was actually deeply influenced by Western cultural and political concepts. I would add that it irremediably changed the meanings of traditional concepts such as shari’a, ijtihad, ummah and jihad. In colonial times, and even more so after the national independences, the co-optation of Islam by the state solidified these political connotations of traditional concepts.
and made them “natural” to masses and clerics alike. Even less frequently explored, but in fact, most important, is the fact that this Westernized Islamic thinking has irreparably changed the tenets of the Islamic tradition. Therefore, debating the nature of political Islam in light of medieval concepts, like we are seeing in the debate on the Islamic nature of ISIS, is moot. In fact, it is misleading to think that Islamists refer to shari’a or ijtihad in their premodern sense. Take for example the following assessment by Noah Feldman (2016):

Political Islamists—Islamists for short—recognize that the classical legal rules, derived from the Quran, the actions of the Prophet Muhammad, need to be supplemented by further legal and administrative regulations. When they seek to incorporate Shari’a into their constitutions, they are usually asking for modern legislation informed by classical Islamic law, and also sometimes for a rule that no legislation may violate classical Islamic legal rules.

No doubt, there is a claim for the inclusion of Islamic law in secular legal systems. But the call for Islamic law is actually not informed by classical legal rules because there is no such a thing as state law in the classic tradition of Islam. Islamists are in fact operating on a Westernized concept of Islamic law that they share with secular nationalists. The difference is that they want to expand the rule of this law to new domains, while secular actors are content with the status quo. For this reason, the distinction between Islamic reform and Western nationalism is not as clear cut as political actors claim. In other words, just because the former is opposed to the latter does not mean that it was not influenced by it. In fact, Islamic reformism was the outcome of the importation of Western ideas into traditional concepts and methodologies. In its initial phase as mentioned above, Islamic reformism was actually modernist and pro-Western. In itself, it was neither good nor bad. Its anti-Western shift occurred later, at the time of decolonization and under the yolk of the authoritarian nation-states. Under these conditions, political Islam is the outcome of never-ending interactions between intellectual, theological debates and institutional changes.

In summary, to gain popular legitimacy, and to counter pan-Islamist threats, the architects of nascent, post-colonial States co-opted Islamic educational and charitable institutions and clerical authorities. This occurred through the nationalization of endowments, creation of ministries of religious affairs, and concessions to the nations’ “Islamic” characters by including Islam in the constitution as a key source of the state’s legal and social roles. Al-Azhar, the world’s pre-eminent Sunni theological religious institution, was co-opted by the state to bolster its legitimacy by reducing the sheikh’s authority and bringing religious schools and mosques under state control. Other authoritarian regimes exercised similar measures to control religious institutions and suppress Islamic authorities that might compete with the state (e.g. Sufi brotherhoods in Turkey). The inclusion of Islam within state institutions has nationalized Islamic discourses, authorities, and teachings, thus giving rise to a hegemonic version of Islam. While most legal codes were based on European models, the primacy of Shari’a in the sphere of family law was retained, and dominant forms of Islam were given legal privilege, which affected the status of minorities. For example, adherents of religions not recognized as distinct Islamic sects, such as the Baha’i in Egypt and the Alevi in Turkey, are either amalgamated within the Muslim majority or rejected as heretics. Thus, whether Islam is defined as the state religion (Egypt) or not (Turkey), Islamic institutions became part of the state system and national identity.

The Modern Political Culture: Conflation of National and Religious Belonging

One of the consequences of the rise of a hegemonic religion is the moralization of the concept of public order as Islamic principles/institutions/actors provide legitimacy to state actions. Included in that process are
often-unarticulated understandings about what religion in the abstract is or should be. Hence, the state is always drawing a line between the religious and the secular, and reserving its sole authority to do so. Hussein Agrama describes secularism in most Muslim countries as primarily a state action, or what he calls “active secularism” (Agrama 2010, 495–523). One way to think about the principle of “active secularism” is to see the state as promoting an abstract notion of “religion,” defining the spaces it should inhabit, and then working to discipline actual religious traditions to conform to this abstract notion and fit into these spaces.

The state’s action created a new religious habitus linking religious belonging to national belonging and citizenship status, erecting the Ummah as a homogenous community of Muslims, and making the state the implementing agent of religious rules. The socialization post-independence built a habitus linking religious belonging and national belonging. Structures of habitus are acquired by specific social positions that are durable, generative, and transposable.

Political culture in modern Muslim-majority countries is built on beliefs that Islam is one and important to citizenry and nationhood. With the creation of the state education system, curricula and textbooks socialized new generations to the idea that national identity and Islamic identity are two sides of the same coin. By inscribing Islam within the public education system, the state positions itself as the protector of Islamic heritage, assuming “the responsibility to provide children and youths with trustworthy religious guidance.”

“Groups claiming independent authority to interpret Islamic scriptures and transmit Islamic culture” therefore undermine the moral legitimacy of the state (Starrett 1998, 5).

National unity comes from two sources. The first is the cultivation of national brotherhood (internal cohesion) against outsiders, including external and internal threats and enemies, regardless of sectarian divisions. Given that nationalism concerns difference, “the imagined community cannot be all-inclusive” (Durrani and Dunne 2010, 218). Consequently, the second source of national unity is exclusivist nationalist discourses, which have implications for citizenship, access to political power, and allocation of resources (Durrani and Dunne 2010, 230). Thus, the state excludes those who do not belong to the dominant group within its discursive project of establishing ideological hegemony and constructing national identity through education.

However, the underlying and more pervasive source of exclusion is the use of Islam within the education system to homogenize the nation. Despite more recent initiatives to focus on tolerance in school curricula, public education curricula still neglect and discriminate against religious minorities. Also, because the concept of tolerance is only promoted in the religious context, other parts of the curricula (history/social studies) that are also influenced by Islamic terms, such as jihad, remain within a militant context and continue to instill ideas of Islamic supremacy and uniting against “infidels.”

Conclusion

Norbert Elias’ civilizational perspective allows us to overcome the “fixism” of most investigations that bypass historical development in favor of decontextualized, variable-centered investigation. It also avoids the teleological temptation of apprehending modernization or democratization as irreversible processes. In Elias’s view, civilization is the result of opposite and conflictual actions that operate simultaneously, like democratization and de-democratization.

His approach is also relevant to overcome the religious/secular divide that permeates most research on religion and politics. A genealogical investigation of civilization highlights the superficiality of the religious/secular divide by focusing on the continuous redistribution of influence and power between political and religious actors and institutions. Consequently, what is at stake is the continuous struggle between actors to define the boundaries of the “secular” and the “religious.” These boundaries are the outcome of the specific state-society relations in a given country and therefore the
civilization in which they are grounded. Away from normative claims, civilization is better seen as processes of adjustments to the dominant international culture and its consequences. It is surely less “glamorous” than the common sense understanding of civilization, but may be more efficient to decipher the clash of norms and beliefs at the international level. ❖

1. Within the Islamic tradition, there are four schools of jurisprudence: Hanafi, Shafi’i, Malik, and Hanbali, all named after their respective founders. In the 9th and 10th century, these schools were consolidated and separated from the caliphal political power.

2. Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz generalized the use of this term in their edited volume (2011).

3. The Young Ottoman movement (1865) was when a contemporary form of political ideology first emerged in the Islamic Middle East, almost completely through civil bureaucracy. Led by Namik Kemal, the movement emphasized the need for activism and critique of the Tanzimat to solve the Empire’s problems. The movement ultimately led to the promulgation of the constitution in 1876. For more information, see Findley 1982.


5. Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) was born in ‘Uyaynah, a village in the region of Najd. He took his first religious education from his father, Shaykh ‘Abd al-Wahhab, who was a prominent judge and religious scholar of the time. Afterwards, bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab embarked on a new educational path in Al-Madinah Al-Munawwarah and Basra in Iraq, where he was taught by a number of Islamic scholars (ulama). He returned to his village and began his own preaching with the goal to purify Islam from traditional schools of jurisprudence and from any practices associated with superstitious beliefs. He was known to coerce people into his interpretations of Islamic prescriptions. After being expelled from his village for his extreme views and conducts in 1744, he was received by Muhammad bin Saud in his settlement. Together, they aimed to expand the al-Saud political influence by creating an army and coercing people into following the Wahhabi doctrine. All who converted were expected to join the army and perform jihad for the cause, including those who converted out of fear (see Algar 2002).

6. Scholars like Khaled Abu Al Fadl have noted that with the international religious influence of the Saudi kingdom, Wahhabism and Salafism have become synonymous, hence erasing the initial modernist connotations of the term (see Fadl 2007).

7. See the Salafiya entry in The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam of the Modern Islamic World (1995) for the whole debate on the impossibility of the Islamic state or the nature of political Islam.

About the Author
Jocelyne Cesari is the T. J. Dermot Dunphy Visiting Professor of Religion, Violence, and Peacebuilding at Harvard Divinity School (2018–2019). She holds the Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham, UK, and is Senior Fellow at Georgetown University’s Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs. She is President of the European Academy of Religion (2018–2019), and her most recent book is What is Political Islam? (Lynne Rienner, 2018).

References


https://doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2019.1570753