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CONFLICT AND CONTROL
Challenge to Legitimacy of Modern Governments

edited by
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The sociology of modernization is a relatively recent, but well-established subdiscipline of sociology that emerged in the early 1950s and which from its beginnings was closely connected with world-historical events. The end of World War II marked the rise of the United States to a world-hegemonic position, the decline of the old European powers, and the accompanying process of decolonization. Dozens of new states attained national independence and were officially credited with political sovereignty. America stepped in to fill the vacuum resulting from decolonization, taking upon its shoulders the gigantic task of policing the world, and keeping it safe for trade and democracy, in an attempt to construct a new version of the nineteenth century Pax Britannica. The results of the Pax Americana were the policy of containment of communism and the emergence of a system of world organization in which the two superpowers competed for the allegiance of the Third World states, converting them into the "marketplace in which Cold War political struggles were expressed" (Vidich, 1975).

From the outset, the social sciences became intimately connected with U.S. foreign policy. Areas of study which divided up the world were established, funds became available and special committees were formed.
which converted some of the social sciences into policy sciences. If the "white man's burden" of the British Empire gave birth to British anthropology, the tasks of the young imperial republic produced much of the "diplomatic literature" known as sociology of modernization and development.

It would be a serious mistake to stop at this level of analysis. The literature of modernization has undoubtedly played a rationalizing function in supplying "the emperor's clothes, which have served to hide his naked imperialism" (Frank, 1972: 397). However, the sociology of modernization is something more than that. It marks in many respects the coming of age of American sociology, ending its parochial interests in exclusively domestic issues. American social science, including anthropology and political science, had now discovered the global social problem created by the radical transformations taking place in the four corners of the world.

American sociologists, however, did not possess adequate logical and conceptual tools to build a general theory which would make sense of ongoing historical processes and, therefore, found it convenient to reconnect with classical European sociology. The sociologist Talcott Parsons was the key agent in the process of borrowing and reinterpreting classical perspectives for the newly conceptualized tasks.

PARSONS' INTERPRETATION:
BIRTH OF THE PARADIGM

It is my thesis that the structural-functionalist, developmental-evolutionist, ahistorical, and ethnocentric model of modernization that has dominated the sociological literature emerged from the fusion of two elements of Parsons' theory, namely: (a) the "pattern variables" as the theoretical basis for the conception of the process of modernization as the passage from tradition to modernity, and (b) the model of the industrial society as the theoretical basis for the assumed teleological and determinist character of this transition.

THE PATTERN VARIABLES:

Parsons' (1967) pattern variables can be regarded as the most systematic elaboration of the series of dichotomous pairs of concepts developed by classical European sociologists. The "pattern variables" were originally "derived by an analytical breakdown of Tönnies' 'Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft' pair into what seemed to be more element-
have in common regardless of whether the means of production are controlled privately or publicly. Aron wanted to undermine the dogmatic Marxist notion of a unilinear course of societal evolution determined by changes in the economic base.

The reception of this idea in America gave origin to what Goldthorpe calls “evolutionary liberalism.” W.W. Rostow’s five stages of economic growth is only the most vulgar version. But even the most systematic elaborations of the “Convergence Theory,” as developed by Kerr and Parsons, while rejecting unilinear evolutionism, nonetheless predicts a uniform industrial society based on some type of “logic of industrialism” or of systemic structural necessity. Although they emphasize that no society has arrived there yet, there can be little doubt that their image of the future for these societies matches the “ideal type” of the “managed,” “modern,” “pluralist,” and “affluent” capitalist society of the West.

Kerr’s model is more explicitly deterministic than Parsons’ in emphasizing a logic of industrialism which operates with increasing rigor with more economic and technological advances. There may be many roads to industrialization “since industrialization came into a most varied world; a world with many cultures, many stages of development from the primitiveness of quasi-animal life to high levels of civilization” (Kerr et al., 1964: 223). But the “road ahead” leaves open very limited responses. Industrial society will have to be “pluralistic,” “organizational,” and “liberal.” Paradoxically enough, “industrial man” who in this liberal society will enjoy the greatest possible degree of individual freedom, “outside his working life,” cannot but “choose” the “road ahead,” namely, “pluralistic industrialism” (Kerr et al., 1964: 221-239).

After having pronounced him dead, Parsons (1968: 3-5) resurrected Spencer in the 1960s when he entertained his ambitious project of developing a “protonaturalist” theory of evolution which would show the fundamental continuity between general organic evolution and sociocultural evolution. Out of a seminar at Harvard with Bellah and Eisenstadt emerged the new evolutionary trend (American Sociological Review, 1964).

In Parsons’ theory, “adaptation” through “differentiation” is the key phenomenon guiding evolution, while the “evolutionary universals” are the stage-marks which serve to arrange hierarchically the societies studied. By choosing as the four evolutionary universals of modernity a bureaucratic administration, a complex money and market system, a universalistic legal system, and a democratic polity, Parsons (1964b) is able to construct the whole evolutionary movement as culminating in American society which then becomes the “leader of the modern system.”

Parsons is not merely content, however, with reconstructing empirical trends of social development, he is also in search of the “directional” logic of the movement which would enable him to gain a grasp on the future. With this special insight into the hidden plans of history, he is in a position to judge which developments are normal and which societies have to change in the prescribed direction in order to adapt successfully and remain in the evolutionary struggle. Since the Soviet Union does not fit his model of industrial society, Parsons (1964b: 354-356) says that eventually it must change in the direction of the prescribed model.

The ironic paradox of Parsons’ (1967) determinism is that in accordance with the inner systemic hierarchy of his structural-functionalism, he sees the original development of modern industrial Western society in almost cultural-deterministic terms as the progressive institutionalization of Christian values in all subsystems and spheres of life. However, once the modern industrial system is established, it is the organizational complexity of the adaptive subsystem, i.e., the economy, which demands the institutionalization of the values which made the organization possible in the first place. In “Some Principal Characteristics of Industrial Societies,” Parsons (1960) argues that a modern industrial economy needs “compatible” cultural and institutional subsystems and that, therefore, he expects the non-Western societies, as they become fully industrialized, to become more like the Western societies in these subsystems. Parsons acknowledges the persistance of “particularism” in Japan despite its successful industrialization, but he states: “I would expect this situation to be seriously unstable and to show a marked tendency to change in the expected direction with further industrial development (1960: 160).

The fusion of the tradition-modernity dichotomy with the logic of development underlying the theory of industrial society provided a systematic theory which could serve as a paradigm for the study of modernization and, at the same time, offer a powerful vision of the future.

Like the Christian missionaries who had previously followed the steps of colonial administrators and capitalist adventurers to bring the “good news” to all the people on earth, now the social scientists followed the path of American economic and military “aid” in order to present to the less-developed people the image of their future, without realizing that with their theories of modernization they, as self-fulfilling prophets, were carrying the forces of the processes analyzed by their theories. These theories envisioned an almost inevitable movement of industrialization, to be followed by democratization—or vice versa—spreading all over the world.

As modern advisors to new princes, Western social scientists visited almost every nation in order to analyze, prescribe, control, or correct the
smooth transition into the promised future. It was implied that through a series of almost automatic stages of economic growth all societies, irrespective of their contrasting histories, traditions, and institutions, would join what I. R. Sinai (1972: 70) has called “the jet flight of history as it moves toward the homogeneous global society of modernization.”

THREE MODELS OF THE PARADIGM

I have chosen to examine the works of Shils, Eisenstadt, and Bellah because they are well-known sociologists, are leading representatives of political, social, and cultural modernization, respectively, and they represent, in a certain sense, three different theoretical and historical moments in the lifework of Parsons. In addition, all of them have incorporated major Weberian themes into their works and hence are also of relevance for the study of the process by which American sociology has reinterpreted Weber on this issue (Roth, 1971).

E.A. SHILS

One of the merits of Shils’ work is that it simplifies in a few terms the complex analytical scheme of Parsons’ functionalist theory of society. At the methodological level, Shils, like Parsons, thinks that the goal of sociology as a science is to develop a general theory of society. Like Parsons, Shils is also expressly concerned with dissociating his own approach from the German “historicist” tradition with its emphasis on the particular and the accidental. In his essay, “On the Comparative Study of the New States,” Shils explicitly states his methodological credo.

The orderly understanding of the new states requires that they be seen “sub specie aeternitatis,” or at least within the categories of known human experience. To escape from “ad hoc” explanations, in which the causes of explanation are historically accidental, we must promulgate categories that are equally applicable to all states and societies, to all territories and epochs—variations must be subsumable within these categories. To attain this end, all societies must be included within our scrutiny. This is why we speak of our mode of analysis as comparative. . . . The comparative study of new states . . . is part of the systematic analysis of human society in which all societies are seen as members of a single species [Geertz, 1963b: 13-17].

Clearly one should not expect too much historical interpretative analysis in Shils’ work. The particular is never a phenomenon in its own right, but only an instance of the species. Even Shils’ main interest in the new states resides in the fact that they are a “perfect laboratory” to study what Shils considers to be the central problem of sociology, namely, the Hobbesian problem: how is social order possible? “By permitting the contemplation of a society in ‘statu nascendi’ the study of the new states offers opportunities similar to those which Thomas Hobbes’ fiction of the state of nature offered for the purposes of political-philosophical analysis” (Geertz, 1963: 24).

At the substantive level, Shils’ macrosociology, which he defines as the “functionalist study of the society as a ‘whole’ with its functionally interrelated parts,” revolves around two pairs of concepts: center-periphery and tradition-modernity.

Center-Periphery

After searching for the generic bases of social order and social control, Shils (1957), like Parsons, comes to the conclusion that “consensus” is the crucial element in the integration of society and that without consensus societies would be in the state of war. By definition, then, the precondition for the existence of a society is the existence of a core of values, which Shils calls the “center” or the “central zone.” Every society, also by definition, has a center and a periphery, an elite and a mass, rulers and ruled. All these concepts come to be interchangeable in Shils’ work. He calls it the center because it is “the ultimate” and “the irreducible.” The central zone partakes of the nature of the sacred and, in this sense, every society has an “official” religion, which becomes elevated to the rank of universal principle (Shils, 1957: 3 and Passim).

This center of society is composed of two elements, the intellectuals and the powers (Shils, 1972). The intellectuals, as agents of the cultural center and guardians of the values and beliefs, see themselves as the agents of the transcendent cosmic order. The powers, as the agents of the central social system and of the polity, try to maintain earthly order in conformity with the transcendent cosmic order. In the last instance, legitimation always comes from the cosmic center, wherefrom “charisma” emanates, legitimating the different sectors of the ruling class.

Shils (1957: 12) argues that “even in a situation of great heterogeneity and much mutual antipathy, the different sectors of the elite tend to experience the ‘transforming’ transcendental overtones which are generated by incumbancy in authoritative roles or by proximity to fundamentally important things.” The elites, by being closer to the sacred values for which man has a universal need, gain charismatic legitimacy and recognition from the masses who are further away in the periphery. For
Shils, charisma is simply given in the nature of power. Massive and continuous power creates the “awe-inspiring charisma” and arouses the sense of “tremendum mysteriosum.” “Great power announces itself by its power over order; it discovers order, creates order, maintains it or destroys it” (Shils, 1957: 264 and Passim).

With this fusion of Weber’s concept of charisma and Durkheim’s notion of the sacred, which one finds also in Parsons, there is a radical shift in the emphasis and meaning of Weber’s concept of charisma: charisma becomes synonymous with domination per se and the key phenomenon in the maintenance of social order. With this shift in emphasis Shils makes an ideological attempt at the sacralization of the institutional order and at the charismatization of the center. In this way, he preempts and neutralizes the possibility of charismatic challenges from the periphery, which form such a central role in Weber’s explanation of social change. Shil’s sociology is a priestly ideology which is a curious fusion of managerial ideology and a sacralmagical conception of society typical of Oriental religions.

The elaboration of the above concepts brings Shils to the first step of functional analysis which consists in developing theoretically the universal functional requisites of every society. Every society has a center and a periphery; this fact never changes. What may change is the relationship between the two elements. It is in relation to this change that Shils develops his second pair of concepts.

Tradition-Modernity

It is the different locus of charisma that distinguishes traditional from modern societies. While in traditional societies concentrated charisma inheres in the center, in modern societies diffused charisma is dispersed more widely to all the areas of the periphery, so that every individual comes to possess some of it. Shils’ thesis of the sacralization of the periphery is meant as a counterpart to the theory of secularization, and his theory of the charismatization of the masses is meant as a counterpart to Weber’s thesis of the routinization of charisma and the related processes of rationalization and disenchantment.

The process of democratization consists in the incorporation of the masses, which before lived “outside” society, into the center. The right to vote is a manifestation of the participation in the sacred center. The process is meant as emanating from the center to the periphery or as a gracious gift of charisma from the elites to the masses. The process has closed the gap that existed between the elites and the masses, so that modern mass society is the most consensual of all societies and, therefore, the best integrated because there is common core of values between elites and masses (Shils, 1957: 97-98). In Shils’ theory there are no “differential” types of social action, of social relations, or of societies. The secular, for instance, is understood as an attenuated form of the sacred, and the rational as an attenuated form of the charismatic (Shils, 1957: xxxiii, 134, 407). Comparison in Shils is only a comparison of degree and quantity and never a comparison of kind or quality. Even the comparison of tradition and modernity is not a differential one. Like Parsons’ pattern variables, it only indicates the two extreme poles of a logical scale of gradation.

Unlike Parsons, however, Shils explicitly wants to free his “comparative method” from its adventitious association with the theory of social evolution (Geertz, 1963b: 19). His surface sociology of the specious present is, by definition, nonprocessual and is forced to conceive social change in static terms. Shils’ approach offers a typical example of the “ideal typical index approach,” which consists in the comparative statics of polar ideal types. This method is not comparative, but only “classificatory.” It uses one or several abstract types to characterize tradition or modernity and then mistakes this labeling for concrete historical analysis. Furthermore, underlying the logical scale of gradation, there remains the latent assumption that history is a process of logical development from tradition to modernity and that this process is governed by progress; the one end of the scale receives all negative connotations while the other end receives all the positive ones.

Three characteristics of Shils’ study of the new states follow from his methodological position, from his definition of society, and from his missionary zeal about modernity.

(1) Shils repeatedly states that he is not interested in the particular differences among the new states but only in what they have in common. According to Shils, the new states have three things in common: (a) all of the new states have recently obtained independence from colonial rule. However, one cannot find in Shils any different precolonial societies. When Shils mentions colonialism it is only to emphasize the positive influence of Western ideas and institutions on the process of decolonization, on nationalism, and on the administrative structures of the new states.

(b) “Their [the new states’] social structure, economy, and culture are, on the whole, highly traditional” (Shils, 1957: 486). But Shils does not state clearly what he means by “traditional.” He says that “Max Weber was of little help in trying to analyze what tradition and the traditional meant.” Shils (1957: xxiv, 486) finds that “the most significant fact is that their [the new states’] central political traditions do not include those
of democratic, representative, constitutional government.” In positive terms, Shils focuses his attention on the existence of what he calls “primordial” rather than “civil” loyalties. Primordial serves as the all-inclusive term for loyalty to kinship, tribe, caste, feudal lord, religious group, and class. Why, for instance, “civil” loyalty to the nation-state should be placed at a higher level than “primordial” loyalty to a multinational religious group is not clear in Shils.

(c) Significant sections of the elites of the new states aspire to modernity. Shils dedicates many of his essays to the study of these modernizing elites or “modern intellectuals.” But we are not really told which type of elites they are and what interests they have. His (1972: 389) definition of the modern intellectual in the new states indicates the abstract level of generality of his analysis: “all persons with advanced modern education and the intellectual concerns and skills ordinarily associated with it.” Shils argues that despite its painfulness, these intellectuals will have to adopt the culture of their former colonizers if they want to modernize their societies. The implication is that there is no alternative but Westernization since, “if he denies that culture, he negates himself and negates his own aspiration to transform his society into a modern society” (1972: 368).

(2) The second characteristic of Shils’ studies of the new states derives from his functionalist theory of society. The main emphasis is on the center, the powers, and the intellectuals. The periphery, that is, the real society, is neglected. Apparently it is from the center that modern society will emanate once a modern, stable, and efficient center has been created. That the perspective of his sociology coincides with the interest of the rulers is candidly acknowledged by Shils when he states that “although the integration of society has been neglected in the social sciences, it has not been neglected by the rulers... who have always had a practical interest in the integration of their societies” (1957: 89).

(3) The third characteristic of Shils’ studies derives from his missionary zeal about modernity. In many respects Shils’ writings read like a collection of advice to new princes or like an inventory of Western institutions and structures which is presented to the modernizing elites as an agenda for modernization (see esp. Shils, 1972). Phenomena such as parliamentary institutions, critical public opinion, free press, modern universities, research institutions, and so on have a top priority on his agenda, while Shils (1972: 444) argues that “the few of the deficiencies which stand in the way of stable modern politics, like poverty of natural resources, insufficient capital to develop what resources they possess, insufficient organizational skill and discipline, etc... none of these obstacles is insuperable.” What is mostly needed, according to Shils (1972: 445-446) is “a redefinition of the image of the self... [which] must first be firmly developed in the minority on whose initiative and persistent action national development depends in the first instance.”

Thus, Shils envisions the future society as the result of the managerial and manipulating virtues of the modernizing elites. This technomanagerial conception of social change is common to much of the literature on modernization. Since such analysts assume that they have a ready-made model of future society in the example of contemporary Western societies, they can conceive of modernization as the “construction” of a model (Shils, 1970: 292). The problem in Shils’ work is that the intellectuals are to be the carriers of both the process of modernization of the socioeconomic structures and the process of democratization. They are to be both manipulators and guardians at the same time. His conception of the modernizing elite is the mirror image of the Leninist-Trotskyst myth of the vanguard party.

Shils seems to be uneasily aware of the dilemmas implicit in his position. On the one hand, he seems to be fascinated by the fact that for the first time in history intellectuals have the power and the possibility of constructing the “good society.” On the other hand, Shils fears that such a concentration of power in the hands of the “philosopher kings” can bring forth a totalitarian system. The other great temptation the intellectuals have to avoid is “political demagogy” or “rhetorical charisma.” For Shils social change should be orderly, devoid of charismatic breakthroughs, and managerially aseptic. It requires only the “passive” participation of the masses. Shils (1972: 445 and Passim) makes clear that he does not think very highly of what is now called “mobilization of the masses” which he equates with old notions of “rabble-rousing.”

Thus, to the question who will guard the guardians? Shils answers: they themselves, by exercising self-restraint and the matter-of-factness which is characteristic of this modern intellectual stratum. The carriers of this modern ethos includes “medical doctors, engineers and technologists, university teachers and research workers, higher civil servants and some secondary school teachers and administrators.” It is out of this coalition of old “literati” and modern “experts” that Shils expects the process of modernization to take place.

Should the intellectuals in some of the new states be tempted to follow “traditionalistic” or “totalitarian communist” detours, there exists finally the world-community of free intellectuals to remind them of the criteria which are to guide the societal transformation. Ultimately for
Shils the guardians of the process of modernization are the intellectuals of the modern Western societies, what he calls “the intellectual metropolis.” “The rest of the intellectual world lives in their reflected light, drawing what inspiration and self-esteem they can from their efforts to conform with the model and to come thereby closer to the center” (1972: 361). Similar to the way in which Shils analyzes the process of modernization in Western societies as the process of diffusion of charisma from the center into the periphery, he conceives of the process of modernization in the new states as the diffusion of Western charisma and values from the metropolis into the “provinces.” For Shils, the process of modernization is basically the process of cultural and political Westernization.

S.N. EISENSTADT

While Shils’ work is akin to the functionalism of the earlier Parsons, Eisenstadt’s fusion of structural-functionalism, systems analysis, and evolutionism is closely related to the work of the later Parsons.

Eisenstadt’s work Modernization: Protest and Change exemplifies the characteristics, ambivalence, and shortcomings of the general theory of modernization. One must grant to Eisenstadt that he is one of the most historically minded of all the sociologists of modernization. Due to his Weberian interest in the comparative study of political empires and of traditional societies, Eisenstadt is aware that what passes for traditional society includes a large variety of different social, political, and economic systems, and that this variety must inevitably have some type of differential influence on the process of modernization.

In contrast to Shils, he focuses on the impact of colonialism and is aware of the resistance of power elites, of the conflicting interests represented by different groups, and of the uneven nature of institutional change.

From Gerschenkron he adopts the idea of “substitute” prerequisites for economic development as well as the notion that the time in which the “take-off” occurs may be of crucial importance, especially when considered together with the different starting points of the different societies (Eisenstadt, 1973: 31ff.; Gerschenkron, 1962, 1968: 6 and Passim).

He also criticizes the naive view of many “communication” and “index” theorists who assume a necessary and systematic interrelatedness among the indices of social mobilization and specific forms of structural differentiation on the one hand and the capacity to absorb continuous growth on the other. These theorists assumed that one could start with any index of mobilization, such as urbanization, mass communication, mass education, and the like, and eventually end up with an index of modernization (Lerner, 1964). Eisenstadt’s awareness of the institutional framework of social reality frees him from this assumption. He also admits of structural diversity and different temporal sequences of modernization in the major institutional spheres.

Yet, despite all this awareness, his structural-functionalist, systemic, and evolutionary premises force him against the evidence he himself amasses to define the process of modernization as one of systemic interrelatedness, internal differentiation, and developmental inevitability. Two components form the “common core” of his concept of modernization: (a) “the socio-demographic aspect” which is conceptualized as “social mobilization” and (b) “the structural aspect” which is conceptualized as “social differentiation.”

These two abstract institutional features, which have come to replace the more concrete historical analysis of bourgeois civil society, of the capitalist order or of bureaucracy, serve as indices of modernization. Modernization is seen as a natural process of systemic transformation through internal differentiation that creates after the “take-off” an institutional structure capable of adapting to sustained growth in such a way that the process then becomes “self-propelling.”

When faced with the rich historical evidence of failures which seem to contradict his theory, Eisenstadt uses a rich variety of concepts, many of them ingeniously developed by him, in order to explain the failures. Concepts like “transition,” “eruptions,” “breakdowns,” “split-up modernization,” and so on serve as ad hoc historical explanations, well backed by empirical evidence, which illustrate the failures of the societies in question to follow the prescribed model.

What we find here is a clear example of the classical Aristotelian separation between the study of “natural” change and the study of “historical” or “accidental” change (Teggart, 1977). On the first level of analysis, we find a theory of modernization which has all the characteristics of the theory of natural growth, except that in the Western case, the process was initiated by causes endogenous to the system and in the non-Western case, “the second phase of modernization,” it was initiated by causes exogenous to the system. Once initiated, however, the process in both cases has the characteristics of being “natural,” “directional,” “immanent,” “continuous,” “necessary,” “proceeding from uniform causes,” and “teleological.”

On the second level of analysis, we find a rich variety of concepts which warn us that something interfered with the natural order of change.

The notion of “transitional” societies, developed to solve the problem created by the countries of Latin America, indicates that transitional
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societies are “in the process of becoming,” that they are in the dynamic transitional stage in that they have already abandoned the “state of equilibrium” of traditional societies but have not yet achieved the “state of equilibrium” of modern industrial societies. It is assumed that the tendencies and capacities inherent in these societies push them in the direction of modernity (Eisenstadt, 1973: 17).

The concept of “split-up modernization” was developed in order to explain the extraordinarily abnormal character of the second phase of modernization. While the Western phase followed the prescribed rules of systemic interrelatedness, the process of development took its normal course in being smooth, slow, gradual, and continuous, but in the second phase of modernization the “revolution of demands” created by overdeveloped indices of social mobilization has outstripped the structural differentiation, causing an incapacity in the system to absorb changes. As a result, “split-up modernization” is characterized by “eruptions” and by “breakdowns” (Eisenstadt, 1966: Chs. 4, 5).

Eisenstadt sees “eruptions” as symptoms of unsuccessful adaptation, as external manifestations indicating that the normal smooth road toward modernity is being blocked. “Breakdowns” in the political sphere occur when a marked discrepancy develops between the demands of different groups and the responses and ability of the central rulers to deal with these demands. “Breakdowns” indicate that something basic has gone wrong. Fascism, for instance, is presented as an example of such a breakdown of modernization at advanced levels of development. It indicates that the development has taken a “pathological” course rather than a complete reversion to a traditional type of society.\(^9\) By bringing in these ingenious auxiliary theories, the paradigm escapes falsifiability.

In Eisenstadt’s work, the theory of development and the many valuable historical analyses that accompany it stand juxtaposed and devoid of integration. What rescues his work is the fact that his breadth of historical knowledge overwhelms his own theory of development.

Eisenstadt’s *Tradition, Change and Modernity* (1973) marks a radical shift from his earlier writings on modernization—there is the abandonment of Parsonsian evolutionism and a shift from a closed to an open systemic approach. The book itself is an uneven collection of earlier essays, which fit into the “framework” analyzed so far, and of recent essays, which criticize the older paradigm and look for new alternatives. Some of these essays could serve as instances of what I will later analyze as the civilizational approach. Of greater significance for my analysis however, are the other essays in which Eisenstadt attempts to develop a new general theory of tradition and of modernity.\(^10\)

Jose Casanova

There is also a change from his earlier institutional-structural focus into a cultural-functionalist one which seems to have been influenced by Shils. For the most part these essays tend to be more general, formal, and ahistorical than his earlier writings. The essay, “The Major Premises of European Modernity,” exemplifies Eisenstadt’s new trend toward cultural functionalism.

Talking about the attempts which led to the development of European modernity, Eisenstadt (1973: 233) states that:

These attempts focused on the establishment of a social and cultural order characterized by a high degree of congruence between the cultural and the political identities of the territorial population; a high level of symbolic and effective commitments of the social sphere to the center and a close relation between these centers and the more primordial dimensions of human existence; and a marked emphasis on common politically defined collective goals for all members of the national or class community.

In this obscure language, Eisenstadt seems to be restating three themes which we have previously analyzed in Shils. First, the process of modernization is seen as a conscious, rationally planned process of social transformation on the part of some elite to “integrate” the population of a given territory into a “legitimate” system of domination; second, the fusion of the “intellectuals” and the “powers” has led to the institutionalization of “charisma” in the center and to the diffusion of this charisma throughout society; and third, these processes have led to the formation of the mass-consensual society where the conflict between classes and the conflict between class and nation have disappeared.

From Eisenstadt’s analysis it is clear that he is confusing the premises upon which European modernity was built with the premises upon which many social scientists have built their conception of modernity.

The model of social and cultural order that developed here assumed that modern societies and polities should be characterized, first, by the institutionalization, both in symbolic and organizational terms, of the quest for some charismatic ordering of social and cultural experience and for some participation in such orders; second, by the crystallization of common societal and cultural collective identity based on common attributes or on participation in common symbolic events; third, by the crystallization and articulation of collective goals; fourth, by the regulation of intrasocietal and intergroup relations; and fifth, by the regulation of internal and external—or power—relations tending to converge around the political centers (1973: 233).
Looking at these characteristics, one cannot find anything that would be specific to modern societies and politics. Rather, they seem to be the characteristics which are often attributed to "traditional" or to "primitive" societies or the characteristics which "functionalists" think every society should have in order to "function."

If one believes, as Eisenstadt seems to do, that modern societies had successfully institutionalized these premises of European modernity, then how does one explain the protest movements and the "eruptions" of the 1960s? It is this problem that forms the real thrust behind Eisenstadt's essay. His theory of modernization had assumed that such "eruptions" were chronic diseases of the second phase of modernization; advanced modern societies, however, were supposed to be immune to such "eruptions." Furthermore, these "eruptions" in modern societies could not be explained as external manifestations of the fact that the normal smooth road toward modernity was being blocked, since modern societies were precisely characterized by the continuous broadening of the scope of participation of all the members of society in the symbolic centers. A different explanation, therefore, was needed.

Eisenstadt's complex line of argument can be reduced to the following: initially, "the specifically charismatic dimension of European modernity" was based on the assumption of the blending of Zweckrationalität and Wertrationalität (1973: 232). This blending of the two rationalities seemed to assure that the process of rationalization would take place "not only in the field of industry and economic expansion but also in the social and cultural spheres" (1973). The merging of the two types of rationality in science epitomized this process since science is one of the central spheres of cultural and social creativity. Science was also crucial because of its expansion and "application" to industrial production and political administration. According to Eisenstadt (1973: 238), "these processes also gave rise to a growing importance of specialized knowledge and information in the process of political and economic decision making, and to the increase of the possibility of rational, efficient consideration of different goals and alternatives in decision making. Thus they seemed to assure the expansion of 'Wertrationalität' and its connection with the expansion of meaningful participation in the society for continuously growing parts of the population."

How is one to explain the attack against the very temples of modern charisma, i.e., the government, the corporations, and especially the universities? Unlike the older European protest movements, the new protests in "postindustrial society" are not focused around demands for broadening the scope of participation and the channels of access to the centers. Rather, the recent protest is manifested in a "growing apathy toward the very central values, symbols and centers— not because of the lack of possibility of access to them but because of, in a sense, "overaccess" to them. Thus the demystification of the world may become manifest in the possibility that the attainment of participation in many centers may indeed be meaningless, as we have observed: the centers may lose their mystery, the King may be naked" (1973: 251).

To stop the analysis at this point would imply the acceptance of the disenchantment of the modern world. Eisenstadt cannot do this, first, because he seems to believe that these centers possessed real charisma prior to the recent demystification in the 1960s, and second, because he seems to believe that "the quest for participation in the charismatic dimension of human and social existence" leads to the continuous search for new alternative centers, independent of the established social and political centers. This trend, apparently, could lead to a transvaluation of values by turning the classification of center and periphery upside down.

Eisenstadt's explanation for the recent disenchantment is that a dissociation has occurred between the two types of rationality upon which the charismatic vision of modernity was built, because the necessary balance between the two has broken in favor of Zweckrationalität. "This growth in the power of experts—especially in the conjunction with executives—in fact denotes a very important shift in the relations between specialized knowledge and the more general rational parameters of modern culture" (1973: 239). In order to fully understand Eisenstadt's argument it is necessary to go back to Shils' concepts since they seem to constitute the hidden background to Eisenstadt's analysis. According to Shils, the "charismatic center" of modern society is constituted by the coalition of the "intellectuals" and the "powers." Moreover, modern intellectuals include the old literati and the new experts. It is the checks and balances between these three groups which seems to offer the best guarantee for an orderly modernization. Thus, Eisenstadt's stand vis-à-vis the technocrats seems to be that their attempts at monopolization of power has destroyed the careful balance, creating a crisis of legitimation.

The real sociohistorical issues touched upon by Eisenstadt's analysis, i.e., the rise of the technocrats, science and technology as ideology, the oligarchization of knowledge in economy and politics, and the crisis of legitimation, are crucial for a sociological analysis of modern society. But to treat these issues in such a mystifying manner only helps to hide them in an ideological cloud. 11

R.N. BELLAH

In *The Structure of Social Action*, Parsons interpreted Durkheim’s and Weber’s works as “converging” in the direction of Parsons’ own theory. Since then Parsons has felt obliged to “revisit” Durkheim and Weber whenever he was going to change the course of his own theory. He reinterpreted them in support of structural-functionalism and system’s theory and, more recently, in support of his own evolutionism.¹² The curious thing is that despite the fact that Durkheim was more of a “proto-evolutionist”¹³ and that Parsons’ own perspectives on the structural differentiation of social systems are much more congruent with Durkheim than with Weber, nonetheless it is Weber whom Parsons insists on forcing into support of his evolutionary theory (Pope et al., 1975).

One of the reasons for this may be the needed division of labor between the theorist of evolution and the historian (see Luhman, 1976). The sociologist needs the historian to furnish him with the genetic explanations which the theory of evolution is unable to provide. Parsons, then, takes from Durkheim the theory of evolution while he uses Weber when he needs to explain genetically the crucial “breakthroughs.”

Another equally powerful reason may be the fascination which Weber’s work still retains for Parsons because he needs Weber’s Protestant ethic thesis in order to confirm his theory of evolution in which all the categories are carefully constructed so that they can point to America as the hidden telos of the evolutionary process. The elected Puritans are the universal class, the anticipators of the universal modern man of the future, the “universal other.”¹⁴ It is this interest in the Protestant ethic and in Weber’s sociology of religion that connects Parsons with Bellah’s work.

With the upsurge of the great interest in modernization beyond Europe, the interest in and the controversy over Weber’s thesis was again revived. The proving ground for Weber’s thesis would no longer be the economic and religious history of sixteenth—seventeenth century Europe, but the modernizing countries of the twentieth century. In a sense Weber’s own counterfactual method was discovered again. Many students of modernization sought in the existence or nonexistence of some equivalent of the Protestant ethic the key to the understanding of successful or unsuccessful modernization (Eisenstadt, 1968).

Of the many misuses and misinterpretations to which Weber’s thesis was put, two are outstanding (Bellah, 1970). The first one, the “entrepreneurship thesis,” sees the Protestant ethic as an ideological orientation tending to lead those who hold it into an entrepreneurial role, which then contributes to economic growth. This led to the search for equivalent religious movements which may have been associated with successful economic activity. Most of the authors, however, overlooked Weber’s distinction between “merchant” and “modern rational” capitalism or between the specifically precapitalist small trader mentality and the innerworldly asceticism of the “Puritans.” In this view Weber’s thesis is separated from its historical and large-societal institutional context and is cloaked in primarily motivational terms. This approach also falls into what Parsons (1960: 128) has called “the fallacy of common sense presumption that the conditions under which an important social phenomenon has for the first time developed are the same as those which will be most favorable to its repetition in later time.” This fallacy, however, was understandably attractive for those who held the American ideology of free-trade and development through private initiative. This ideology was so powerful in the United States that some economists were advocating a government-planned institutionalization of a free-market economy. Even such a careful scholar as C. Geertz, in his analysis of the relations between religions, economies, and societies, falls victim to this fallacy when he thinks that he has found in the “santiri” Muslim pretty traders of Java, the functional equivalent of Weber’s Puritans. Considering, however, the wider Indonesian context, Geertz himself is uneasily forced to admit that there is “an air of quaint irrelevancy about Modjokuto’s ‘shopkeeper revolution.’”¹⁵

Another even more distorting interpretation of Weber is the so-called “psychological thesis,” which holds that it is the existence of the “achievement motivation” which produces economic development (McClelland, 1961). Here economic development is totally detached from historical, institutional, or social structural contexts and is converted into a psychological problem. By linking social achievement to individual motivation, this psychological theory of development was also very attractive to American “possessive individualism.”

Probably, the most sophisticated interpretation of Weber’s thesis is the one presented by Bellah (1957) in his work *Tokugawa Religion*. The point of departure in this case is the assumption that if Weber’s thesis was correct, given the successful industrialization of Japan, one would have to find in Japanese religion some “functional analogue” to the Protestant ethic which would explain the rapid development under the Meiji Restoration. As a student of Parsons, however, Bellah follows an “institutional approach,” being aware that the institutional framework for follow-up industrialization may be different from the one which was required for the original industrialization of Europe.¹⁶ The first conclusion of Bellah’s (1957: 192-193) study was that:
individuation and its typically Western institutionalization in political democracy, private property, free market system, religious denominationalism, and other institutional spheres, would force them to revise their evolutionary faith in the developmental inevitability and teleological character of the process of modernization. Only such a faith could allow Bellah (1968: Passim; 1965) to talk of Japan’s “unsuccessful modernization” or to label the Soviet case a “pathology of modernization.”

**DISINTEGRATION OF THE PARADIGM**

If one sees the sociology of modernization as an integral part of the general attempt by the West to impose a universal, global world culture upon all nations, then it is not surprising that the disintegration of the paradigm and its major critiques coincided with the thawing of the Cold War and with the acknowledgment by the United States that it had failed to create the attempted world order.

It also coincided with the emergence of a new “definition of the situation” from a Third World perspective that attempted to liberate itself from the definitions imposed by the Great Powers. Other factors also worked in the direction of discrediting the paradigm: the imperialist intervention in Vietnam, the revelation of connections between American secret operations and the scientific projects of some students of modernization, internal “eruptions” in “modern” societies like the student revolts and other protest movements. All these put into question the idealized conception of modernity.

Equally important was probably the sheer evidence that the envisioned prophecies were not fulfilled. The “modernizers” however, may have found enough ad hoc explanations for the failure of their predictions if the paradigm itself had not been challenged by competing paradigms coming also from the social sciences. Eisenstadt himself, in his essay “Disintegration of the Paradigm” provides a good summary of all the criticisms. It is R. Bendix however, who in his essay “Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered,” offers the most systematic critique of the dominant theories of modernization. His critique can be summarized in seven points:

1. oversimplified and ideological view of traditional societies, of modern societies, and of the transition of the one to the other;
2. undue generalizations of the European experience and candid use of the Western modernization as a model of global applicability;
3. tendency to treat societies as natural systems composed of interrelated variables;
CONFLICT AND CONTROL

(4) no clear differentiation between ideal-typical constructs of development and actual sequence of historical change;
(5) application of evolutionary theory to very short time periods;
(6) managerial interpretation of social change;
(7) the “fallacy of prerequisites” which consists in taking all the basic traits of modernity to be preconditions of modernity.

A powerful critique of this paradigm, has been presented by Bendix, who has, in addition, undertaken to present an alternative approach to the study of modernization.

THREE ALTERNATIVE PARADIGMS

(1) Bendix’s Historical-Empiricist Approach:
The Acceptance of Histories

In the essay mentioned, Bendix also presents a scheme of an alternative paradigm which is more systematically elaborated in National Building and Citizenship. He (1969: viii-ix and Passim) ties his approach to the works of Tocqueville and Weber, two authors who, according to Bendix, rejected the evolutionary theory of the nineteenth century and were concerned with the question: “whence have we come and whither are we going?” It is this rejection of evolutionism which connects Bendix’s position with Teggart’s school of historical positivism represented by R. Nisbet and K.E. Bock. The motto of this approach is “the acceptance of histories.”

In his study of modernization Bendix emphasizes the importance of government intervention and of external influences in contrast to the structural-functionalist emphasis on systemic interrelatedness and on the notion of internal change.

Bendix sees the process of modernization as a one-time historical process which was started by the Industrial Revolution in England and the political revolution in France, creating a “gap” between these pioneering societies and the other “backward” societies. This degree of backwardness of the follower societies in relation to the economic and political successes of the advanced countries became a “challenge of modernization” for the world. In their endeavor to bridge the “gap” as rapidly as possible, the leading strata of the follower societies have looked for “substitutes” which could compensate for their disadvantage. Adoption and borrowing and heavy investment in science and technology can be seen as substitutes. By far the most important substitute, however, has been the importance which government intervention has come to play in order to coordinate the “catching up.” Bendix (1967: 324 and Passim) also emphasizes that the division of the world into advanced and follower societies, together with the relative ease of communication, puts a premium on education as a means to modernization because it is more readily available than the capital required for modern technology.

Although Bendix’s approach is comparative, historical, and differential, his study of the process of modernization remains “historical” in the classical Western sense of “storytelling.” Bendix’s justified criticism of structural-functionalism and systems analysis has led him to a total denial of the systemic approach to society. As Eisenstadt (1973: 10) points out, the process of modernization for Bendix “does not have any definite universal, systemic or structural characteristics.” This is reflected in a formal and contentless definition of the process of modernization: “it refers to a type of social change since the 18th century, which consists in the economic or political advance of some pioneering society and subsequent changes in following societies” (Bendix, 1967: 331).

Bendix’s misgivings about theories of development and his refusal to search for the universal components of the process of modernization are understandable if one considers the excesses of most theories of modernization. But this cannot be a justification for falling back into simple storytelling. Bendix himself uses the comparative method of ideal-typical structures which was pioneered by Weber. But there is a sense in which his comparative analysis of structural types and his historical analysis of the process of modernization remain juxtaposed in such a way that the separation of history and sociology repeats at another level the Aristotelian separation between the study of the “natural” and the study the study of the “historical.”

Bendix (1969: 7) himself rightly says that “there is nothing inherently wrong about using the history of Western societies as the basis of what we propose to mean by development—as long as the purely nominal character of the definition is understood.” Similarly, one could say that there is nothing inherently wrong in building typical constructs of the process— or better, of the different patterns of modernization, as long as one understands that such “ideal-types,” as Weber said, are “utopias” which are not to be confused with actual historical processes, and as long as one keeps in mind that the function of such ideal-typical constructions is to serve as tools for the better understanding of particular histories.

(2) THE MARXIST APPROACH: “IMPERIALISM AND DEPENDENCY”

If the merit of Bendix’s approach is to remind us that the process of modernization is a historical process and not a natural one, the merit of the different “Marxist” approaches is to remind us that this historical process is very much governed by what still remains the most fateful force of our modern life—capitalism and its seemingly never ending tendency to expand. Whether this tendency will be stopped by the industrialization of the whole world, by the burning of the last ton of fossilized coal, or by a
greater catastrophe still remains to be seen. It is still a fact that what Weber called the "tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order" continues to determine all our lives and that there is no society or community on earth which has not been affected by this tendency of capitalist production.\(^{21}\) In fact, the so-called process of modernization makes little sense if one does not take into consideration our capitalist "fate." Marxists are therefore correct in pointing out that the abstract analytical categories and the general distinction "traditional-modern" tend to lose sight of the historically specific setting of the process of modernization, i.e., the world-economic system created by capitalism.

The literature on imperialism and dependency reminds us that many of the so-called "traditional" societies have been in a close relationship with the "modern" world for many centuries.\(^ {22}\) In fact, many of these societies did not have to wait until the second phase of modernization in order to come into contact with this modern world, since many of them contributed in a very active way from the periphery to the formation of the modern world system, or to the original accumulation of commerical capital which fed the early Industrial Revolution (Wallerstein, 1974; Hobsbawm, 1968). Mercantilism, liberal imperialism, colonialism, and modern neo-imperialism (Lichtheim, 1971) have been integral parts of the long process of modernization and in many ways have reshaped and often even created the "traditional" structures as well as the "underdevelopment" of the modernizing societies.

Equally valid is the Marxist criticism of the "nation bias." The sociology of modernization, by assuming as the natural unit of study the newly born national state, and by focusing its attention on internal variables, has failed to see the reality of empire and of dependency. One could argue that the "nation" is at the same time too small and too large a unit to study (Sinai, 1972).

Yet even after one has corrected the historical and substantive neglects of the sociology of modernization, one realizes that the Marxist alternative leaves untouched the basic structural-functionalist, systemic, developmentalist, and teleological premises of the dominant paradigm. One could argue with G. Omvedt that "the Marxist theory of Imperialism is almost a mirror image of the theory of Modernization" and that Marx himself was the first modernization theorist (1972: 131 and Passim; Marx, 1969). The "Marxists" mainly criticize the "Imperialists" for being bad structural-functionalists because they take as systems what in truth are only subsystems of greater systems. The systemic approach with its assumption of the necessary interrelatedness between the part of the system is not challenged; it only draws the boundary lines of the system differently. There has been a shift in Marxist dialectics: the inner contradictions and the class struggle have been transferred to the international plane. We now have "bourgeois" nations facing and exploiting "proletarian" nations.\(^ {23}\)

Both approaches also assume a "natural process of development" after the respective "take-offs." One sees the barriers to the capitalist "take-off" as internal to the "traditional" societies, while the other sees the barriers to the socialist "take-off" as external to these societies, but internal to the larger capitalist system. Therefore, in order to initiate the process, revolution and rupture with the exploiting system and the incorporation into the "liberated" socialist system is needed. Wallerstein (1975); at this point brings the systemic logic to its full expression. "Socialism in one country" is a myth and no socialist country can escape being determined by the one "world system."

The Marxists also criticize the "Imperialists," not for being teleological, but for being bad prophets in envisioning as the final telos what is only the penultimate end. Finally, both of them have also ready-made blueprints of the future society which allow them to have a managerial conception of social change. To be sure, in both cases they insist that the present-day model societies have not yet arrived at the future end-stage. In any case, no radical change is foreseen prior to reaching the end-stage, so that ideologists can present their respective model societies, i.e., American, Soviet, and Chinese, as models of development. The managerial conception of social change tends to be different depending on whether it is the political or the technical managers who are able to impose their vision. The political managers' underlying ideology is that total social creation is possible and that societies are made by acts of will. The technocrats' ideology emphasizes that industrial societies require "scientific-technical" solutions to their "complex" problems (Mallet, 1970; Lilienfeld, 1975; Ludz, 1975).

(3) CIVILIZATION APPROACH:\(^ {24}\)
THE CHALLENGE OF WESTERNIZATION

There is a sense in which the motto of this approach, especially as developed by B. Nelson, could also be the "acceptance of histories." But the comparative historical study of civilizations and cultures has an explicitly "differential" aim. Weber's (1976: 385) work offers the main inspiration for such a method of analysis.

Such a comparative study would not aim at finding "analogies" and "parallels," as is done by those engrossed in the currently fashionable enterprise of constructing general schemes of development. The aim should, rather be precisely the opposite: to identify and define the individuality of each development, the characteristics which made the one conclude in a manner so different from that of the other. This done, one can then determine the causes which led to these differences.
Although for different reasons than the Marxists, the civilizational analysts also question the “nation bias” or the tendency to treat the nation-state as the ultimate unit of sociological analysis (Tiryakian, 1974). We can say that Bendix’s approach focuses on the polity, the role of government, and the types of domination. The Marxist approach focuses on the economy, the socioeconomic formation, and the socioeconomic relations of production. The civilizational approach, finally, focuses on structures of consciousness, sociocultural processes, and interactions of meaning in civilizational settings. If the difference, however, was only one of focus, there would be no need to consider them alternative approaches.

What distinguishes civilizational analysis from the historical-empiricist approach is its incorporation of the phenomenological approach, in that it is interested in the interpretive understanding of meaning structures and contexts of meaning (Weber’s Sinnzusammenhänge) from the point of view of the actors as well as from a civilizational and intercultural point of view. If the economic and political approaches focus their studies on the challenges of industrialization and national-building, the civilizational approach focuses its attention on the cultural dilemmas presented by the challenge of Westernization and on the different responses to this challenge. The process of modernization is seen as a collective and individual crisis of identity created by Western cultural imperialism.

Civilizational analysis rejects the invidious dichotomies between tradition and modernity and the assumption that modernized societies are without traditions. Indeed the notion of modernization itself is a concept laden with values that are specific to the Western tradition. Civilizational analysis is especially aware of the persistence of traditions, well into the modern era, which cannot be explained away as “survivals.” Indeed the process of modernization may well go hand in hand with a rebirth or a strengthening of cultural traditions or with a reawakening of religious and ethnic identities. M.N. Srinivas, for example, has analyzed the complex relationships between the processes of “Sanskritization” and “Westernization.” Civilizational analysts are also aware of “cross-civilizational borrowings,” “partial adaptation,” and “partial modernizations.” They point to the need to subdivide the all-encompassing concept of modernization into subareas for analytical as well as substantive reasons (Srinivas, 1966, 1972).

Eisenstadt (1973: v) has, I think, captured the central thesis of the civilizational approach.

The recognition that although the process of response of various societies or civilizations to the development of “modernity” certainly has several specific characteristics that distinguish it from other historical situations and hence poses before the societies on which it impinges many new types of problems, yet the response to this process which develops within any society or civilization may exhibit many similarities or parallels with the process of change in these respective societies or civilizations in other [previous] historical periods.

However, civilizational analysis, in its emphasis on the persistence of traditions, has a tendency to become what E. Gellner (1970: 269) calls “vertical theories,” namely, theories which tend to credit industrial societies with the same crucial characteristics as those which were possessed by its preindustrial ancestor. Such theories often overlook the distinction between “traditional” and “modern” traditions and the fact that the “communications revolution” has created the possibility of manufacturing and managing “culture” itself (Marriot, 1963).

Finally, they follow Weber in their insistence upon stressing the autonomy of sociocultural processes, but they tend to forget the dialectic of ideas and interests which had such a central place in Weber’s analysis.

The line of criticism in this chapter has been based on the assumption that the process of modernization should not be conceptualized as one universal process of development to be undergone, sooner or later by all societies. I prefer to see the process of modernization as a world-historical process with definite structural strains which forms the global context within which peoples and cultures of the world have to live their own histories. While it is the task of sociology to look for “universal” and “quasi-global” structural strains of the processes of modernization, its ultimate aim should be to examine the differential patterns of response of different societies to the problems created by these processes. I assume that there is not one, but many centers and many peripheries — and, therefore, many perspectives from which to look into the world and into each particular society, and that the perspective of Western scientists is also hermeneutically grounded in particular cultural traditions.

It think, therefore, that a comparative, historical, and differential sociology offers the best tool for an interpretation of our present world. More specifically, sociological analysis should focus upon the conjuncture of three “determinants.”

1. “Horizontal” determinants. Although I am not advocating a world-systemic approach, I think that particular societies should be analyzed in their larger political, economic, and cultural contexts.
How do international political relations affect the particular societies?
The global relations of domination behind such terms as: "Cold War,"
"Era of Detente," and the like should be analyzed.

Is a global division of labor taking place? Which types of socioeconomic
relations of global production are being formed? Phenomena such as
economic neo-imperialism ("capitalist" and "socialist" alike) and the
global expansion of the international corporations and state agencies
should be carefully analyzed in their effects upon the economic develop-
ment of developed and underdeveloped countries.

Which are the global ideologies and the cultural revolutions that are
shaking the established cultural paradigms? How are they appropriated
and reinterpreted in each society? Special attention should be given to
nationalism, socialism, and other ideologies of modernization, as well as
to "human rights" movements and movements stressing the liberation
from oppression and discrimination due to class, ethnicity, race, sex,
religion, or personal beliefs.

I think however, that the truly universal "horizontal" determinant is the
scientific-technological revolution of the twentieth century and its effects
upon polities, economies, and cultures. It constitutes the very "dynamics
of modernization" and the "algebra of revolutions" (see Black, 1966;

(2) "Vertical" determinants. Societies possess different reserves of
material and cultural resources which have a great impact upon their
capacity to respond to the challenges of modernization. Societies tend to
carry certain patterns of responses to social problems well into the
modern era because of the persistence of cultural traditions, classes and
class-relations, and sets of habits of social conduct. How do these
traditions manage to persist in the face of the challenge of modernity?
How are they reinterpreted in order to adapt to new circumstances and to
legitimate the new ways of life? What happens in societies which, due to
the colonial experience or other circumstances, lack such a reservoir of
traditions with which to reinterpret the meaning of modernity in accord-
ance with particular needs? How are new collective identities created?
How are new forms of domination legitimated? What is the effect of the
revolution in communication and mass media upon these processes?

(3) "Human" determinants. It is particular groups of people, not
societies, who "act" and "interact." The form in which different groups
act, however, is in many ways determined by the dialectic of their "ideas"
and their "interests." These "ideas" and "interests" in turn have special
elective affinities with the social position of these groups. Who are the
"carriers" of the different processes of modernization? What "interests"
do they have and how are the conflicts between the various, sometimes

antagonistic, "ideas" and "interests" solved? Is a process of global
homogenization of the "carriers" of these processes taking place? Are we
in the midst of a technocratic, managerial revolution?

"Societies" continue to offer stubborn resistance to the models
prescribed by social scientists and to the plans imposed upon them by
self-appointed leaders. Developmental theories of modernization have
an inherent tendency to overlook these "resistances," explaining them
away as "accidents," "deviances," or an inconvenient but "functional"
obstacles in the process of development. Similarly the structural-
functionalist theory of society has a tendency to eliminate the problem
of political legitimacy by absorbing the relationship between rulers and
ruled into the theory. But rulers are still faced with the problem of
legitimizing their domination on grounds other than a sociological theory
of consensus. It is the task of sociology to study in each concrete society
the ways in which the problem of legitimacy is solved or unresolved.

NOTES

1. Three committees played a crucial role in the development of the dominant
modernization paradigm: (a) the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science
Research Council; (b) the Center for International Studies at MIT; (c) the Committee for
the Comparative Study of New Nations.

2. Therefore, I have chosen to analyze the sociology of modernization by looking at
the Parsonian reinterpretation and its further elaboration in the writing of E.A. Shils, S.N.
Eisenstadt, and R. Bellah. There are, for sure, many other ways of ordering the literature.
M. N. Nash, for instance, argues that the "index approach" (B. Hoselitz, W. W. Rostow), the
"diffusionist approach" (D. Lerner), and the "psychological approach" (D. McClelland,
E. Hagen) are the only three modes of attacking the problems of social change and
economic development. A. G. Frank has rightly argued, however, that these three modes
are rather three articulated moments of the general process of modernization as implied by
the main paradigm. The first mode sets up the assumed typical characteristics of
development, the second mode studies its diffusion to the underdeveloped countries, and
the third mode analyzes how these characteristics are internalized by the recipients (see
A. G. Frank, 1972). For yet another way of classifying the literature, see Chong-Do Hah
and J. Schneider (1965).


4. For Aron's attempt to dissociate himself from the "convergence" theories, see R. Aron,
The Industrial Society (1967).

4. In The Structure of Social Action Parsons tried to show the "convergence"
between Durkheim's and Weber's quite different notions. The fusion of the two concepts
was further elaborated in Parsons' later writings.

5. Shils' revision of Weber's concept of charisma is elaborated in "Charisma, Order
and Status." According to Shils (1957; 261), Weber's "historicist concern to delineate the
unique features of "modern society"—rationalization and bureaucratization—hindered
his perception of the deeper and more permanent features of all societies." Weber was not
able to see that "a great fundamental identity exists in all societies and one of the elements of this identity is the presence of the charismatic element."

6. By reducing his focus of study to the New States, Shils excludes from this analysis key countries such as Russia, Japan, China, Turkey, and the Latin American countries.

7. See "Metropolis and Province in the Intellectual Community" in The Intellectuals and the Powers.


10. Eisenstadt's essay "The Distintegration of the Initial Paradigm" offers the best summary I know of all the major criticisms of the modernization paradigm. His own self-critique in Chapter 1 is helpful for a reconstruction of the origins and the main assumptions of the paradigm.

11. Eisenstadt seems to be disappointed that instrumental rationalization does not bring along with it substantive rationality. One would think that a "Weberian" scholar should have been spared such disappointment. Furthermore, his stress on the novelty of the crisis indicates both a short historical memory and an unbroken belief in scientific reason, since the history of Western modernization is full of such movements of protest and of such crises at the societal as well as at the intellectual level.

12. To appreciate the radical shifts in Parsons' interpretations of Weber, one only needs to compare T. Parsons' "Capitalism in Recent German Literature: Sombart and Weber" (1929), The Structure of Social Action (1968), and "Introduction to Max Weber," Sociology of Religion (1964c).

13. It was Bellah's "Durkheim and History" which seems to have reminded Parsons of that. See Parsons, "Durkheim on Religion Revisited" (1973).

14. For an interesting interpretation of Parsons along these lines that presents him as "a major representative of 20th century American Protestantism," see Nelson (1965).


17. See Horowitz (1972), Worsley (1964), F. Fanon (1968). This Third World perspective could be considered as a separate fourth alternative to the modernization paradigm, in spite of the fact that it is heavily influenced by the "Marxist" approach, especially in its Maoist version. For the similarities and differences between the two, see Desai (1972), especially Omvedt's essay "'Modernization' Theories: The Ideology of Empire?"; and Wallerstein, Social Change: The Colonial Situation (1966).


20. I cannot treat in this paper the contradictory issues raised by the different "Marxist" approaches. Thus, my analysis is extremely simplified. The best critical analysis of Imperialism from a Marxist perspective, as well as a critical overview of the different "Marxist" theories of imperialism is, in my opinion, to be found in Lichtheim, Imperialism (1971). O'Connor's The Corporations and the State (1974) offers also a valuable analysis of similar issues but his attempt to develop an overall systematic theory of modern economic neo-imperialism is not able to integrate successfully the three different phenomena which are implied in the concept of imperialism, namely, foreign economic expansion (a) as a mode of surplus utilization, (b) as a fresh source of profit to counteract the declining rate of profit at home due to monopolistic stagnation, and (c) as a mode of economic exploitation to keep the Third World countries "underdeveloped" within the capitalist system.

21. For a classic study of the capitalist expansion into the "hinterland," emphasizing the disruptive effects upon the natural economies, see Luxemburg (1951).

22. Crockcroft et al. (1972) is the most representative statement of this, now rapidly growing literature. It goes back to Baran (1962).

23. This shift, which was already started by Lenin, was fully elaborated by Mao into a powerful ideology for the Third World by identifying nationalism with anti-imperialism, and both with socialism. The Maoist formulation follows logically, however, from Lenin's identification of imperialism and monopoly capitalism. For a severe critique of the Maoist position from a "classical Marxist" perspective which sees the Maoist Third World ideology as a form of populist agrarian socialism of the "Narodniki" type, see Lichtheim (1971).

24. The civilization approach is still in its beginnings and no general study of the process of modernization from a civilization perspective has yet been developed. Nelson's unfinished project toward a "comparative, historical and differential sociology in a civilization perspective" is the most articulate statement in this direction (see especially Nelson, 1973: 79-105).

25. The intercultural meaning arises in the interaction of the different "definitions of the situation" from the point of view of the actors and from the point of view of the observers. Both "definitions of the situation" are hermeneutically grounded and, therefore, have to be understood historically within the context of specific cultural traditions. Intercultural encounters offer strategic research sites for case studies of such "meaning interactions."

26. The analysis of this challenge of "Westernization" has formed the theme of some of the best studies in the civilization perspective (see Nelson and Nielsen, 1973: 3-15).

27. This criticism can be applied to Nelson who, like Parsons and his students, tends also to identify the process of modernization with the process of Protestantification (see Nelson, 1973).

28. For an attempt to develop an international systemic approach, see Nettl and Robertson, 1968.

29. For an example of this typically "Weberian" approach, see Barrington Moore, Jr. (1966).

REFERENCES

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THE LANGUAGE OF POLITICS IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

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As ideologically oriented parties and movements have been formed in the underdeveloped countries, they have commonly adopted political designations that had become prominent in nineteenth-century Western Europe. In the following pages, I shall attempt to show briefly how, in the process of transfer to a new environment, the old bottles came to be filled with new contents, that is, how old labels came to be attached to new classes or groups and their interests and ideologies. That change in content has tended to be obscured by the retention in unchanged form of the label on the bottle. While the Western labels thus became misleading for descriptive purposes, they were turned into treasured symbols that could generate myths, that is, beliefs inducing or conditioning overt behavior. It will then have to be noted how such myths can even be based on the original Western European meaning of the label, thus giving that

AUTHOR'S NOTE: Sections of this article appeared in Abdul A. Said (ed.) Protagonists of Change (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 103-111, and are reprinted in revised form with the permission of the publisher. For an elaboration of two ideas touched upon here, the distinction between modernization from within and from without and the process and consequences of Western symbols, especially those of communism, become myths in underdeveloped countries, see respectively, the author's The Political Consequences of Modernization (New York: John Wiley, 1972) and "Myth, Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, and Symbolic Reassurance in the East-West Conflict" in John H. Kautsky, Communism and the Politics of Development: Persistent Myths and Changing Behavior (New York: John Wiley, 1968), pp. 121-144.