INTERACT – RESEARCHING THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS’ INTEGRATION AS A THREE-WAY PROCESS – IMMIGRANTS, COUNTRIES OF EMIGRATION AND COUNTRIES OF IMMIGRATION AS ACTORS OF INTEGRATION

Co-financed by the European Union

Religion and Diasporas: Challenges of the Emigration Countries

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INTERACT Research Report 2013/01

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Researching Third Country Nationals’ Integration as a Three-way Process - Immigrants, Countries of Emigration and Countries of Immigration as Actors of Integration

Research Report
Position Paper
INTERACT RR2013/01

Religion and Diasporas: Challenges of the Emigration Countries

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Around 25 million persons born in a third country (TCNs) are currently living in the European Union (EU), representing 5% of its total population. Integrating immigrants, i.e. allowing them to participate in the host society at the same level as natives, is an active, not a passive, process that involves two parties, the host society and the immigrants, working together to build a cohesive society.

Policy-making on integration is commonly regarded as primarily a matter of concern for the receiving state, with general disregard for the role of the sending state. However, migrants belong to two places: first, where they come and second, where they now live. While integration takes place in the latter, migrants maintain a variety of links with the former. New means of communication facilitating contact between migrants and their homes, globalisation bringing greater cultural diversity to host countries, and nation-building in source countries seeing expatriate nationals as a strategic resource have all transformed the way migrants interact with their home country.

INTERACT project looks at the ways governments and non-governmental institutions in origin countries, including the media, make transnational bonds a reality, and have developed tools that operate economically (to boost financial transfers and investments); culturally (to maintain or revive cultural heritage); politically (to expand the constituency); legally (to support their rights).

INTERACT project explores several important questions: To what extent do policies pursued by EU member states to integrate immigrants, and policies pursued by governments and non-state actors in origin countries regarding expatriates, complement or contradict each other? What effective contribution do they make to the successful integration of migrants and what obstacles do they put in their way?

A considerable amount of high-quality research on the integration of migrants has been produced in the EU. Building on existing research to investigate the impact of origin countries on the integration of migrants in the host country remains to be done.

INTERACT is co-financed by the European Union and is implemented by a consortium built by CEDEM, UPF and MPI Europe.

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Abstract

Using the theoretical framework of transnational studies and sociology of religion, this paper identifies the most significant factors that influence the religious dimensions of the emigration countries: the majority or minority status of the migrant group in the receiving countries as well as the pre-existing level of politicization of religion in the sending countries.

It shows that the interactions of sending and receiving countries take place in religious terms in a broader transnational space including deterritorialized religious and political actors.
Immigrant and religiosity

According to a 2011 survey conducted in the 27 EU member states, all immigrant groups tend to be more religious than the native born population of the host country. Overall, immigrants pray more (30.02%) than native populations (21.86%) and attend religious services at least once a week. Interestingly, the religiosity of the same immigrant group varies from one receiving country to another. For example, certain destination countries such as Greece, Poland, Portugal, and the UK demonstrate high levels of immigrant religiosity, however, Scandinavian and Eastern European countries (except Poland) tend to show lower levels of religiosity for immigrants as compared to other countries based on their “religious attendance and praying. There are also certain countries (like Cyprus, Greece, and Ukraine) whose native born population is more religious than the immigrant population.

Unemployment and low levels of income do not increase immigrants’ religiosity. On the other hand, the level of education and the length of time spent in the host country tend to diminish the level of religiosity. Finally, Muslim immigrants are more religious on the three accounts (prayer, religious attendance, and self-declaration) than other immigrants.

Regrettfully, this survey is one of a kind. Undoubtedly, surveys on the religiosity of immigrants have increased in the last 15 years. But most of them are focused on Muslim immigrants in Western Europe. They have the inconvenience of being nationally defined and qualitative and therefore difficult to use in any comparative work. There are also surveys on the policy of receiving countries for religious recognition or in the fight against religious discrimination. They are also surveys on Muslim organizations and their relations with the states of receiving countries. Through this angle, it is possible to get sparse information on the strategies of some sending countries to take advantage of this situation.

There has been very little work done on the religious dimension of political actors from the sending countries, when they interact with migrants. There is no work at all on the dialectical interactions between migrants, countries of origin and countries of residence. In this perspective, the INTERACT project could open a pioneering field of research to overcome the binary approach to sending or receiving country policy analysis.

I. Theoretical framework

The analysis here is situated within transnational studies and sociology of religion. The former allows a broadening of the role of religion beyond state actors by looking into groups’ or individuals’ actions both in the sending and receiving countries. Therefore, the conventional approach to migrations is no longer adequate. Formerly, we understood migrations as flows of people from one nation-state to another; these flows were thought to indicate different sets of policies on the parts of net-immigrant

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2 Religiosity was measured by three questions: frequency of prayer, attendance at religious services and self declaration as religious. Based on subjective religiosity, the difference between immigrants and native population is small.

3 Although Ukraine is not a member of the EU, it was included in the survey.

4 For a systematic review of surveys on Muslims across European countries over the last two decades, see Jocelyne Cesari (2013), Why the West Fears Islam: Exploring Muslims in Liberal Democracies, New York, Palgrave MacMillan.


and net-emigrant countries. The classical emigration/immigration distinction thus refers to the notion of a definitive transfer from one country to another. In this shrinking world, however, it seems that no one leaves a country “forever.” The possibilities for remaining in touch with the homeland are diverse and in the age of social media, increasingly efficient. In these conditions, people identify themselves with different nations and cultures, and manage trans-frontier activities and loyalties, without particular conflicts or tensions. These transnational identities are by no means new, but they tend to have greater political and economic impact due to the increase in intensity and technological progress. However, transnational networks do not signify the end of the state power over its nationals. We will see that in some situations, the state can actually instrumentalize these networks for its political advantage, either domestic or international.

In these conditions, the religious and cultural condition of migrants can be defined by three principal dimensions: the awareness of a religious identity, the existence of communal organizations, and the persistence of relationships (even imaginary ones) with the homeland. These three dimensions usually define the diaspora condition.

For this reason, religion cannot be apprehended exclusively as faith or belief. Additionally, while the surveys analyzed below show that migrants appear to be more religious than their fellow citizens in receiving countries, we should be aware that these features do not translate automatically into greater religious practices. Sociological work has highlighted an increasing disjunction between believing, behaving, and belonging among followers of all denominations. These three dimensions have historically been systematically linked or associated in the definition of a person’s religiosity. In other words, a person’s religiosity has long been defined by the inextricable connection of believing, behaving, and belonging. However, sociological analyses shed light on the disjunction of these three dimensions and apprehend this disjunction as modern forms of religiosity. Thus, a person can believe without automatically behaving and belonging; can belong without believing or behaving; or can behave without believing or belonging. For example, surveys have shown that many Christians maintain private, individual religious beliefs but do not practice on a regular basis (i.e., believing without behaving), or in some cases, Christian identity has taken on cultural rather than spiritual meanings.

The studies discussed in the following sections, show that belonging is more relevant than believing in understanding the political dimension of religion. In fact, belonging is often strongly asserted even when migrants lack belief. The belonging identity is strengthened when religion is embedded within the national identity of the sending country (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Poland). A difference emerges between being a “practicing Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox” and just “being Muslim, Catholic or Orthodox.” So when people say that they are very much Muslims, it does not mean that they are pious. This loose cultural identity can become an asset for the sending country.

In order to capture the religious dimension of the different state and non-state actors, this paper will analyze the interactions between receiving countries and sending countries in the religious domain. From a literature review, it is possible to distinguish three situations that influence the actions of sending/receiving countries as well as of migrants: the minority condition, the minority within the minority and the majority situation. The religious minority situation refers to cases where the religion of the migrant groups is a minority within the receiving country. Muslim immigrants in Christian western countries are a paradigmatic example of this situation. There is also the condition of the religious minority within the minority migrant group, like Alevis within the Turkish Sunni migrants in western Europe. Finally, there are circumstances where the religion of the migrant group is similar to the religion of the receiving country. In these cases, the majority situation is not evaluated in numbers but in terms of proximity or familiarity with the migrants’ religion. For example, Germany and the UK

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are Protestant countries. However, we have included Catholic migrants to these countries in the majority/majority situation, because they share a Christian background and because there are already Catholic groups in receiving countries.

We will first present the features common to all migratory situations, i.e. disconnection between national and religious identities, cultural discrepancy between the clerics of the sending countries and the religious communities in the receiving countries, and influence of transnational religious groups (section II). We will then address the specifics of the minority condition, (sections III and IV) as well as of the majority condition (section V). We will conclude by discussing the positive or negative role of religion on the integration of migrants in the receiving countries.

II. Influence of Religion on Migrants

An analytical review of the existing literature highlights three major aspects of religious influence on immigrants: disconnection of religious and national identities, the gap between clerics and religious communities in the receiving countries, and the influence of transnational religious movements on the religious condition of migrants.

A) The disconnection between religion and national identities

The immigration situation creates new conditions of identification where personal attachment to a given religion prevails over belonging to the national community of the sending country. In this regard, sociological surveys show that Muslims in Europe tend to redefine their attachment to Islam in their new countries of residence through personal belonging to the religion more than through collective belonging to an Islamic or national group. Attachment to Islam becomes disconnected from attachment to the national community of origin (unlike the first generation of immigrants).

This disconnection between religion and national identity also appears vis-à-vis the country of residence. According to a report from Vincent Geisser and Francoise Lorcerie about Muslims in Marseilles, only 30% of the city’s population introduced their identity as Muslim. Attachment to Islam becomes disconnected from attachment to the national identity of origin (unlike the first generation of immigrants).

In some surveys, the disconnect is expressed in cultural terms. For example, in a 2009 survey, Turks who are born in Germany (32%) and those who are immigrants to Germany (52%) declared that they do not feel attached to the German national identity when it comes to the education of children and gender relations: compare this with the 9% of Germans who thought the same way. In summary, the study showed that the perception of German Turks, at least in this respect, is similar to their counterparts in Turkey rather than their fellow citizens in Germany.

10 For a comprehensive analysis of these surveys across Western and Eastern Europe, see Jocelyne Cesari (ed), Handbook of Islam in Europe, Oxford University Press (forthcoming).


mainstream. These figures change slightly when taking into account German Muslims: While, then, 78% of Muslim favor integration, 22% prefers a more separatist approach. Overall, about 24% of non-German Muslims reject integration and question Western values.\footnote{New Study on Muslims and Integration in Germany. (2012, March 5). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2012/03/05/new-study-on-muslims-and-integration-in-germany/}

This disconnect with the dominant cultural values of the national community has to be distinguished from loyalty to the political institutions of the receiving countries. Usually quantitative surveys of Muslims across Europe show an attachment to the national institutions of the country of residence, though results can be contradictory and vary from one European country to another.\footnote{Nyiri, Z. (2007). Gallup World Poll. “Muslims in Europe: Basis for Greater Understanding Already Exists. Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Gallup Poll: http://www.gallup.com/poll/27409/Muslims-Europe-Basis-Greater-Understanding-Already-Exists.aspx}

A survey of Muslim youth in the UK compared to their counterparts in various European countries show that the former feel more integrated within their national community of residence. For example, youth of Asian origin in Britain feel more British in schools than their counterparts born or raised in Germany and France. Another example was observed in the second generation Pakistani and Indian Muslim immigrants in the UK, who feel more integrated than Moroccan or Algerian Muslim youth in France. Also, young Turks and former Yugoslaw in Germany feel less integrated than their counterparts in the UK.\footnote{Muslim youths in UK feel much more integrated than their European counterparts. (2009, August 20). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2012/07/02/british-muslims-have-more-sense-of-belonging-than-their-white-counterparts/}

According to a survey by the British think tank Demos, British Muslims have a greater national identity attachment to the UK than the average British citizen. In other words, for them, being British is something they are proud of and they would like to contribute to the future of the UK. Furthermore, the 2000 survey suggested that 83% of Muslims were happier than the national average among British citizens of 79%. This research refuted the myth that Britain Muslims get their identity primarily from their religious identity. Rather, they were mostly satisfied by living in the UK and they were proud to be British citizens.\footnote{New Survey Reveals: Britain’s Muslims Proud and Optimistic. (2011, November 28). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2011/11/28/new-survey-reveals-britain%E2%80%99s-muslims-proud-and-optimistic/}

The same trend is identifiable in other parts of Europe. According to the Metrosocpia Report, Muslim immigrants living in Spain put confidence in the national identity of Spain much more than Spaniards do. So Spanish Muslims trusted the national identity of Spain and felt themselves to be part of national ideals such as justice, the Parliament, the King, and the Catholic Church. This study’s results demonstrated that liberal and tolerant Spanish Muslims are not trouble makers, but rather they feel at home in Spain and at the same time they can practice their faith without mixing it with the national ideals of Spain.\footnote{Muslims express more trust in Spanish institutions than Spaniards. (2010, April 8). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2010/04/08/muslims-express-more-trust-in-spanish-institutions-than-spaniards/}

On the other hand, other surveys attest to frustration and discontent vis-à-vis the receiving countries. For example, a 18 month-long study conducted in 2007 in England, Scotland and Wales found that young Muslims express frustration about the way they are depicted in the media and they do not feel that British society conforms to Muslim “ideals.” They also define themselves as patriotic and they aspire to serve British national ideals.\footnote{Seen and Not Heard: Voices of Young British Muslims. (2009, September 7). Retrieved July 19, 2013, from Euro-Islam.Info: http://www.euro-islam.info/2009/09/07/seen-and-not-heard/}
Besides media treatment and negative political discourses, the assertive religiosity of young Muslims is another reason for the gap with their non-Muslim co-citizens. According to the 2011 census, 1 out of 10 youths younger than 25 in the UK describes themselves as Muslim. While the population of immigrant Christians such as Catholics from Poland and other denominations from different countries such as Nigeria are dramatically increasing in the UK, the population of British-born Christians has decreased about 15% from 2001 to 2011.20 According to a 2007 survey, young British Muslims’ religiosity is growing. As a result, they feel challenged to relate with non-Muslim British youth. The identity of these young British Muslims is expressed in their strong preference for Islamic schools and sharia law, which set them apart from the “lifestyle” of mainstream society.21

According to the 2011 IFOP mentioned above, 41% of the respondents define themselves as both observant and believing, 34% of them define themselves as only believers, 22% defined themselves as only Muslim origin, and 3% said they did not have any religion. These numbers, confirmed by previous surveys of the same kind, put them at odds with their fellow French citizens that do not express the same levels of religious attachment or practices.

According to a 2012 report of the National policy unit SCP, Muslims’ religiosity is increasing in the Netherlands. From 1998 to 2011, mosque attendance among Muslims of Moroccan origin increased from 9% to 33%. This report also suggests that observant Muslims tend to identify with their country of origin more than with the Dutch national community.22 According to 2008 Dutch research, young Muslims do not believe that they can openly practice their Islamic identity, as they do not think they have enough resources to improve their faith and society does not help them. These young Dutch Muslims considered that when they openly show their Islamic identity and practice their faith, they do not feel welcome and fully accepted as citizens in the Netherlands.23

The same disconnect appears for immigrants who share the religion of the receiving country. Additionally, centralized religious institutions like the Catholic Church can reinforce the gap and lead to the isolation of immigrant religious communities. Based on a 2007 survey conducted among children and adolescents in Germany, Catholics who come from immigrant families are more observant than young indigenous Catholics.24 According to the same survey, migrants are taught through parishes about values such as “trust, solidarity, and help”, in ways that strengthen the migrant group. Anthropologist Georg Elwert qualifies this process as inner integration. Usually parishes do not facilitate interaction between immigrants and local Catholics. As a result, migrant Catholics do not have opportunities to be exposed to Catholicism from the German point of view.

Several studies have emphasized that local more than national community is a strong identifier among Muslims across Europe. According to research on the Muslim community of Waltham Forest, one of the London’s 2012 Olympic boroughs, the respondents express a strong attachment to their community.25

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neighborhood in contrast to their attachment to Britain, while the non-Muslims in the same neighborhood show a greater attachment to Britain over their neighborhood.  

The consequences on attachment to the sending countries of these emerging Muslim identities in Europe have not been systematically studied. We know that being a Muslim in France or Germany is increasingly disconnected from national attachment to Algeria or Turkey. But this does not mean that religious interactions with the countries of origin have stopped: they usually happen through family, business or social networks, and are more influential when they materialize outside the institutional channels of the sending state (Ministry of Religious Affairs, embassies, etc.). As explained above, religious identity is more and more shaped within transnational semantic spaces in which national frameworks are included but not exclusive anymore. For example, the fluid and multi-layered religious and national identities of the German-Turkish youth were reflected in a research conducted by Selcuk Sirin among 1,400 participants who were 18-25 years old. It shows that these young peoples’ collective identity cannot be classified as Islamist vs. secularist. Instead, Turkish youth have multiple identities, with the dimensions of belonging to secular movement (Ataturkism) and Islamic identity that shape their political identity. They do not define themselves according to Ataturk’s ideals or Islamic ideals, but they say “I like Atatürk and I also feel like a Muslim.”

In sum, the disconnect between religious belonging and the dominant culture of the receiving country does not lead to lack of loyalties but to multiple allegiances that are not seen as conflicting or contradictory. Nor does it translate into an exclusive link with the sending country, which is not seen as an ideal place for the fulfillment of migrants’ personal values, especially in the second or third generation. The country of origin still triggers sentimental attachment through family links, but it is not the place to definitively return to.

This cultural gap is also reflected in the tensions that often occur between clerics from the countries of origin and religious immigrant communities.

B) Discrepancy between the Cultural Background of Clerics and the Religious Expectations of the Communities in Receiving Countries

The religious role of the countries of origin can clash with the religious expectations of the migrants. For example, in 2008, during Ramadan, French-born Muslims complained to the representative body of French Islam (CFCM) about the lack of French language skills among these imported imams. More generally, the aforementioned surveys among Muslims across Europe attest to this gap between the sociological reality of the religious minority and the inadequate clerics from the sending countries.

Even in the case of training independent from the country of origin, the questions of external influence on the curriculum, and lack of cultural skills of the imam, remain. For instance, the European Institute of Human Sciences de Saint-Leger-de Fougeret, set in Burgundy, has for decades trained imams who intend to minister to the French Muslim population in France, but without great success. The institute has been under close governmental scrutiny because of its alleged links with the Muslim Brothers. The annual number of students is very small, and the training still not up to the demands of the French Muslim population. Generally, initiatives from “indigenous” Muslims across Europe to counter external influences are almost non-existent. One exception is the Buhara project in Berlin: a training institute for imams in the “Sufi” tradition was initiated in 2009 by German-born

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Muslims in reaction of the overpowering presence of foreign born imams who lack social understanding and language abilities to relate to Muslims in Germany.  

It is worth noting that a similar gap exists when the religion of the migrants is the same than the majority of the receiving country. For example, the increased arrival of Polish immigrants to the UK since 2004 has resulted in an influx of “Easy Jet priests”, i.e. Catholic priests flown into Britain to provide pastoral care to migrants. It appears that their cultural and national background does not fit the British national context. “They enter an already formed social field which has been shaped by power struggles and politics they know little, or nothing, about. A training program for Polish priests relocating to the UK was deemed unnecessary by Polish Catholic missiologists; hence no assistance was given to Polish priests prior to their arrival in the UK. The situation is further complicated by the fact that Poland’s entry into the EU in 2004 is perceived as a threat to Polish Catholicism by some Catholic politicians and clergy and by others as an opportunity for Polish Catholics to evangelize secular Europe. It is a combination of these attitudes that shapes the behavior and strategies of Polish clergy in the UK.”

The increased influence from transnational religious groups is another challenge for the clerics of sending countries.

C) Influence of Transnational Religious Groups on Religious Immigrant Communities

The proliferation of religious authorities and the shrinking realm of their authority is by no means a new phenomenon, and it has been the subject of many studies. Both mass education and new forms of communication have contributed to the increase of actors who claim the right to talk on behalf of any religious tradition in both authoritative and normative ways. Therefore, established religious figures, such as the sheikhs of Al-Azhar or Medina, are increasingly challenged by the engineer, the student, the businessman, and the autodidact, who mobilize the masses and speak for Islam in sports stadiums, in the blogosphere, and over airwaves worldwide. This trend predates the Internet and is related to public education programs and the increased availability of new technological communicative mediums such as magazines, cassette tapes, and CDs. However, the internet has added a new element to this proliferation of religious voices: the greater influence of globalized authority figures that have an audience beyond their particular cultural background. This transnationalization of religious voices can be defined as neo pan-Islamism. There are multiple forms of this contemporary pan-Islam, the Muslim Brotherhood being the one that has been the most studied.

Interestingly, the Muslim Brothers, at least for the most part, tend to foster national allegiance to the receiving country rather than to the sending country or the global ummah. For this reason, they stand on the same side as the sending and receiving countries, in the competition against global

31 Traditionally, authority was conferred according to one’s theological knowledge and mastery of the methodologies used to interpret this knowledge. Only those who possessed knowledge that had been passed down through a chain of authorities or a line of recognized masters could claim legitimacy as religious leaders. Though formal education was an important component throughout much of the Muslim world, the transmission of knowledge did not always rely on formal education, especially if the knowledge being passed down was esoteric in nature (as was the case among the Sufi masters).
Salafism.33 The same logic is at work among religious movements like Christian Evangelicals, who challenge the established religious institutions of both sending and receiving countries.

Today, the conditions for the communication and the circulation of people and ideas make the ummah (the community of Muslim believers) all the more effective as a concept, especially considering the fact that nationalist ideologies have been waning. The imagined ummah has a variety of forms, the most influential of which emphasizes direct access to the Qur’an and Muslim unity that transcends national and cultural diversity. In this sense, those extolling this modern trend can be called pan-Islamists even though the restoration of the caliphate is no longer their priority.34 It is worth noting that not all these movements are reactionary or defensive. For this reason, a distinction must be drawn between the Wahhabi/Salafi and Tablighi movements, on one hand, and the Muslim Brotherhood, on the other. Both trends dominate global interpretations of Islam across Europe but have very different positions vis-à-vis modernity.

Wahhabism is characterized by a rejection of critical approaches to the Islamic tradition. Mystical approaches and historical interpretations alike are held in contempt. Orthodox practice can be defined as a direct relation to the revealed Sources (Qur’an and hadith), with no recourse to the historical contributions of the various juridical schools (madhab).

In this literalist interpretation of Islam, nothing must come between the believer and the text: customs, culture, and Sufism must all be done away with. The heirs of this rigorist and puritanical line of thought are the existing Saudi religious establishment, also known as Salafi. Adherents of Wahhabism have rejected all ideas and concepts that are deemed Western, maintaining a strictly revivalist agenda. As a stringently revivalist movement, Wahhabism seeks the “Islamization of societies,”35 which entails formulating contemporary ways of life in relation to the conditions of seventh century Arabia by “returning to the sources” whose “true meaning,” Wahhabis argue, was lost over the centuries following the Prophet Muhammad’s death.

The significant difference between the global Salafi Islam of today and the original Wahhabi period is a difference in audience: in other words, Salafi decisions and interpretations are no longer limited to the Saudi kingdom, but are now followed by Muslims around the world. The fatwas of Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ibn Baaz (d. 1999), Grand Mufti of the Saudi Kingdom, and of Sheikh Al-Albani (d. 1999) are the common points of reference for their followers in Europe and the United States, and more generally throughout the Muslim world. The movement has succeeded in imposing its beliefs not as one interpretation among many but as the global orthodox doctrine of Sunni Islam.

The considerable financial resources of the Saudi state have also helped create this religious monopoly. In the 1970s, Saudi Arabia began investing in a number of international organizations that “widely distributed Wahhabi literature in all the major languages of the world, gave out awards and

33 Salafism is a multifaceted revivalist movement within Islam (the name being a reference to as-salaf as-salah, or the pious ancestors) that advocates a literalist interpretation of the Qur’an and a rejection of the Sunni schools of jurisprudence (Madahib).

34 The Hizb ut-Tahrir party is one of the most significant contemporary pan-Islamist movements that still advocates for the restoration of the Caliphate. Founded in Jerusalem in 1953, it claims branches in the Muslim world as well as Europe and the United States. In Great Britain, the party is known under the name Muhajirun, and was active in the public sphere, particularly before September 11th. Suha Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate (London: Grey Seal, 1996).

35 “Movements that were conceived as movements of ‘renewal’ were in fact more a part of the ongoing processes of Islamization of societies on the frontiers of the Islamic world. They were, in effect, part of the ‘formation’ of the Islamic societies rather than the ‘reformation’ of existing ones.” John Obert Voll, “Foundations for Renewal and Reform: Islamic Movements in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” in The Oxford History of Islam, ed. John L. Esposito (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999) 516–17.
grants, and provided funding for a massive network of publishers, schools, mosques, organizations, and individuals.\textsuperscript{36}

In the West, this 	extit{dawa} (proselytization) resulted in the building of new Islamic centers in Malaga, Madrid, Milan, Mantes-la-Jolie, Edinburgh, Brussels, Lisbon, Zagreb, Washington, Chicago, and Toronto to name just a few; the financing of Islamic Studies chairs in American universities; and the multiplication of multilingual Internet sites. In March 2002, the official Saudi magazine 	extit{Ain al-Yaqin} estimated that the Saudi royal family has “wholly or partly financed” approximately 210 Islamic centers, 1,500 mosques, 202 colleges, and 2,000 Islamic schools in Muslim-minority countries.\textsuperscript{37} It is important to note that these estimates do not include the number of institutions funded by the Saudi Government in its entirety or other sources within Saudi Arabia that finance Wahhabi proselytizing.\textsuperscript{38} According to some estimates, the Saudi Kingdom spent over $80 billion on various Islam-related causes in Muslim-minority countries between 1973 and 2002.\textsuperscript{39} King Fahd alone invested over $75 billion dollars in the construction of schools, mosques, and Islamic institutions outside of the Kingdom in the 1970s and 1980s.\textsuperscript{40,41} This massive effort of propagation has contributed to the promotion of Wahhabism as the sole legitimate guardian of Islamic thought.\textsuperscript{42}

The construction of mosques, schools, and other Islamic institutions is only one Saudi strategy to circulate the Wahhabi ideology. They also rely heavily on media to promote and spread their message, whether through the circulation of handouts, the creation of websites, or the airing of satellite television shows. For example, in 1984, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia opened the King Fahd Complex for Printing the Holy Qur’an in Medina. According to the website of the now-deceased King Fahd bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz, the Complex produces between 10 and 30 million copies of the Qur’an each year. Copies of the Qur’an also are available in Braille, as are video and audio recordings of Qur’anic recitations.

\textsuperscript{36} Fadl, A. E. (2005), 	extit{The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists} (pp. 73-75). San Francisco: HarperOne.


\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{40} (2006). In R. Bronson, 	extit{Thicker than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia} (p. 10). New York: Oxford University.

\textsuperscript{41} According to its website, the King Fahd Foundation has wholly or partially funded thirty such projects in Africa, six in South America, 23 in Asia, six in Australia and Oceania, twelve in Europe, and 22 in North America. (The website is http://www.kingfahdbinabdulaziz.com/main/m400.htm)

\textsuperscript{42} In addition to funds coming straight from the Saudi government, the Kingdom also supports proxy organizations that spread Wahhabism. A notable organization that depends on Saudi funding is the Muslim World League (MWL, Rabitat al-’Alamat al-Islami). Today, the Muslim World League oversees a number of non-governmental organizations such as the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), the Holy Qur’an Memorization International Organization, the International Islamic Organization for Education, Makkah Al-Mukarrarahah Charity Foundation for Orphans, the Commission on Scientific Signs in the Qur’an and Sunnah, The World Supreme Council for Mosques, and The Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) Council. Although to the outside world they strongly emphasize their strong humanitarian aims (providing relief, assisting orphans, etc.), these organizations are often focused on propagating a Salafist interpretation of Islam. Many, including the International Islamic Relief Organization and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth concentrate on setting up and supporting mosque centers with an orthodox persuasion, as well as hiring, training and subsidizing imams with Salafi/Wahhabi orientation, and publishing and disseminating Salafist literature.
By 2000, the complex had produced 138 million copies of the Qur’an translated into twenty languages.\(^{43}\) It is extremely difficult to gauge the precise influence exerted by Wahhabism on Muslim religious practice. In the case of European Muslims, the influence cannot simply be measured by statistics. In a minority culture lacking both institutions for religious education and the means by which to produce new forms of knowledge, the easy access to theology that Salafism offers is one of the main reasons for its popularity. The widespread diffusion of Salafi teachings means that even non-Salafi Muslims evaluate their Islamic practice by Wahhabite standards. In other words, even if most Muslims do not follow Wahhabi dress codes—white tunic, head covering, beard for men, \textit{niqab}\(^{44}\) for women—the Salafi norm often becomes the standard image of what a good Muslim ought to be.\(^{45}\) Despite the strong presence of many different interpretations at the grassroots level,\(^{46}\) the Salafi revivalist interpretation of Islam dominates the Internet \textit{dawa}. Salafis oppose all forms of nationalized Islam either in the receiving or sending countries, at least rhetorically. For this reason, tensions between national religious authorities and Salafis are reported everywhere.

The appeal of transnational movements and their challenges for established religious groups are also reflected in the growing influence of evangelical movements in Europe. The \textit{EEA’s (European Evangelical Association) Brussels office} represents 15 million European evangelicals from 35 countries to the European Union.\(^{47}\) Compared to Latin America or Africa, the diffusion of evangelical Christianity in Europe remains small. Evangelicals represent less than two percent of the European population.\(^{48}\) Some 4.5 million of the UK’s foreign-born population claim to have a religious affiliation. Of these, around a quarter are Muslim, while more than half are Christian with Polish Catholics and African Pentecostals among the fastest-growing groups.

While traditional churchgoing has been on the decline in the UK over the past decade, immigration has made Christianity more charismatic and fundamentalist. The most significant change has been the growth of Pentecostal and charismatic Christianity among migrants from Africa and Latin America. In Lewisham, there are 65 Pentecostal churches serving the Nigerian community, and others serving the Congolese. Ghanaian and Ivorian Professor Mike Kenny of IPPR said: “The research shows that recent waves of inward migration have given a boost to some of the UK’s established faith

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\(^{44}\) A cloth covering the face in Wahhabi law.

\(^{45}\) Another group, albeit with much less financial resources, that takes a traditionalist and legalistic approach to Islam is the Tabligh, sometimes referred to as the Jehovah’s Witnesses of Islam. The Tabligh is usually described as a pious and proselytizing movement whose primary aim is to promote Islamic education. The essential principle of this sect within the Deobandi movement—founded in 1927 in India—is that every Muslim is responsible for spreading the values and practices of Islam. In the last two decades, this movement has gained a wide following, especially in Europe and the United States. In these conditions, competition rages in the West between Tablighis and Salafis, and anathemas rain down on both sides.

\(^{46}\) There are Muslim Brotherhood groups that are very active at the grassroots level and in creating Muslim organizations to cooperate with political institutions (see Marechal, Brigitte, \textit{Les Freres Musulmans en Europe: Racines et Discours (Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots and Discourses)}, (BRILL, Leuvenm, 2008).There are religious authorities related to some Muslim countries (Morocco, Algeria, and Turkey) who propagate a traditional interpretation of Islam. Finally, there is a proliferation of independent authorities: scholars (Tariq Ramadan, Professor of Islamic Studies at Oxford University, and known for his reformist thinking), social activists (Hamza Yusuf, Director of the Zeytuna Institute in San Francisco) and more traditional authorities (Cheikh Qaradawi, who became global with his show on Al Jazeera called \textit{Al Sharia wal Hayat} (Sharia and Life). For a typology of the different religious leaders operating in Europe and in the USA, see Cesari, J., \textit{When Islam and Democracy Meet} (New York: Palgrave, 2006).


Religion and Diasporas: Challenges of the Emigration Countries

communities at a time when Britain’s society and culture are generally more secular, and smaller numbers of the indigenous population are regularly attending churches.”

Recent migration trends are altering the faith map of the UK. Their biggest impact is being felt in the largest cities: London above all, where a rich mosaic of different faith communities has come into being. Evangelical Christianity may be heavily African-influenced, but it is also spreading among British natives.

France has witnessed an eight-fold increase in Evangelical Christians during the past half century, from roughly 50,000 to 400,000.

Evangelical movements also made significant in-roads in the Eastern parts of Europe, especially in the 1990s after the collapse of communism, although their influence has stalled since the early 2000s. The stagnation has been explained by a greater resistance of the traditional churches than in Latin America, as well as a greater suspicion towards movements seen as foreign and Western.

Overall, we are missing localized studies on the influence of these transnational movements on the religious landscape of the sending countries. Most surveys on Salafis focus on their doctrine and practices in different local contexts but do not systematically investigate the connection with their counterparts in countries of emigration.

When it comes to the situation of religious minorities, the focus of studies has mostly been on the sociology of clerics as well as on Islamic organizations, much less on the role of religion in the personal integration of immigrants.

III. When the Religion of the Sending Country is in Minority in the Receiving Country

The minority/majority divide has usually favored the sending countries’ interests vis-à-vis the receiving countries’, especially when there is no strong dominant religious institution in the sending countries. For example, in the initial phase of Muslim immigration to the West in the 1970s and 1980s, the religious institutions of the sending state had a monopoly on the representation of the religious interests of its nationals, especially vis-à-vis the political institutions of the receiving countries.

In the case of Catholic immigration, the state is supplanted by the Church, which sometimes has divergent interests, as we shall see below in the case of Spanish immigration in Germany.

The state’s or church’s monopoly is usually challenged and weakened by the rise of “autochthone” religious authorities in the receiving countries and by the competition of transnational religious networks. However, since 9/11, the securitization of immigration policies and the war against terrorism have created new “religious opportunities” for sending countries, especially Muslim ones.

An analytical review of the existing literature reveals that the decline of the religious legitimacy of clerics from sending countries has been a major focus of study as well as of political concern. The quick depreciation among emigrants of the religious leadership from the country of origin has deprived sending states of an important resource of political influence. This situation has been extensively studied in the case of Muslim minorities in Western Europe.

49 Ibid.
This depreciation is caused by the social, cultural and linguistic gap between the clerics from the countries of origin and the Muslim communities in the West. Islamic religious authorities in Western Europe are often more conservative than Muslims at large, and less well-integrated into society. A significant body of academic work has focused on this problem, including Frégosi,54 Shadid and van Koningsveld,55 Ceylan,56 Peter and Arigita,57 and van Bruinessen.58 This work concerns the sociological background of clerics, the political instrumentalization of religion by sending countries, and the training of clerics in the receiving countries.

A) The Background of Imams and Priests

On average, imams are foreign born, do not master the language of their host countries, are older than the immigrant population, and are characterized by very low religious skills. At the same time, they have become instrumental in the policies of the host countries, because they are seen first, as important actors in the social integration of Muslim immigrants and second, as possible partners in the fight against radicalization, especially since 9/11. For both reasons, actors from the sending states try to maintain influence among their former nationals and face increasing competition from migrants themselves, from transnational religious leaders and even from the receiving states.

Imoet Boender and Meryem Kanma, discussing the Netherlands, give a neat summary of the political challenge faced by European countries: “Can imams function as intermediaries between European and Islamic societies…to what extent to the countries of origin exert a political and ideological influence on Muslims in the host countries through these “key figures”; how can these men function in the host society if they do not speak Dutch; how do they interpret the norms and values of their host societies; should they not receive their education in the their host country rather than in their country of origin?”59 A primary concern is that the enduring influence of imams who are under-integrated into their host societies creates a sociocultural, political, and linguistic gap between clerics and the communities they have authority over. These questions can also be interpreted in relation to the cases of many European countries and immigrant Muslim leaders.

Politicians across Europe repeatedly express suspicion toward imams. In 2013, in an effort to counter radicalization, the Belgian foreign minister, Didier Reynders, announced different measures to control imams’ discourses in mosques as well as their training.60 According to Le Monde, data collected by the Interior Ministry indicate that France expelled 166 Islamists, including 31 imams, between September 2001 and 2011. In 2012, the Swedish state television (SVT) revealed that 6 out of 10 mosques in the country provide counseling in contradiction with Swedish laws on issues of the face veil, polygamous marriages, domestic violence and nonconsensual marital sex.61

56 Rauf Ceylan, Die Prediger des Islam: Imame - Wer sie sind und was sie wirklich wollen, Freiburg, Herder, 2010.
According to the study of the Council of British Pakistanis (CBP) in Scotland, most out of 31 imams, stated that the UK’s foreign policy and misrepresentation of Islam caused violent terrorism in the name of Islam.\(^{62}\)

Imams are also suspected of politicizing religion. For example, in 2009 in Milan, the collective prayers of Muslims to protest the situation in Gaza was presented by media and politicians as religion inciting hatred. In other words, Italian politicians interpreted the imams’ use of prayer as a political weapon that ran contrary to the Italian political culture.\(^{63}\)

At the same time, Muslim populations across Europe are in dire need of religious leaders to fulfill their basic religious requirements, a situation that cannot be ignored by European countries. For example, a 2011 internal document of the Dutch Ministry of Justice states a sharp increase in Muslim chaplains from 37 to 42, while the overall number of chaplains has gone down from 177 to 160.\(^{64}\)

Religious leaders can have a positive influence on social and political integration. Imams in Scotland have cooperated with law enforcement officers to diminish gang activities among the youth. These imams, mostly Scottish born, did not preach, but performed community service by working with the Youth Counseling Agency (YCSA) and Glasgow Community and Safety Services.\(^{65}\) In the same vein, it was reported that several imams called on young French Muslims to use their right to vote during the two rounds of the presidential elections on April 22 and May 6, 2013.\(^{66}\)

The same goal of fostering positive integration through Islam has justified the organization of representative bodies of Islam under the auspices of the state in Belgium, France and Spain. These new institutions were perceived at first as a fatal blow to the influence of the countries of origin. However, it appears that state actors have redefined their strategy of influence by working within these new institutions to maintain connections with their nationals or former nationals.

After 9/11, and even more so after the Madrid bombings and the 7/7 bombings, imams and religious institutions in general have been seen as major actors in the fight against radicalization. While umbrella Muslim organizations assert general principles, the fight against terrorism is usually conducted at the local level by mosques or imams cooperating with the police: this allows for informal influence by state and non-state actors from the sending countries.

In order to foster a peaceful Muslim society in Britain, British born imams led citizenship classes to differentiate British Islam from the “al-Qaida version” of Islam, to inspire young Muslims and to encourage them to feel part of British society.\(^{67}\)

Dutch mosques have developed a strategy against extremism: three mosques in Amsterdam supported and showed interest in cooperating with the plan of the Prime Minister of the Netherlands,


Jan Peter Balkenende, about fighting terrorism. In the same vein, Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen showed appreciation for imams and representatives of Muslim associations who got actively involved in a campaign against terrorism.

These different initiatives and somewhat contradictory perceptions of imams have drawn attention to external influence from the sending countries.

B) Political Instrumentalization of Religious Authorities by the Sending Countries

The external origin of most European imams has raised questions over the political influence of the sending countries. According to a study of the French Ministry of Higher Education and Research in 2013, 1,800 imams were educated in their countries of origin even though these imams are assigned to represent the second and third generation of Muslim immigrants. One of the main challenges for imam training is funding. That is why Algeria, Turkey, and Morocco are the primary countries that have been sending imams to France. For example, in 2010, the Algerian Minister of Religious Affairs sent 52 Algerian imams to France with the aim of promoting Algeria’s ideas among the immigrant Muslim community in France, as well as its stance against the extreme/radical notion of Islam. In the following year, 180 Moroccan imams came to France for the fast of the month of Ramadan in order to enhance Muslim immigrants’ spiritual experiences.

In 2012, the Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs, represented in Europe by DITIB, decided to open a training center in Strasbourg and intended to start training courses for at least 30 French students by 2013. The cost of the project, approximately 2 million Euros, is covered by the Turkish state, which means that the evaluation of the training will not be performed by French institutions.

Germany accepts imams posted by the Turkish government’s Presidency of Religious Affairs, who often have a poor knowledge of German and German culture. 90% of the imams in Germany are of Turkish origin and the rest are from Morocco or Iran. According to a research report by the Chester University, 8% of imams in British mosques are native born, and 6% of them speak English as their native language.

With Islamist governments in power in Turkey and Tunisia, the perception of Islam as a positive link with the country of origin is even stronger. Interestingly, these new authorities do not express it as an exclusive allegiance, like it was during the strong nationalist phase under authoritarian regimes. For example, in 2009, the Fetullah Gullen movement cooperated with the AKP government in Turkey to

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launch the “Alliance for Peace and Fairness”, which aims to unite Turkish Muslim communities with other Muslim groups in Germany. The leaders of this initiative have also called for all Muslims in Germany to use their political rights as citizens of Germany – as voting makes them contribute to the political representation of Germany. In these circumstances, Prime Minister Erdogan has expressed his support for the creation of a Turkish Muslim community without assimilation and discrimination in Germany, one that is in touch with the other Muslim communities in Germany. 76 As another sign of this acceptance of multiple allegiances, in July 2013 the Turkish government has decided to stop judicial pursuits against Turkish citizens abroad who have not fulfilled their military obligations. In the same vein, the Islamist regime post-Ben Ali in Tunisia has institutionalized the role of the diaspora, granting it eight seats in the Constituent Assembly in the October 2011 elections.

This implicit or explicit recognition of the multiple allegiances of Muslim immigrants by their former country of origin goes hand in hand with the growing trend among Muslims in Europe of valorization of multiple identities. In contradiction with the 1980s discourse on conflictual identities among second and third generation immigrants, research actually shows that people identify themselves with different nations and cultures, and manage trans-frontier activities and loyalties, without particular conflicts or tensions. 77

For this reason, Russia’s revival in world affairs in the 2000s has led to an explicit use of religion through increasing cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MF) and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). 78 In the 2000s the Putin administration issued a National Security Concept that aimed to stabilize all Russians’ “spiritual and moral welfare” and ensure that foreign religious organization and missionaries will be prevented from “destabilizing” Russians outside Russia. In the 1990s, the leaders of the ROC were afraid that Russia was losing its Orthodox identity and sought the state’s help to fight against the influence of other religious groups or sects inside and outside the country. Non-orthodox religious groups were depicted as foreign intelligence workers conspiring against “Russian policies and strategic activities”. 79 Therefore, the Russian Orthodox Church became a tool for the defense of the national and spiritual identity of Russians. “Spiritual security” became synonymous with the defense of religious freedom. The 2007 Act of Canonical Communion between ROCOR (The Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia) and the Moscow Patriarchate was a new step in the Russian government’s efforts to instrumentalize religion for international reasons. The unification of the ROC, the ROCO and the Russian President led to a sort of Russian “super-church”. ROC congregations in different countries were used as foreign intelligence centers in the 1970s. It was speculated that the Russian government could use the ROC congregation today in the same way for its geopolitical aims. The 2007 reunification has been seen as the most important and largest overture to the Russian diaspora by the Putin administration and the ROC. The ROC and the RFM aim to protect Russian citizens’ rights and liberties when living in foreign countries. In addition, the foreign minister supports the spiritual needs of the Russian diaspora. This includes building new churches and transferring lost properties back to Russian ownership. The re-appropriation of churches built in Western Europe prior to the communist period is part of this strategy: they are considered to be a tool for the unification of Russian people. There is a debate over the true owners of these properties, the Russian state or the Russian Orthodox Church. There is also the question as to which entity can supersede the other to influence Russians outside Russia is not clear. In fact, both entities are

strengthened by their “alliance”. In sum, by fighting against the militant secularism and Protestantism that permeates European culture, the ROC serves the Russian state’s international strategy.

Political instrumentalization by the sending countries, as well as concerns about transnational religious influence, have led to multiple political initiatives to train imams in receiving countries.

C) Training of Clerics in the Receiving Countries

Due to the persistent fear of international influence, receiving states have been taking initiatives to select the entry of imams on cultural grounds. They have checked their command of the language as well as their political background. They have also initiated training programs.

Since 2007, all incoming imams to Germany are required to take integration courses (such as German language and culture) whether they will be staying in Germany permanently or temporarily. At the same time, the German state has promoted Islamic Studies chairs in universities to foster a greater competence of homegrown Muslim leaders. Greater training for religious authorities is seen as a way to combat the dangers of communalism and fundamentalism that could be caused by cultural isolation. This initiative raised a lot of criticism from Muslim organizations that did not have a say in the curriculum’s definition, even if some faculties do seek advice from local mosques or national Muslim associations. In 2008, a case at the University of Münster caused a large debate: Muhammad Kalisch, Professor of Islamic Religion, publicly questioned the historical reality of the Prophet Mohammed, which caused an outcry among Muslim associations. They called for Prof. Kalisch to step down and discouraged students to take up Islamic teacher training in Münster. Because they had no say, Kalisch still continues to teach.

For this reason, the Wissenschaftsrat (German Council of Science and Humanities) has proposed granting both universities and Muslim associations a say in education. The new proposal seeks to guarantee the acceptance of Islamic teachers and imams among the believers, and, therefore, allows associations to have more influence. Together with the universities, they may take part in decision-making on what will be taught and by whom. While it is certainly necessary to consult Islamic expertise in this matter, the question is whether the largely conservative associations would be the best partners.

In 2007, the UK government addressed imam’s training from the language ability perspective. As a result, foreign-born imams who didn’t learn English were required to refrain from giving sermons. This ban’s purpose was to increase English-speaking imams, so it would be easier to fight against radicalism among young British Muslims. Sometimes the training of imams can be assigned to other religious institutes, like the Catholic Institute of Paris in France, which in 2008 started training Muslim chaplains.


In the Netherlands, in the early 2000s, state-subsidized imam-education programs were created and there was a requirement that imams recruited from Islamic countries must undergo a year-long integration course. However, less than a decade later, the only Dutch vocational training course for imams is closing, raising doubts over the fruitfulness of efforts to create a “Dutch Islam.” Indeed, the end of the program at Inholland University echoes more general concerns over integration and imam training: “It’s one of our most expensive programmes. A large proportion of the 150 students need intensive supervision. We are having to deal with students with different cultural backgrounds.”

The difficulty faced by this program, and others, is how Islamic education is to be standardized when faced with student diversity, differing backgrounds (cultural, religious, and otherwise) and economic concerns.

Even in countries of recent Muslim immigration, the training of imams has become a political priority. For example, a four-day seminary course initiative has been designed in Palermo to train imams in Italy, in dialogue with Muslim communities all around Europe. The seminary educates the non-Muslims of Sicily about Islamic values. About 30 Muslim imams and different professionals of the Muslim community participated in these educational programs, backed by the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO), cohosted with the Italian Religious Communities (COREIS), the Ministry of Religious Affairs of Kuwait and the Municipality of Palermo.

It is clear that across Europe, imam training is seen as a way of bridging cultural divides and integrating immigrants. A common theme across many different countries is the desire to create country-specific brands of Islam: “Dutch” Islam, “German” Islam, “French” Islam, and so on. Contextualizing and domesticating Islam is meant to foster attachment to a host country. Some scholars push back on government emphasis on imams solely; Jørgen Nielsen, for example, notes “most research shows that local imams have only minimal influence over their assemblies, with the partial exception of [a] few, notorious, extremist imams.” Regardless, governments across Europe continue to view domestic imam training as a way of strengthening the attachment of Muslims to host societies. Since 9/11 this goal is increasingly linked to security issues. Countries of origin like Morocco and Turkey have been using this particular angle to regain religious credibility in the receiving countries, by arguing that they can efficiently counter radicalism and Salafism. Interestingly, these challenges are much less critical in the case of the minority within the minority, as we will see in the next section.

IV) The Minority within the Migrant Minority

In addition, to the points highlighted above, surveys on minorities within the minority, like Alevi in Germany, highlight a few more specifics of the religious interaction between sending and receiving countries. First, in the case of oppressed minorities, migration breaks down the proclaimed religious and cultural homogeneity of the sending country by providing visibility and freedom of action. Second, this visibility can facilitate the group’s religious integration, when it promotes the same values as the receiving country. Third, this visibility is often re-invested in political actions in the country of origin and, indeed, beyond.

86 Ibid.
For example, the Alevi declaration in Germany\textsuperscript{89} in 1989 declared that Alevis are compatible with multiculturalism and therefore a resource for any society in which it operates. It emphasizes Alevi’s difference from Sunni Muslims in order to bring Alevi closer to German cultural values. Brochures in German on the Sivas massacre of 1993 (where 35 Alevi were killed by an angry mob) read: “Alevis do not differ from Germans with regard to fundamental rules and values,” as they, unlike fundamentalist Sunni Muslims, value democracy and the rule of law.\textsuperscript{90}

Because Sunni Islam in Germany is perceived negatively and associated with the oppression of women, terror, fanaticism and radicalism, Alevis have emphasized their difference to gain legitimacy as a distinct Muslim group within German society. For example, in the ongoing controversy over female teachers wearing the headscarf in public schools, Alevis have been explicitly opposed to the headscarf: they declare it unnecessary in religious terms. Therefore, they implicitly send the message that they can integrate within German culture and society. In other words, they present Alevism as the embodiment of universal values that has its place in Germany.

According to Soysal (1997),\textsuperscript{91} more immigrant communities can easily relate to Alevi identity politics because of its emphasis on citizenship and human rights issues. Thus, Alevis do not demand their rights through religion, but through the language of rights and citizenship. While Sunni Muslims demand halal slaughtering and emphasize their specificity, Alevis inscribe their demands within existing German law (Alevi rituals do not contradict German law) and the rhetoric of universal human rights.

For this reason, Alevis have gained greater institutional recognition than Sunni groups. Alevi leaders tend to associate with various German civil and governmental institutions, notably in interfaith dialogue. They raise funds for their local events by seeking institutional cooperation with municipal institutions. They also take advantage of public funding for various projects for disadvantaged youth and information for new citizens. While Alevis application for the legal status of “corporation under public law” has been pending since 1995, the application of Sunni Islamic organizations has immediately been rejected without consideration. This is another illustration of the political advantage of Alevis over Sunni Muslims in Germany. In the same vein, AABF, in the \textit{Länder} of North-Rhine Westfalia, Hesse, Berlin and Bavaria has achieved recognition as a religious community in accordance with Article 7, paragraph 3 of the Basic Law. This paragraph allows them to provide religious studies as a standard subject in the \textit{Länder} specified above.\textsuperscript{92}

The grounding of Alevism in German society has also strengthened its political struggle in Turkey by giving it global visibility. For example, the Alevi Cultural center in Hamburg has helped the Alevi cause by inviting politicians from Turkey such as Arif Sag, a member of Turkish parliament who participated in the campaign against anti-Kurdish politics in Iraq. It has also facilitated the development of religion by allowing the multiplication of places of worship and traditional teachings in Turkey. For example, the AABF assisted the construction of new Cem houses in the city of

\textsuperscript{89} “Alevi Declaration (Alevi Bildirgesi known in Turkish) made in 1989, stated that there were about 20 million Alevi among Turkey’s population of (at that time) fifty five million, i.e., that Alevi did not form a small minority. The declaration referred to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the Turkish constitution of 1982, both of which guarantee the freedom of conscience, opinion and religion. The declaration pointed out that Alevi did not enjoy freedom of religion in Turkey. It demanded the official recognition of Alevism in Turkey as an important step towards democratization of the country. The declaration also dealt with the situation of Alevi in Germany, stating that because of ignorance also in Germany only Sunnis are taken into account, and that Alevi should enlighten both Sunni fellow migrants and the German public about Alevis.”


Erzincan. When the funding was very limited in Turkey, the chairman of the AABF himself helped out through different German associations. It also allows many humanitarian events such as helping out the Alevi victims of the earthquake in the city of Pulumur in 1967.

Alevi’s relations are not limited to Alevis in Turkey. They extend to the multiple locations of the group. In other words, Alevis see their diaspora and the homeland as being interconnected. In this regard, the EU space is also an asset for the recognition of the Alevi movement. For example, a bilingual brochure (German/Turkish) about discrimination against Alevism in Turkey was sent to the EU. The brochure presented Alevism as embodying modernity, tolerance, enlightenment, freedom, and rejecting fanaticism, fundamentalism and sharia. The leader of AABK, Turgut Oker, implied that with these publications, the organization had the ambition to serve as a mediator in the relations between Turkey and Europe.

As already mentioned, the features described above, most notably disconnection between national and religious identities and competition from transnational movements, apply also to migrants who share the religion of the receiving countries. They also have specific additional characteristics analyzed below.

V) When the Religion of the Migrants is the Same as the Religion of the Majority in the Host Country

Counter-intuitively, past and recent surveys show that shared religion does not lead to cultural or social integration, even if it provides resources for structural integration. Political activism in the workplace, however, was and in some cases remains a powerful tool for social integration. For example a 2008 survey of Italian, Croatian and Spanish immigrants to Germany show that the immigrants and their offspring have not assimilated into the local church, let alone disappear into a Catholic “melting pot.” Many of them still live their faith in separate migrant parishes that do not foster social integration. In creating these structures, the Church acted similarly to some German Länder that offered special schools for immigrant children or local foreigners’ councils in the political sphere. The German unions, on the other hand, did not establish special institutions but rather included immigrant members in their regular structures.

At the same time, the parishes could efficiently support their members because of their resources. Offering social services, leisure activities, and linking the immigrants in dense networks, they initiated structural integration processes.

In the same vein, since Poland joined the European Union in May 2004, it is estimated that over half a million Polish nationals have arrived in Britain. The presence of Polish migrants has significantly transformed Catholic parishes around the UK, by increasing the number of parishioners as well as service attendance. The consequence has been a growing anxiety of the autochthonous priests over ethnic divides in parishes. The Archbishop of Westminster, Cardinal Murphy-O’Connor, publicly declared his fears of Poles splitting the Catholic Church in Britain, and urged them to integrate. He implied that the introduction of Polish masses hindered successful integration. The Polish clergy and community in Britain responded passionately and the deputy rector of the Polish Catholic Mission, Grazyna Sikorska, felt “spiritually raped” by the Cardinal’s words. This public disagreement over appropriate pastoral care for Polish migrants and their place in the Catholic Church in Britain has unfolded differently across the UK, but most tensions arise at the parish level.

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As Trezbiatowska states, “Catholic migrants in Britain serve as a good example of a faith group currently incapable of overcoming religion-national identity. While it may be true that Catholics of different nationalities can understand one another because their religious habitus is formed by the same religious institution “that features a very centralized and unifying liturgical spine.” It is not the case with Polish Catholic priests in the UK. Their habitus clashes with the local religious field (of British Catholics) they have entered, partly because the religious capital they deploy is determined by the needs of the consumers – the Polish laity – who expect “Polish”, rather than “universal”, Catholicism. Polish priests cannot afford to extend their definition of Catholicism cross-nationally because it would de-legitimize their relations with lay Polish migrants. Polish Catholics reinforce their Polishness through the use of native language and ethnic rituals, which in turn create “parallel congregations.”

From existing surveys about the majority situation, we can draw the three following conclusions. First, the role of the religion in integration varies according to its status in the country of origin. According to the survey of Catholic immigrants in Germany, each of the migrant groups’ parishes has a different way of understanding integration. For example, for Spanish priests, integration is undertaken through education. For Croatians, integration is about national community and finally going to back to the fatherland, as well as individual networking. For Italians, integration is about political fragmentation. According to the 2002 Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs among the states in the Federal Republic of Germany, Spanish and Croatian children are more successful than Italians: 58.7% of Croatian students and 54.3% of Spanish students accessed well-qualified schools, while that was the case for only 30.7% of Italian students. Scholars explain this difference by the fact that Spanish priests focus on education more than on religious instruction or preservation of origin identity. For the same reason, the percentage of inter-marriage between German and Spanish groups is higher than for Croatians or Italians. In contrast, Croatian groups tend to preserve their own identities and upward social status, and refrain from inter-marriages. Compared to Croatians, Italians are more open to intermarriage, but their children are less successful in schools, probably because Italian priests emphasize integration rather than self-organization.

Second, there is the possibility of marginalization of emigrants by the national religious institutions of the receiving country. A case in point is the emigrants from the Philippines to Italy, who are still perceived as “other” or different even if they share the same religion as the majority. Similarly, German Catholics have a higher social status than Catholic immigrants. According to Leuninger (1987), even though local parishes were supposed to be open to foreigners and native language counseling, immigrant Catholics became secondary church participants, because even if religion was a shared heritage, there were many differences in terms of social values.

2003-2009, the financial and personal support of the German Bishops’ conference for the integration of Catholic migrants in Germany has provoked resistance: for example, the Rottenburg-Stuttgart diocese raised concerns over divided parishes.

Again, socioeconomic status, political memory and perceived social distance play a decisive role in shaping the influence of religion in the integration process as well as its political relevance for the emigration country. More generally, it seems that in this case, religion is trumped by the level of modernization of the country of origin in comparison to the immigration country.

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96 Trezbiatowska, M, op-cit p.1069
Third, religious institutions from the sending country can act independently of the state and create connection with their counter parts in the receiving countries, thereby operating as an independent political force. In some cases, this political influence undermines the influence of the country of emigration (as with Spanish priests in immigrant parishes in Germany at the end of the Franco regime). In others, religious institutions maintain the diaspora in the cultural and political orbit of the emigration country, therefore, reinforcing its influence. For example the Croatian priests in Germany at the time of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{99}

\textbf{Overall synthesis}

The migration situation has increased, among migrants, a differentiation between personal attachment to religion and belonging as a sense of collective identity, both religious or national. This is a challenge for sending countries for which religion is part of national identity. It has obliged them to diversify their strategies \textit{vis-à-vis} their former nationals, as well as with the receiving countries. A widespread notion of “religious culture” with no fixed content seems to override the more circumscribed definition of “being religious” that is usually measured in polls.

Due to the rise of global proselytizing movements, the influence of the country of origin has to be contextualized in broader transnational religious spaces where different actors operate: state actors (from both sending and receiving countries), non-state actors from receiving and sending countries (religious leaders, intellectuals) and transnational actors (Salafis or Tablighis).

It seems that in the majority situation, there is a greater independence of the religious institutions of the sending countries \textit{vis-à-vis} the integration policies of the receiving countries. For example, in the case of the Catholic Church in the UK, integration strategies remain entirely under the jurisdiction of religious leaders, with no interference or guidance from the British state, whereas Muslim communities and their religious leaders are subjected to strict visa requirements and state control. The same seems true for Catholics in Germany. More studies are needed to find out if the “majority” condition is the major cause for this difference in treatment. In other words, is this independence due to the fact that the Catholic Church operates as a sort of state? Or is it due to the fact that Catholic groups are seen as familiar or closer to the dominant culture, and therefore need less control?

In sum, from the analysis above, the following six factors seem to influence the role of religion in interactions between sending and receiving countries:

- The preexisting political status of religion in the emigration country;
- The strong connection between religion and national identity (Muslim countries, Poland, Ukraine…);
- The respective countries’ mutual perception of emigration and immigration: from postcolonial memory to specific historical events or contemporary international situations (unskilled migration, the war on terrorism…);
- The influence of transnational religious movements (Salafism, Tablighi, Evangelical Movement) that challenge national versions of religion;
- The social and modernization distances between the emigration and immigration country (religion trumped by class).

\textsuperscript{99} Historically speaking, the first Croatian parishes were formed by the priests that escaped from communist Yugoslavia after 1945. 1960 was the time when Yugoslav leadership let the Catholic Church send preachers into foreign countries. About 84 Croatian priests were employed in Germany. In 2010, there were about 96 Croatian priests in Germany. The Croatian parishes had an important role in church services for the Catholics who came from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their bishop or head person of their diocese visited 89% of these parishes in Germany. 71% of these were members of a religious order. For example, for the Croatians, the most important religious order has, since the beginning, been the Franciscan Order. More recently, Franciscans still represent most of this parish population.
Interestingly, it is not possible to draw definitive conclusions from the existing literature on the positive or negative role of religion in the integration of migrants.

The way forward: the influence of religion in migrant integration

Based on research done by the author,\(^\text{100}\) it appears that some aspects of religion (like mosque attendance or church attendance) favor political participation, while others (like religious self-identification) do not. As Driskell et al have argued, church attendance is not on its own a significant predictor of political participation. Rather, “participating in Church activities (such as choir) and levels of church involvement have a positive and significant effect on political participation. Simply sitting in the pew appears not to matter; yet participating in various church activities and levels of church involvement play a significant role in political participation.”\(^\text{101}\)

According to existing surveys across different religious groups, religiosity is measured through two major indicators: church attendance and self-declaration of religiosity (do you consider yourself: very, little, or, not religious). In general, engagement in congregational activities and personal belief as an indicator of group consciousness positively influence political participation, defined as more than simply voting, to include civic activism (petitioning, demonstration, and voluntarism).

However, our surveys of Muslim immigrants raise the question of whether ethnic diversity engenders or inhibits social cohesion and, therefore, trumps religious influence. For example, respondents in these surveys expressed feelings of confinement within a specific ethnic or sociocultural group along with isolation from mainstream society. This did not foster strong solidarity or trust for the majority group. In this sense, focus group discussions validated the “conflict theory” that states that isolation fosters out-group distrust. However, two factors seem to change this “conflict” situation: the density of the minority group (for example, the percentage of the locality that is composed of members of that minority) and the cultural and social diversity of the whole population in the locality. For example, a 2008 British study showed that a greater density of ethno-religious minorities within a culturally diverse environment leads to higher voter turnout among those minorities.\(^\text{102}\) Therefore, density was far more significant than diversity per se in terms of minority political and civic participation. Interestingly, the same survey shows that the density of the Muslim population has a negative effect on the non-Muslim majority’s turnout in a given area.\(^\text{103}\) In other words, diversity and density did not decrease political participation among Muslims, but did negatively affect political engagement of members of the majority population.

Other surveys, however, have illustrated the opposite trend and assert that, in fact, ethnic diversity has a negative effect on trust and social cohesion. This theory, known as the “constrict theory,” has become prominent in the United States.\(^\text{104}\) In the European context, however, this theory is not systematically validated by data. On the one hand, some surveys have shown that ethnic diversity


\(^{103}\) Ibid.

\(^{104}\) Putnam argues that diversity “seems to trigger not in-group/out-group division, but anomie or social isolation,” asserting that “people living in an ethnically diverse setting appear to ‘hunker down’—that is, to pull in like a turtle.”
limits social trust. For example, a Dutch study in 2007, focusing on the neighborhood level, concluded that diversity has a negative impact on individual trust among neighbors. Diversity also has a positive impact on intra-ethnic trust, which means individuals tend to trust other groups less and trust their own ethnic group(s) more.105

Another 2010 study conducted across 19 different countries with various types of immigrants concluded that “diversity is detrimental to a vibrant civil society.”106 However, the authors nuanced their conclusions by emphasizing the role of “institutional arrangements” in determining how diversity affects a society. In a country of “greater economic insecurity, residents might feel more threatened by immigration and, therefore, withdraw more from collective life.” The study ultimately concedes that the relations between immigration and collective mindedness is mediated by institutional structures and state policies. If immigration is threatening – economically or culturally – it leads to “hunkering down.”

Although this survey confirmed that social cohesion can be hindered by ethnic diversity, it also emphasized that institutional arrangements can potentially work to counter such hindrance. For example, in the 1970s, Sweden and the Netherlands began implementing multiculturalism policies, such as funding for ethnic or immigrant organizations and non-majority language learning, along with the public recognition of immigrants. These policies have promoted social cohesion and have provided immigrants with support and symbolic legitimacy that could increase their “overall stocks of social capital as immigrant populations grow.”107 The authors also made clear that “hunkering down” concerns the majority groups, not primarily Muslim or other immigrant groups.

Overall, no clear trend emerges from these different surveys to confirm either the “conflict” or the “constrict” (“hunkering down”) theories. Altogether, though, these studies do shed light on a few factors that influence the positive or negative effects of ethnic diversity on social cohesion. First, it seems that in European contexts, the majority groups more than the minorities tend to “hunker down” in an ethnically diverse environment. Second, institutional arrangements and existing policies also affect social trust in the context of an ethnically diverse community. Third, for minority groups, other elements, such as ethnic density combined with class and socio-economic levels, facilitate or prevent social cohesion. Finally, the time cycle of the coexistence of different ethnic and cultural groups seems influential. As Putnam points out, hunkering down may simply be a short-term situation that can evolve as groups evolve.108

Due to these complex layers of factors, scholarly work has political weight. Specifically, it is very important to develop analyses that take into account context-level variables, such as policy making, institutions, and majority/minority divides, in order to avoid sweeping generalizations about the positive or negative influence of ethnic diversity that can be instrumentalized politically. For this reason, scholars should be aware of the political use of their generalizations, such as the often blanket assertion that “ethnic diversity leads to hunkering down.”109 In this regard, it is important to note that the critique of ethnic diversity as eroding social cohesion in Europe, along with the critique of multiculturalism, have become staples of anti-immigration discourse. The underlying assumption of this discourse is that immigrants show insufficient trust or eagerness to participate in mainstream

107 Ibid, 324.

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society, especially immigrants with a Muslim background. The more general the argument concerning
the negative effects of ethnic diversity, the more political traction it gains for politicians and pundits
who want to make a case against immigration and welfare politics, even if the premise of such an
argument is not validated by empirical data.

In sum, it is not possible to conclude that the more religious an individual migrant is, the more
politically engaged or disengaged he or she becomes. Other dimensions, such as ethnic affiliation,
immigrant status, and residential distribution, seem to affect the level and intensity of political
participation. Unfortunately, none of these dimensions have been systematically and comparatively
tested across religious immigrant groups in Europe.

Three primary points from our research can serve as a starting place for further analysis. First, more
investigation is needed to distinguish Islam as a marker for an identity group from Islam as personal
faith. The former more positively influences political participation. This is counterintuitive at a time
when Islam is defined as a collective ideology opposed to the West. Second, context-level variables,
such as local and/or regional ethnicity, religious makeup, and institutional arrangements, should be
taken into account in order to establish the relevant correlation between Islam, religion in general, and
political participation.

In the same vein, the political culture and existing norms of the region and nations in which
Muslims live need to be identified, because these are as important as their identification to Islam. This
refers particularly to the religious distance between Muslim believers and the rest of the population.
First, the gap is between “religious” migrants and “secular” Europeans. Across European countries,
the level of self-declared religiosity in the general population is systematically much lower than
among immigrant groups. In other words, the general context of religiosity and social legitimacy of
religions in each country is the real discriminatory factor that must be understood is getting to grips
with the situation of Islam and of Muslims.
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