It seems we all have survived the passage of the millennium without many visible trials and tribulations. Actually, one could contend that Dionysius Exiguus, the monk who around 525 A.D. came up with the A.D. calendar division now in use around the globe, miscalculated and postdated the birth of Jesus by at least four years, in which case our millennial celebrations were actually a few years late. Alternatively, one could believe that Dionisius Exiguus was misguided in choosing the Incarnation rather than the Passion and Resurrection of Christ as the *anno Domini*, in which case we were a few decades early. Or one might follow the Jewish calendar, or the Islamic one, or the Chinese, the Aztec, whichever, in which case the B.C./A.D. convention is meaningless. Or one could be a strict separationist and deem it unconstitutional to imbue our strictly secular calendar conventions with any particular denomination religious meaning and, therefore one would carefully lowercase the B.C./A.D. signs into the religiously neutral *b.c./a.c.*, before and after “our common era.” Which, of course, only opens up the question who are the we? Common to whom? Which era are we talking about? We could continue this exercise *ad infinitum* and *ad absurdum*.

The fact is that most Christian believers, whether pre-millennial, post-millennial, or simply a-millennial accept the fact that only the Father knows the hour and the day and despite all numerology, it may be futile to try to curtail God’s freedom by tying the divine eschatological plans to our own secular calendars and human deadlines. Sacred time and secular time are related, for sacred time can only happen within worldly time. But the relationship is not objective or automatic, and therefore believers are compelled to search for God’s

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1 The BC dating was first introduced two centuries later around 731 by the Anglo-Saxon monk, the Venerable Bede.
signs in worldly events, with or without the help of prophetic revelations. Very few Christian millenialists, however, looked at the year 2000 as a significant event in God’s calendar. Most of the hoopla connected with the year 2000 was predominantly secular in origin and character. Indeed, looking at the year 2000 preparations, anticipations, and celebrations a few striking things stand out. I am going to select five:

1) The most striking thing perhaps is how little millenarian the turn of the second millennium has turned out to be. This is the more surprising given the many build-up signs anticipating much greater outbursts of millenarian fervor around the year 2000 (Clagett 1999; Strozier and Flynn 1997; Stearns 1996). The few well-publicized incidents of apocalyptic mayhem induced by millenarian doomsday cults, beginning with the collective suicide of the Peoples Temple in Jonestown in 1978, and followed by the apocalyptic immolation of the Branch Davidians in Waco, TX in 1993, by the ritual murders and collective suicides of members of the Order of the Solar Temple in Switzerland and Quebec between 1994 and 1997, culminating in the 1997 mass suicide of the Heaven’s Gate UFO cult in California, led many experts to anticipate increasing eschatological millenarian activity (Robbins and Palmer 1997). The fact that l’affaire Temple Solaire happened in francophone Europe and Canada and that it was contemporaneous with the Aum Shinrikyō sarin gas attacks in Japan, led some people to the conjecture that apocalyptic millenarian movements were assuming a global character and were no longer primarily Christian or restricted to their traditional breeding ground in the United States (Hall and Schuyler 1997; Mullins 1997). Here in the United States, the public re-emergence of Protestant Fundamentalism in the 1980s had exposed to public view this peculiar cultural survival of Anglo-American Protestantism, dispensationalist pre-millennialism (Marsden 1980). Traditional pre-millennialist images and beliefs, now filtered through the popular media of religious radio, televangelism, and the best-selling books of Hal Lindsey had entered the mainstream of American mass culture and were now routinely exploited by secular Hollywood (The Rapture, Armageddon), were strangely informing American geo-political debates, particularly on the Middle East, and were feeding the paranoid anxieties of extremist fringe groups from Catholic Marian apocalypticism to the right-wing militias of Survivalists and the Christian Identity movement (Boyer 1992; Benjamin 1998; Wojcik 1997; Cuneo 1997; Lamy 1996). Not surprisingly, given such an apocalyptic cauldron, millenial outbursts were anticipated by academic experts and sensational journalists alike. Alas! The feared millennial frenzy did not materialize.

2) In this respect, the second millennium has turned out to be not unlike the first one. The visions of millennial terror and frenzy around 1000 A.D., most historians now admit, were concocted by 18th and 19th century rationalist or romantic historians. Particularly, the great French historian Jules Michelet wrote such a vivid and realistic narrative of the “Terrors of the year 1000,” that it
became a standard account (Bernstein 1999). Richard Landes' (1997) recent revisionist attempt to reopen and give new life to the apocalyptic atmosphere of the year 1000 is unconvincing. People throughout Europe used different calendars and were probably not much aware of living through 1000 A.D. But Landes may be more right in arguing that the period, albeit for reasons that may have little to do with millennialism, marks a turning point in Western European Christianity, preparing the ground for all the reform movements of the 11th century: the Peace of God, the Cluniac reform, the Papal reformation, the Crusades (Head and Landes 1992). Indeed, one could even say that the period constitutes the very formative foundation of Western Christendom as a civilization. We are accustomed to think of Western European Christianity as a 2000-year-old civilization. As a system of religious beliefs and practices this may be the case, but sociologically speaking the core institutions and social forms of Western European Christendom which form one of the foundations of modern Western civilization are only 1000 years old: the first 500 years as Medieval European Christendom centered around the Papacy and the next 500 years as modern Western Christianity in its post-Reformation multi-denominational forms and in its expanded Western colonial and post-colonial forms. Let's not forget that the core of Western Christendom, the Holy Roman Empire with the Papacy as its spiritual head, was only established in 962 and that its internal and external boundaries only became fixed around 1000, with the conversion of Norse and Vikings, Magyars, and Western and Eastern Slavs and with the consolidation of the schism between Eastern and Western Christianity in 1054 with the excommunication of the Patriarch of Constantinople. None of the other non-Western forms of Christianity — Byzantine, Alexandrian-Coptic, Antiochian-Syrian-Middle Eastern, Armenian, etc., — which are much older and institutionally closer to early Christianity, and thus one could say more primitively Christian, none of them has evinced the historical dynamism of Western Christianity in its European and New World forms. As we are entering the third millennium, however, we are witnessing the end of hegemonic European Christianity due to a dual process of advanced secularization in post-Christian Europe and of the increasing globalization of a de-territorialized and de-centered Christianity. Thus, the one thousand year old association between Christianity and Western European civilization is coming to an end. Western Europe is less and less the core of Christian civilization and Christianity in its most dynamic forms today is less and less European.

3) If the turn of the second millennium was not unlike the first in its lack of eschatological millenarian fervor, the end of the 20th century was much unlike the end of the 19th century. Last turn of the century was characterized by a dual atmosphere or spirit, by post-millennial progressive fever and by fin de siècle anxiety (Briggs 1985; Schorske 1981; Weber 1986; Schwartz 1990). Both progressive fever and anxiety have been manifestly absent from the year 2000 millennial celebrations, as well as from its much shorter anticipatory
preparations. Despite all the millennial media hype, the attitude has been much more subdued, even blase, than a century ago.\(^2\) It is of course too early to tell, and future historians analyzing the spirit of our own age may or may not confirm it, but it is my impression that we may be witnessing the end of post-millennialism as a progressive philosophy of history.

The view that modern progressive and teleological philosophies of history as well as Enlightenment rationalist beliefs in progress have a Judeo-Christian origin and may be viewed as secularized forms of Biblical millennialism, has an old pedigree and has been stated in many different forms, perhaps most persuasively and systematically in Karl Löwith’s *Meaning in History*. The thesis found a forceful rebuttal in Hans Blumenberg’s *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*. In an attempt to defend the Enlightenment and modern scientific rationalism from Nietzschean-based critiques, Blumenberg (1983) traces equally convincing the modern views of historical progress and the self-confident sense of superiority of “the moderns” over “the ancients” back to the actual historical experience of Western European societies from the late Middle Ages, through the Renaissance, the early modern Scientific Revolution, and the expansion of capitalism, as well as to the utopian visions of a new anthropocentric social order which originated in such historical experiences. Blumenberg’s aim was to show that modernity does not have a religious and therefore an irrational and illegitimate Judeo-Christian pedigree. Inadvertently, for he seemed to have been unaware of the heated German debate, Theodore Olson (1982) offered a convincing resolution to the debate by showing that the modern belief in progress, as it crystallized in the 18th century as a dominant, pervasive, and taken for granted worldview, was equally dependent on contributions from both, millennialism and utopianism. It was the peculiar combination of millennialism and utopianism, two old separate traditions almost antithetical in character and with very different roots, that explains the nature of modern beliefs in progress. From this perspective, post-millennialism can be viewed as secularized Christian millennialism infused with utopian Enlightenment rationalism. If the thesis is correct, we may be witnessing the end of post-millennialism not so much because of the decline of Christian millennialism due to further secularization, but rather because of the collapse of utopianism, one of the two legs sustaining the modern belief in historical progress.

The post-modern critiques of Enlightenment rationalism and historical grand narratives, as well as the post-colonial deconstructions of Western modernity should be viewed not so much as the cause, but rather as evidential expression of the collapse of utopianism. As we enter the 21st century, history is

\(^2\) The concept of century as a one hundred year calendar unit emerged first around 1300 and became firmly established in its secular usage only in the 16th century. The year 1700 marks the first public turn of the century celebration in Europe, a practice which became increasingly widespread and globalized in the next three centuries (Schwartz 1990; Gould 1997).
no longer taken for granted as a meaningful, teleological, progressive, and
immanently driven process, a worldview that has been so uncontested for almost
three centuries that even the unequaled historical catastrophes and the unprece-
dented inhuman barbarisms of the 20th century could at first not make a dent on
it. Francis Fukuyama's (1992) "end of history" thesis may be right after all, but
not, as he implies, because history has reached its immanent telos with the
realization of the Hegelian dialectic of master and slave through the final
triump of liberal democracy, (as much as this may be indeed a prodigious
historical achievement), but rather because of the collapse of the utopianism
which had sustained modern conceptions of history. Paradoxically, the collapse
of utopian visions is happening at a time of accelerating technological and sci-
cific revolutions and at the very inception of a new global age.

Just three symbolic illustrations of our flattened utopian vision:

a) Contrast the long-list of utopian, science-fiction, and futuristic scientific works
centered on the year 2000, from Restif de la Bretonne's 1789 play The Year 2000 to Herman
Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener's 1967 exercise in social-scientific forecasting, The Year 2000,
with the dearth of any kind of forecasting of the 21st century, not to speak of anybody daring
to imagine what the next century, the 22nd, may look like.

b) Think of how the Clinton-Gore electoral slogan "a bridge to the 21st century" failed
to catch the popular imagination. We can only think of the next century as more of the same
and not as something radically new, and therefore we are possessed neither by progressive
fever nor by existential angst.

c) Consider the perplexing lack of excitement generated by the news of the
extraordinary achievement of the human genome project, notwithstanding the fact that it
happened in the midst of the millennium and is certain to have revolutionary consequences
for human life on earth. Our utopian vision deadened, we've learned to take the most
astounding scientific and technological breakthroughs in stride.

The end of post-millennialism as we've known it, however, does not neces-
sarily mean the end of Christian millennialism. On the contrary, it is the crisis
of utopianism and of the imminent progressive philosophy of history it entailed
that opens the way for the unexpected revival of transcendent millennialisms,
Christian as well as non-Christian. Thus, the surprising vitality of traditional
Protestant pre-millennialism and the enduring fast growth of the most
millennialist of Christian denominations — Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, and
Seventh Day Adventists. The modern interpretive understanding of Jesus as the
charismatic leader of an eschatological cult helps to explain the perennial
presence of millenarian sects in the history of Christianity (Cohn 1970;
Baumgartner 1999; Weber 1999). One only needs direct access to the Gospels
unmediated by historical traditions and unencumbered by church doctrines to
find there the paradigmatic model of a successful millenarian cult.

4) Equally striking and even paradoxical is the fact that the least mil-
ennalist of all Christian denominations, the Catholic Church, had the greatest
millennial celebration and prepared for the coming of the millennium with
almost millenarian anticipation. The traditional amillennialism of the Roman
Catholic Church is well known. It was consolidated in the fourth century in its conflict with the North African millennialist Donatist sect. St. Jerome set the basis for Catholic amillennialism by deriding the idea of a thousand years earthly kingdom of God as a fable and St. Augustine gave it the standard definitive form. Thereafter, the Catholic Church rejected the vision of a Kingdom of God on earth as well as the idle numerical millennial calculations. In other words, the Kingdom of God was both otherworldly and eternal and thus unrelated to the saeculum, to the secular world and the secular age.

The Vatican aggiornamento of the 60s altered radically the traditional Catholic position by embracing the saeculum, that is, the modern secular age and the modern secular world. In its temporal dimension, the legitimacy of the modern age entails the acceptance of the principle of historicity, the continuous revelation of God's plans of salvation in and through history, and thus the church's obligation to discern prophetically "the signs of the times." In its spatial dimension this process of internal secularization entails an innerworldly reorientation. From now on, action on behalf of peace and justice and participation in the transformation of the world will become not an added but a constitutive dimension of the church's divine mission. This innerworldly historicist reorientation has led Catholicism to embrace a progressive view of history to such an extent that Catholicism may be today the most post-millennialist of all major Christian denominations. Considering that traditional Catholicism had been characterized by a negative philosophy of history which viewed the modern age as a concatenation of related heresies from Protestantism to atheist communism, the reversal is quite remarkable.

This general Catholic reorientation was reinforced and shaped in a particular direction by the personal millennialism of the present Pope John Paul II, who despite his advanced age and fragile health devoted himself with amazing vigor to the year-long millennial celebrations, he carefully prepared and anxiously anticipated for years. The very fact that he was alive to celebrate the special Jubilee year 2000, he and many Catholics interpreted as a clear sign of divine grace and as confirmation of his papal mission.

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3 Emperor Constantine, even before his baptism, used the repressive power of the state to enforce church unity. It was the first time that state authority was used to repress a dissenting movement within Christianity, thus setting a fateful precedent of state repression against millennial groups and establishing the model of church in the Weberian sense, as an institution claiming the monopoly of the means of grace over a territory. The reaction of the Donatists was fraught with equally fateful precedents. They embraced martyrdom proudly, frequently through self-immolation by fire, and redirected the apocalyptic invectives of the Book of Revelation against the first Christian emperor, "the Antichrist," and against the Pope and Roman church, "the whore of Babylon," establishing images which have endured with every millennialist sect until the present. The more Roman the Christian church became, the more it had to shed its millennialism and the anti-imperial anti-Roman vitriolic of the Apocalypse.

4 The Catholic tradition of Jubilee years goes back to 1300AD, when Pope Boniface VIII issued the bull Antiquorum, granting indulgences to those who visited the main Roman basilicas during the year in commemoration of the century past and in celebration of the new age to come. It marked, therefore, the first celebration of the end of a Christian century. By the end of the 15th century the custom of celebrating a
But for Karol Wojtyła the model for the Jubilee 2000 was the experience of the celebration of the millennium of Polish Christianity in 1966. This celebration constituted a turning point in the protracted battle between the Catholic Church and the Communist regime over the minds of the Polish people. The massive effervescent celebration served as the culmination of a plan devised and implemented by Cardinal Wyszyński upon his release from prison, to keep the church and the nation mobilized, for 26 years, around the traditional Marian devotion to Our Lady of Częstochowa. It began with the rededication of the nation to the “Queen of Poland” in 1956, followed by the yearly vows of the Great Novena culminating in the 1966 millennium celebrations of Polish Christianity. The attempt of the regime to upstage the church by organizing competing celebrations of the millennium of Polish statehood failed miserably. This triumph was capped by the annual procession of the Black Madonna to every single town in Poland, leading up to the celebration of the ninth centenary of the martyrdom of Saint Stanislaw in 1979, and culminating in the unanticipated visit of the recently elected Polish pope. The crescendo of the collective effervescence was palpable to participants and observers alike (Casanova 1994).

It should be clear that this is a very different kind of millennialism than the dispensationalist one. We could call it Durkheimian millennialism, with altogether different numerical calendar calculations oriented to the commemoration of past events, rather than future ones. It certainly illustrates in paradigmatic fashion the power of religious beliefs and rituals to serve the cause of social integration by re-creating the bonds of solidarity of the imagined community of the nation. It also links sacred history and secular history in an intricate way; it scrutinizes the “signs of the times” in order to divine prophetically God’s redemptive plans; and it demands from believers the appropriate attitude of penance, change of heart, and commitment as condition for the success of the divine plans. Furthermore, this form of revivalism is often linked to a call for action which has not merely conservative or traditionalist implications. As the rise of Solidarity one year after the completion of the Marian program of mobilization clearly indicates, it can also prepare the ground for radical social transformation.

Inspired by the Polish revivalist experience and imbued with a powerful sense of divine mission, John Paul II has tried to recreate this millennial revivalism within the entire Catholic Church, with more mixed results. As the first non-Italian pope in almost five centuries, and as the first Slavic pope in history, he felt a special mission to liberate the Slavic peoples from the communist yoke and to further ecumenical dialogue with the Eastern churches.

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jubilee every 25 years was well established and despite Luther’s critique of the indulgences trade, the practice continued albeit with much diminished popular support until its recent revival and vigorous reaffirmation by the present pope.
The fall of the Berlin Wall confirmed him in his mission, now redefined as the reunification and spiritual regeneration and materialism of Christian Europe. But his vision had to confront the presence of a stubbornly materialist capitalist Western Europe, the traditional core of Western Christendom, that he came to perceive as increasingly pagan, hedonist and unresponsive to his revivalist message. Frustrated, he turned to Eastern Europe, particularly to Catholic Poland, still untouched by capitalist materialism, urging them to serve as the "spiritual reservoir" of Christian Europe, only to find out that Western material goods and materialist values were flooding the Eastern spiritual reservoir. The failed assassination attempt and the recovery which he attributed to a miraculous Marian intercession confirmed him in his millennial vision and mission, now tinged with suffering messianism and Marian apocalypticism connected with the third secret of Fatima. The celebration of the second millennium became now a millennial goal in itself.

5) The fifth striking thing, now focusing narrowly upon the Y2K's New Year's Eve celebration, is that it was the first common collective global celebration in the history of humanity. The simultaneous and reciprocal broadcasting of the 24 hour-long party celebrations around the globe made them into something more than a global party hyped by the media. What made the event special and different from other televised spectacles with perhaps as large an audience was the reciprocal reflexivity virtually built into it and shared by the active participants, making them reflexively aware of partaking in the same common global human celebration. Strictly speaking, it was a secular party devoid of religious symbolism or meaning. Indeed, most religious people around the world may have purposefully stayed away from it. Yet from a Durkheimian perspective, it may be viewed as a sacred event, as the first collective celebratory virtual gathering of humanity. For the first time in history humanity shared virtually the same time and the same space. Indeed, tongue in cheek, I am even going to propose that ASR sponsors a resolution addressed to humanity suggesting that we humans redate all our calendars globally and reset Y2K as Y0ac, that is, as the first year of our truly common era.

Now a bit more seriously, the image of a year zero is not so far-fetched if one considers that the millennium celebration had, despite its name, absolutely no temporal referent. The con-celebrants were not commemorating some common history or some common past event, historical or mythical. Humanity, in this sense, has no common history. Only now in the age of globalization are we writing and constructing the first world histories. If there was any temporal referent it was solely to the present, to the common present shared by global humanity. The referent and the symbolism was primarily spatial, the globe and the 24 time-zones or spaces. One could say that with globalization the spatial metaphor has come to replace the dominant temporal-historical metaphor of modernity. Globalization is the new philosophy of space that has come to replace progress, the old philosophy of history. Both are conceived similarly as
meaningful, teleological, immanently driven, and forward advancing processes. Both processes just happen before humans become reflexively aware of them and of their own actions' complicity in bringing them about. Only then can they become "projects." Of course, globalization is also a temporal-historical process in so far as it happens in historical time, but its primary reference is not temporal but spatial, in the same way as history also happens in space, but has no intrinsic spatial referent.

GLOBALIZATION?

So what do we mean by globalization and how does it affect religion? Obviously, I cannot try to offer a systematic, much less a comprehensive, answer. I can only select arbitrarily a few entry points in the hope that they may illuminate some areas of the complex and fluid field. I will begin with a series of general statements about globalization, upon which I cannot elaborate further thus they will have to be taken at face value:

- Globalization is not a historical process whose origins can be dated.
- Historically, globalization is a process continuous with modernity, with the capitalist world system, and with the world system of states.
- Globalization serves as an analytical category to indicate that these processes, while continuous, have entered a qualitatively new phase.
- While continuous with modernity, globalization breaks with the grand narratives and philosophies of history, undermines the hegemonic project of Western universalization, and decenters the world system. In this sense, globalization is post-modern, post-colonial, and post-Western.
- Globalization is surely continuous with the world capitalist system, but it frees capitalism from its territorial-juridical embeddedness in state and national economies, and therefore fosters its further development, quantitatively as well as qualitatively, unencumbered by extrinsic political, cultural, or moral principles.
- Globalization is also continuous with the world system of states, but it alters radically that system by dissociating the elements which were clustered together within the nation-state: administrative territorial state, political society or body of citizens, market economy, civil society, and nation, all embedded territorially within a system governed by the principle of undivided and exclusive sovereignty. Globalization limits and relativizes state sovereignty; frees capitalist market and civil society from its territorial-juridical embeddedness in state and nation; and, as a result, dissolves the particular fusion of nation and state which emerged out of Western modernity and became institutionalized worldwide, at least as a model, after the French Revolution. Globalization does not mean the end of states or the end of nations and nationalism, but it means the end of their fusion in the sovereign territorial nation-state.

Globalization and Religion

Now let's bring religion back in! Obviously, I am not going to try to discuss the different ways in which globalization may affect religion or vice versa. For instance, I am not going to touch upon the kind of issues which have been the
analytical focus of our dean of globalization theory Roland Robertson (1992) and associates, since I could only rehash their arguments in less eloquent form (Robertson and Chirico 1985; Simpson 1996; Beyer 1994). Following the line of argumentation initiated above, I am particularly interested, as I've always been, in reviewing from a long-term historical perspective the changes in the patterns of relations between church, state, nation and civil society brought about by processes of globalization. After reviewing these changes analytically, I'll offer some illustrations of two contemporary forms of global religion: Catholicism and Pentecostalism.

Church and State

As the Weberian definitions of both indicates, there is an intrinsic relation between church and state. Both are defined by the same dual principle of territorality and monopolistic claims, over the means of salvation in the case of the church, over the means of violence in the case of the state (Weber 1978:54-56). Both are either mutually dependent, enforcing and legitimating each other's claims, or mutually exclusive and antagonistic. As I've written elsewhere (Casanova 1994:45-48), the church is a particular historical fusion of two types of religion which, following Weber, we should distinguish analytically: the community cult and salvation religions. Not every salvation religion functions as a community cult, i.e., is coextensive with a territorial political community or plays the Durkheimian function of societal integration. Think of the many denominations, sects or cults in America which function primarily as religions of individual salvation. Nor does every community cult function as a religion of individual salvation offering the individual qua individual salvation from sickness, poverty, and from all sorts of distress and danger. Think of state Confucianism in China, Shintoism in Japan, or most caesaro-papist imperial cults.

Historically the formation of the modern European system of states, the Westphalian system which later gained worldwide expansion, and the post-Reformation dissolution of Western Christendom into competing churches were interrelated and reciprocally conditioned processes. In the early absolutist phase every state and church in Europe tried to reproduce the model of Christendom according to the principle cuius regio eius religio, which de facto meant that all the territorial national churches fell under the caesaro-papist control of the absolutist state. This model of church-state fusion was already challenged by the liberal-democratic state and is now undermined further by processes of globalization. The liberal state challenged the monopolistic claims of churches by introducing either principled constitutional separation and religious freedom or expedient religious toleration. Globalization furthers this process by undermining the principle of territorality at various levels. The universalization and globalization of human rights deterritorializes their state-based jurisdiction, i.e., the human
person is the carrier of inalienable rights, and freedom of conscience is the most sacred of these personal rights. The world system of states and its supranational rules and institutions limit state territorial sovereignty and undermine the traditional etatist principle of non-external interference in the internal affairs of states. By undermining the territorially-based fusion of state, market, nation, and civil society, globalization also undermines the model of territorially based national religion or culture. At the very least, we can say that globalization makes Weber’s definition of both, church and state, outmoded and increasingly irrelevant.

Church and Nation as Imagined Communities

As Benedict Anderson (1991) has pointed out, the modern nation has to be understood as the combined successor of the dynastic monarchy as political system and of the church as a religious community. With the dissolution of medieval Christendom, the old transnational sacred community integrated by Latin as a sacred language was transformed into fragmented, pluralized, and territorialized churches. The new state churches functioned as community cults of the absolutist state and as national religious communities integrated by the emerging national vernaculars which were gradually transformed into high literary languages by the printing press. The process of nationalization of the state churches, exemplified by the Anglicanization of the Church of England, was most pronounced in Protestant countries, but became generalized also in Catholic and Orthodox countries, as shown by the Gallicanization of the French Catholic Church and by the Russification of the Orthodox Church under Peter the Great. Similar versions of the same national millennial myth, using biblical archetypes of the New Jerusalem, the New Israel, and the chosen people, first used probably by Savanarola in 15th century republican Florence, are to be found throughout 16th century Europe: in Spain, Portugal, France, and England. The archetypical myth serves to link together sacred land, sacred history, and sacred people, anticipating the same combination one finds in 19th century secular nationalism. The great French nationalist historian, Jules Michelet, was conscious of recreating the myth when, convinced that church and Christianity were dead, he decided that France had to take the place of God “whom we miss” and that his beloved country had to fill the “incommensurable abyss left by an extinguished Christianity” (Bernstein 1999:114). Thus spoke Michelet before Zarathustra. Durkheim’s secular republican is equally self-conscious of filling the same void. Again, following Anderson (1991:12), modern nationalism has to be understood not as a form of “self-consciously held

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5 The myth of Moscow as the Third Rome, after the Fall of Constantinople, the Second Rome, plays a similar function in 16th century Russian state nationalism.
political ideology,” but as a secularized form of the religious cultural systems, “out of which as well as against which — it came into being.”

Excursus on Secularization

It should be evident, I hope, that therein lies the key to the radical secularization of Christian Europe. Do not worry! I am not going to rehash the fruitless secularization debate between Europeans and Americans all over again (Bruce 1992). But allow me a brief excursus which is related to our topic at hand, religion and globalization. After all, the relative validity of the two theories will be measured eventually not by how much they are able to account for what happens to religion in Europe or the United States, but for what happens to religion in the rest of the world. We have reached an impasse in the debate. I say we, because I am caught in the middle urging both sides to take each other’s arguments more seriously in order to learn from the valid points and the blind spots in both positions (Casanova 1994). The traditional European theory of secularization, which postulates a structural link between social differentiation and religious decline, offers a relatively plausible account of European developments, but is unable or unwilling to take seriously, much less to explain the surprising vitality and extreme pluralism of denominational forms of salvation religion in America, notwithstanding the pronounced secularization of state and society (Casanova 2001). What Stephen Warner (1993) has called “the emerging American paradigm” turns the orthodox model of secularization on its head and uses the American evidence to postulate an equally structural relationship between disestablishment, an open, free, competitive, and pluralistic religious market, and high levels of individual religiosity. Low levels of religiosity in Europe ought to be explained, accordingly, by the persistence of either establishment or of highly regulated monopolistic or oligopolistic religious markets (Caplow 1985; Stark and Iannaccone 1994; Finke 1997). But as Steve Bruce (2000) has shown convincingly, internal comparative evidence within Europe simply does not support the basic tenets of the American theory. Monopolistic situations in Poland and Ireland are linked to persistently high levels of religiosity, while increasing liberalization and state deregulation elsewhere are often accompanied by persistent rates of religious decline. Thus, the impasse. The orthodox model works relatively well for Europe but not for America, the American paradigm works for the U.S. but not for Europe. The supply side theory of religion needs to explain why there is no greater individual demand for religious salvation in Europe in the face of open free markets and, even more so, why religious suppliers, and there have been plenty of religious entrepreneurs who have failed lately in Western Europe, seem unable to generate or mobilize greater religious demand. The notion of a constant religious demand or of a constant demand for supernatural compensators is a-historical, a-sociological, and flies in the face of European facts.
Imagined Communities, Religions, and Globalization

If we want to make sense of religion today not only in Europe but throughout the world, and with this we are back to our topic, we simply must think of religions more as cultural systems and less as religious markets. Surely, our theories will be less elegant and less scientific, but they will make more sense of complex historical realities and will lead to greater understanding. They will also be less-UScentric. The truly puzzling question in Europe, one we need to address, is why churches and ecclesiastical institutions, once they ceded to the secular nation-state their traditional historical function as community cults, that is, as collective representations of the imagined national communities, also lost in the process their ability to function as religions of individual salvation. The issue of greater or lesser monopoly is relevant but not the most crucial one. In this context, it may be more helpful to think of churches, in the Durkheimian sense of the term, as collective representations of imagined communities, than to think of them, in Weber’s sense, as monopolistic salvation institutions or firms. Ireland and Poland illustrate the case of churches which were strictly speaking not monopolistically established, in the Weberian sense, yet continued to function as community cults of the nation in the absence of a secular nation-state, and have maintained their ability to function also as religions of individual salvation. Elsewhere in Europe, by contrast, once the secular nation takes over their function as community cults, churches tend also to decline as religions of individual salvation (Davie 2000). For a vivid illustration, closer to home so that you do not think that this is strictly speaking a European problem, think of Quebec, so similar to Poland and Ireland otherwise, and the sudden collapse of Catholicism there with the rise of Quebequois secular nationalism. Once the Catholic Church ceased being the community cult of Quebec, people ceased going to church and stopped looking for alternatives, having apparently lost also the need for individual religious salvation, so evident only a decade before. We could rephrase the question and ask, why individuals in Europe, once they lose faith in their national churches, do not bother to look for, or actually look disdainfully upon alternative salvation religions. Such a kind of brand loyalty is hard to imagine in other commodities’ markets. Why does religion today in Europe remain “implicit” instead of taking more explicit institutional forms? If we want to answer the question why the lack of appeal of religions of individual salvation in Europe, we cannot skip the Weberian question, “salvation, from what, and for what?” The interesting sociological question, the one we sociologists of religion should be addressing, is not whether religious and salvation needs remain universally constant across time and space, let psychologists and economists address this question, but rather the changing character of their cultural manifestations across societies and through history.
Territorialization, Civilizations, and Global Civil Society

So how does globalization affect all cultural systems, including religious ones? I would suggest that one of its most important effects is their “de-territorialization” (Basch, Schiffer, and Blanc 1994). By de-territorialization I mean the disembeddedness of cultural phenomena from their “natural” territories. Cultural systems throughout history have been territorially embedded. I do not mean simply that cultural phenomena are in space. Everything in the world is in space, in the same sense as everything is in time. But not everything that happens in time is historical, i.e., has historical meaning. Temporal phenomena are historical only when they become part of meaningful narratives. Similarly, spatial phenomena become meaningful when they are embedded in a territory. By territory, I also do not mean simply ecology in the strict sense of the term, as the relations between organisms and their physical environments. Territories are imagined spaces, mental mappings. The nation, for instance, is as much an imagined territory as an imagined community. Territories, moreover, have a proprietary and purposeful character. The dictionary I was using while writing this address in the mountains defined territory, first, as “the domain over which a sovereign state exercises jurisdiction” and, second, as “an area assigned for a special purpose.”

With the triumph of European modernity and of the world system of states it carried with its global colonial expansion everywhere, the entire world underwent a particular form of territorialization. Every space, every piece of land, and large portions of the seas, the so-called territorial waters, have been parceled out, appropriated, and territorialized within the fixed boundaries of nations-states. But the same happened to peoples, cultures, religions, sciences, markets, civil society, all became territorially embedded within the nation-state. People, for instance, became territorialized through the universalization of the principle of citizenship after the French Revolution (Brubaker 1992). As an institution, citizenship is based on the principle of universal inclusion within a territory and universal exclusion outside. Consequently, everybody, individual or group, was forced to become part of a state territory. The same happened to religious and cultural systems, indeed, to civilizations and world religions.

The point I am trying to make is that this logic of territorialization was initiated by the dissolution of Western Christendom and its pluralization into territorial states and national churches. Outside the state, no legal person. Extra statu nulla persona is a version of the church principle extra ecclesia nulla salus. Before people became subjects or citizens of states, they became members of state national churches. The expulsion of Jews and Moors from Spain, which may be viewed as the starting point of the modern process of universal territorialization and was certainly the first instance of modern ethnic cleansing, was required precisely because Jews and Muslims could not become subjects of the new Catholic national state. Spain, a country where the three Abrahamic religions
and civilizations, Jewish, Christian, Muslim, had coexisted for centuries, as central to the mental maps of Jews and Muslims, as to the mental maps of Christians, became now exclusively Catholic territory, even before Reformation and Counter-Reformation had divided up Europe into Protestant and Catholic territories.

Western Christendom was the first civilization to be territorialized into nation-states. Others would follow. Islam was the last to be forced into the straight-jacket of sovereign territorial states (Piscator 1986). Civilizations appeared to have lost their relevance as units of analysis, at least for social scientists. When sociologists talked of societies, they meant as a matter of course national societies. But globalization is beginning to loosen up the straight jacket of the sovereign state, its boundaries are becoming ever more porous. The world system of states is not disappearing, but states are becoming less undivided and exclusive sovereign territorial domains and more regulatory administrative territorial networks interlinked and overlapping with wider networks (Guehenno 1995; Shaw 1997). The solid territorial embeddedness of all social phenomena under the sovereign jurisdiction of the state is dissolving into more fluid conditions. Peoples and their identities, commodities and firms, information systems and media, social movements and public spheres are not only increasingly transgressing those boundaries but also overlapping national territories and thus becoming transnational (Beck 2000; Rajaee 2000).

Glocalization, another of these awful neologisms we social scientists (Robertson 1992) like to use as shorthand analytical terms to characterize complex processes and phenomena, refers to the simultaneous reassertion and increasing relevance of the local and the global over the national. The national is fragmented within into smaller particularistic units and transcended without into ever larger units. Glocalization can also be interpreted as a dimension of what I call de-territorialization. Local and regional spaces, communities real or imagined, identities, subcultures and ethnic groups all gain spatial autonomy from the state-national territories within which they have been embedded and circumscribed. The local gains a territory of its own independent from the nation. I do not need to emphasize the relevance of the global. Global markets, global media and information systems, global subcultures and identities (youth, indigenous people), global movements and organizations (Amnesty International and human rights, feminism, Greenpeace, Doctors Without Borders) of a global civil society, all proliferate and become increasingly more relevant traversing national borders and transcending national territories (Castells 1997). The globe itself becomes the physical space and mental territory within which the nation-state itself and everything embedded within its territory becomes circumscribed.

Consequently, global humanity becomes a self-reflexive and self-referential unit, the reflexive point of reference for all societies and peoples (Robertson and Chirico 1985). But humanity itself can hardly become an identity group or an
imagined community. Individual and collective identities are necessarily plural, they need an other to become reflexively aware of their own particularity and singularity. The end-result of the process of globalization, much less its telos, is unlikely to be one world government, one world society, one single global community. Global civil society is a transnational space, a transnational network of associations, movements, organizations, and communications that transcends the territorial nation-state, but it is not itself a territorially organized society or domain.

None of you, I suppose, expects the formation of one single global religion. The religion of humanity, its sacralization, and the cult of the individual announced by the founding fathers of sociology, by Saint-Simon, by Comte, by Durkheim has indeed arrived (Casanova 2000). The triumph and the global expansion of human rights doctrines and movements at the end of the 20th century seems to confirm at least part of their visions. But they were wrong in assuming that the new religion of humanity would sooner or later replace the old theocentric religions, that, in Durkheim’s (1965:475) words, “the old gods were dying while the new ones had not yet been born.” What none of the Enlightenment prophets and positivist sociologists could have anticipated was that, paradoxically, the old gods and the old religions were going to gain new life by becoming the carriers of the process of sacralization of humanity.

Globalization facilitates the return of the old civilizations and world religions not only as units of analysis but as significant cultural systems and as imagined communities, overlapping and at times in competition with the imagined national communities. Nations will continue to be, for the foreseeable future, relevant imagined communities and carriers of collective identities within this global space, but local and transnational identities, particularly religious ones, are likely to become ever more prominent. While new transnational imagined communities will emerge, the most relevant ones are likely to be once again the old civilizations and world religions. Therein lies the merit of Samuel Huntington’s (1996) thesis “the clash of civilizations,” in recognizing the increasing relevance of cultural systems and civilizations for world politics. The thesis has been widely and rightly criticized, most frequently for its “essentialism” and for its undiluted West-centric hegemonic vision (Huntington 1996; Riesebrodt 2000). But in my view, where Huntington is particularly wrong is in his geo-political conception of civilizations as territorial units akin to nation-states and superpowers, which leads him to anticipate future global conflicts along civilizational fault lines. The analysis misses the fact that globalization represents not only a great opportunity for the old civilizations and world religions to free themselves from the straight jacket of the nation-state, to regain their transnational dimensions and their leading roles in the global center stage. Globalization also represents a great threat insofar as it implies the de-territorialization of all cultural systems. Globalization threatens to dissolve the intrinsic link between sacred time, sacred space and sacred people common to all
world religions, and with it the seemingly essential bonds between histories, peoples and territories which have defined all civilizations. Let me offer brief illustrations of some of these threats and opportunities from a summary and very selective review of two world religions, or rather of two versions of Christianity: Catholicism and Pentecostalism.

Transnational Catholicism

Of all the world religions none was as threatened at its core by the emergence of the modern world system of sovereign territorial states as the Roman church. The Protestant Reformation undermined its claims to be the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Christian Church. Catholic lost its original connotation of universality and became simply a denominational term distinguishing the Roman church from other Christian denominations. The dissolution of Western Christendom undermined the role of the Papacy as the spiritual head of a universal Christian monarchy represented by the Holy Roman Empire. The Papacy lost control of the national Catholic churches to caesaro-papist Catholic monarchs through Concordats and it itself became territorialized into the Papal States, reduced to being just another marginal and increasingly irrelevant sovereign territorial state. One by one, most of the transnational dimensions of Medieval Catholicism receded or disappeared altogether. It is not surprising therefore that the Catholic church remained for centuries adamantly anti-modern and developed a negative philosophy of history (Casanova 1996, 1997).

Ironically, it was the loss of territorial state sovereignty with the incorporation of the Papal States into the new Italian state, that allowed the Papacy to be reconstituted anew as the hegemonic center of a much revived transnational religious regime. In 1870, the very same year that the Papal States were lost, the First Vatican Council proclaimed the dogma of papal infallibility and reaffirmed the papal supremacy over the entire Catholic church. In this respect, 1870 represents the original milestone in the modern process of globalization of Catholicism. From now on, through the control of the nomination of bishops the papacy progressively will gain control over the national Catholic churches. This process was facilitated by the expansion of the liberal secular state which gave up the old caesaro-papist etatist claims to control the national churches. Not surprisingly, non-Catholic liberal states were the first ones to accept the transnational papal claims, while Catholic monarchs and states tried to preserve their old claims of state supremacy.

The papacy of Benedict XV marks another milestone in the process of globalization of Catholicism for two reasons. Elected shortly after the outbreak of World War I, the first general conflagration of nation-states, he condemned bitterly the senseless slaughter and the general chauvinist frenzy, worked tirelessly for peace negotiations, and supported the organization of a League of Nations, which would mediate national conflicts and establish the conditions
for a just peace, not one imposed on the defeated. The pope's intervention fell on deaf ears. Catholic priests everywhere answered enthusiastically the patriotic calls to arms. Even transnational religious orders, including the most transnational and papal of them, the Jesuits, who had been expelled from their countries by anti-clerical laws returned home to die for their countries (Holmes 1981). National solidarity proved much stronger than human or Christian solidarity. Despite its failure, however, the papal intervention marks the reinsertion of the papacy in international affairs, the renewal of its historical role as international mediator and court of appeals, and the point of departure of its growing international recognition. Thereafter, the popes have been consistent advocates of world-wide international bodies, from the World Court to the United Nations, which limit absolutist state sovereignty, arbitrate international disputes, and represent the interests of the entire family of nations (Hanson 1987).

In addition, it was under Benedict XV's papacy that the Vatican began to promote the recruitment of indigenous clergy and the formation of native Catholic hierarchies, breaking with the European colonial legacy and preparing the ground for the modern internationalization of the Catholic church. The modern expansion of Catholicism beyond its traditional European territories had been connected until the mid-nineteenth century with the global European colonial expansion. Even its missionary efforts, with the exception of independent Jesuit initiatives, had been led and controlled by European national churches. The massive immigration of Irish Catholics to the United States and other British colonies, followed by the general immigration of other European Catholics, had expanded the Catholic presence beyond Europe. But until the 20th century, overseas Catholicism had been primarily a transplanted European institution. Vatican I still had been a predominantly European council, even though the 49 prelates from the United States comprised already one-tenth of the gathered bishops. Vatican II, by contrast, was the first truly global ecumenical council in the history of Christianity. The 2500 Fathers in attendance came from all over the world. Europeans no longer formed a majority. The U.S. delegation with over 200 bishops was the second largest, yet smaller than the combined 228 indigenous Asian and African bishops. The numbers represent the notable displacement of the Catholic population from the Old to the New World and from North to South.

The papacy of John XXIII marks another milestone in Catholic globalization, not only because of the convocation of the Second Vatican Council and the process of aggiornamento it instituted, but because of the definitive incorporation of the modern discourse of human rights in his encyclical Pacem in Terris (1963). Until then the Catholic church had consistently opposed modern conceptions of human rights. Pope Pius VI in his 1791 papal Brief Caritas had adamantly condemned the Declaration of the Rights of Man by the French National Assembly, arguing that the rights to freedom of
religion and freedom of the press, as well as the Declaration on the Equality of all Men, were contrary to the divine principles of the Church. The papal condemnation was reiterated throughout the 19th century and Pius IX included the principle of human rights and most modern freedoms in the Syllabus (1864) of errors. Religious freedom was particularly odious since it implied equating the true religion and the false ones, as well as the separation of church and state. As we all know, Vatican II's Declaration on Religious Freedom, Dignitatis Humanae, radically changed the Catholic course by recognizing the inalienable right of any individual to freedom of conscience, grounding it in the sacred dignity of the human person. Thereafter, the church has adopted the discourse of human rights as its own, making it part of every papal encyclical and of most episcopal pastoral letters throughout the world. This has had dramatic world-historical effects, as evidenced by the global role of the Catholic church and Catholic movements in the "third wave of democratization" from the mid-70s to the 90s (Casanova 1996; Huntington 1991). Indeed, the Catholic church has been at the vanguard of the global human rights revolution.

John Paul II in particular has served as one of the most effective spokespersons of this global revolution and represents the definitive globalization of the Catholic church. The church at its apex — pope, Vatican Curia, College of Cardinals — has ceased to be a predominantly Roman-Italian institution. As Bishop of Rome, he has assumed eagerly its role to speak literally, urbi et orbi, to the city and to the globe (Weigel 1999). He also became an untiring world traveler proclaiming everywhere the sacred dignity of the human person. He wants to be viewed not just as Holy Father of all Catholics but as common father of God's children and as self-appointed spokesman of humanity, as defensor hominis. In the process the pope has learned to play more effectively than any competitor, the role of first citizen of a catholic, i.e., global and universal, human society. The Catholic church has embraced globalization, welcoming its liberation from the strait-jacket of the territorial sovereign nation-state which had restricted its catholic universal claims. But the embrace is not uncritical. The church has remained one of the public voices left still questioning capitalist globalization and demanding the humanization and moralization of market economies and a more just and fair international division of labor and distribution of world resources.

The contemporary globalization of Catholicism, moreover, does not have only a radial structure centered in Rome. In the last decades there has been a remarkable increase in transnational Catholic networks and exchanges of all

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6 At the end of World War II two-thirds of all cardinals were still Italian. The College of Cardinals that elected the first non-Italian pope in four centuries already had a much more global representation: 27 Italians, 29 other Europeans, 12 Africans, 13 Asians, 11 North Americans, 19 Latin Americans. John Paul II himself has now nominated 166 cardinals — more than any other pope in history. Forty one percent of the 135 cardinals presently eligible to vote for the next pope are from the third world. The fact that there is even speculation that the next pope may be African indicates how far and how fast the church has changed.
kinds, which crisscross nations and world regions, often bypassing Rome. Indeed, throughout the century one can observe an amazing resurgence of the transnational dimensions of medieval Catholicism which for centuries had been recessive or dormant: not only papal supremacy and the centralization of the church's government, as well as the convocation of ecumenical councils already mentioned, but also transnational religious cadres, transnational religious movements, transnational schools, centers of learning and intellectual networks, and transnational centers of pilgrimage and international encounters (Casanova 1997).

Let me give two anecdotal illustrations of the potential implications of this process. In his last visit to Mexico in 1999, Pope John Paul II gathered the bishops of all the Americas, north and south, consecrated Our Lady of Guadalupe as the Virgin of all the Americas, and urged them to cease viewing themselves as national Catholic churches and to become one single American Catholic church. In a lecture at the Library of Congress in 2000, Catholic Christianity and the Millennium, Francis Cardinal George offered an equally global vision:

In the next millennium, as the modern nation state is relativized and national sovereignty is displaced into societal arrangements still to be invented, it will be increasingly evident that the major faiths are carriers of culture and that it is more sectarian to be French, American or Russian than to be Christian or Muslim, Hindu or Buddhist. Inter-religious dialogue is more basic to the future of faith, therefore, than is Church-state dialogue, important though that remains. And among the dialogues, that between Christians and Muslims promises to be the most significant for the future of the human race. . . . The conversation between Christianity and Islam is not yet far advanced, but its outcome will determine what the globe will look like a century from now.

Global Pentecostalism

The transformation of contemporary Catholicism illustrates the opportunities which the process of globalization offers to a transnational religious regime with a highly centralized structure and an imposing transnational network of human, institutional and material resources, which feels therefore confident in its ability to thrive in a relatively open global system of religious regimes. Contemporary Pentecostalism may serve to illustrate the equally favorable opportunities which globalization offers to a highly decentralized religion, with no historical links to tradition and no territorial roots or identity, and which therefore can make itself at home anywhere in the globe where the Spirit moves.

Since the rise of Montanism, the first Pentecostal Christian sectarian movement, in 2nd century Phrygia, when Montanus began prophesying in ecstasy and speaking in tongues, declaring that his visions, the "Third Testament," came from the Holy Spirit, the spirit of Pentecost has moved Christians confirming them in their faith that the apostolic charismatic age of revelation is not closed
and that a "third age of the Spirit" is near if not already here. Joachim of Fiore's speculative millennial theology and the movement it spun is only one of the most famous and intellectualized versions. One could view such Pentecostal sectarian movements as prefigurations of contemporary developments. But in fact Pentecostal Christianity is a 20th century phenomenon, yet is already the most dynamic and fastest growing sector of Protestant Christianity worldwide and is likely to become the predominant global form of Christianity of the 21st century, possibly linking all the Christian churches (Poewe 1994; Hunt, Hamilton, and Walker 1997). In this sense, the "third age of the Spirit" is already upon us as we enter the third millennium.

I am using Pentecostalism here in the widest possible sense to include Pentecostal churches and denominations in the strict sense of the term, the broad charismatic renewal lately gripping much of Evangelical Christianity worldwide, particularly in the Third World, and all kinds of independent syncretistic neo-Pentecostal mega-churches, such as the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God in Brazil or The Light of the World in Mexico. Indeed, the field is so complex and fluid that I do not think it would be either possible or helpful to stick to rigorous analytical categories from the past. I must confess, the more I read from what experts in the field have to say, and they say very different, often contradictory things, the more complicated the field gets, at least for me (Martin 1996; Lehmann 1996; Corten 1999; Westmeier 1999). Perhaps only my ignorance allows me to make bold generalizations. So, take the following with a grain of salt, as the attempt of an outsider to organize a chaotic field by bringing his own external prejugements.

What all the phenomena gathered under the term Pentecostalism have in common is an emphasis on the charismatic "gifts of the spirit," including any combination of healing, exorcism, prophecy, and speaking in tongues, as well as an emphasis on emotional and experiential expressions over and against discursive and doctrinal ones. Moreover, although I am referring primarily to Protestant Christianity, in order to come to terms with the truly general and global character of the phenomenon, we must consider as well the increasing relevance of the charismatic renewal taking place within Catholic and even Eastern Christianity. When charismatic revivalism reaches as far and wide as the Coptic church in Ethiopia, the Catholic church in India, and the Orthodox church in Romania, then we can confidently say that the phenomenon is a global Christian one.

Strictly speaking of course, Pentecostalism originated in the United States at the beginning of the century with dual roots in transplanted Americanized Methodism and African-American Christianity. In this respect, it was simultaneously typically American and transnational from the start. Its initial transnational expansion followed at first also the typical evangelical missionary pattern. It is revealing, however, that the two oldest Pentecostal churches in Brazil, the Congregação Cristã do Brasil (Christian Congregation) and the
Assembleia de Deus (Assembly of God), were established respectively in 1910 and 1911, thus only a few years after the first American Pentecostal churches, by non-American missionaries.

The Christian Congregation of Brasil was established by an Italian immigrant from Chicago, who led a typical sectarian schism from a local Brazilian Presbyterian church. It remained until the 1930s primarily a Pentecostal church of Italian immigrants in Brazil. The Assembly of God, the largest Pentecostal church in Brazil and probably in the world, at least until very recently with approximately 8 million members, was founded also via Chicago by two Swedish pastors.

The transnational character of Brazilian Pentecostalism is inscribed in its very beginnings. It arrived from the United States, even before it had taken roots there, and immediately assumed an indigenous Brazilian form. In this sense, Brazilian Pentecostalism represents a dual process of de-territorialization: American Christianity is de-territorialized by taking indigenous roots in Brazil, a Catholic territory, which therefore leads to the de-territorialization of Catholicism from Brazil. This is the most important consequence of the explosive growth of Pentecostalism throughout Latin America.

Latin America has ceased being Catholic territory, even if Catholicism continues to be for the foreseeable future the majority religion of all Latin American countries. I do not believe that the often fantastic projections of contemporary rates of growth of Protestantism in Latin America into the future are realistic or sustainable (Martin 1990; Stoll 1990). Yet, Latin American Pentecostalism is neither a foreign import nor a local branch of a transnational religious firm, as the first misleading interpretations tended to suggest, but an authentic Latin American product. It is not anymore Protestantism in Latin America, but Latin American Protestantism. Indeed, I’d venture to say it is as Latin American as liberation theology. Both, irrespective of their transnational roots or origins, are Latin American religious responses to Latin American conditions. Today, at last, after so many misguided one-sided interpretations juxtaposing the supposedly radical differences between the two phenomena, we are beginning to see truly illuminating comparative analyses bringing the two phenomena together in all their intriguing similarities and complex differences (Lehmann 1996; Corten 1999).

Be it as it may, there can be no doubt about the local nature, the widespread though not uniform expansion, and the dynamic growth of Latin American Pentecostalism. Protestants now constitute 10 percent of the Latin American population. The proportions are higher in Chile (over 20 percent) or Guatemala (over 30 percent). The proportion in Brazil is smaller but it dwarfs every other Latin American country in absolute numbers (25 million). In Rio de Janeiro one new evangelical church pops up every day and 90 percent of those are Pentecostal-Charismatic. Today two-thirds of all Latin American Protestants are Pentecostals-Charismatics. Indeed, Latin America, particularly Brazil, has
become in a very short time a world center of Pentecostal Christianity, wherefrom it has now begun to radiate in all directions.7

Yet Latin America is not the only world center. The growth of Pentecostal Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa (Ghana, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, South Africa) is equally explosive. Moreover, African Pentecostalism is as local, indigenous and autonomous as its Latin American counterpart. The same could be repeated about Pentecostalism in Korea or China. Indeed, as Hexham and Poewe (1994:61) have pointed out, global Pentecostalism must be seen as “a multi-source diffusion of parallel developments,” encompassing Europe, Africa, America, and Asia. It is truly the first global religion. Global Pentecostalism is not a religion with a particular territorial center like Mormonism, which is rapidly gaining worldwide diffusion. Nor is it a transnational religious regime like Catholicism, with global reach. In the words of Paul Freston (1997:185), the foremost scholar of Brazilian Pentecostalism, “new churches are local expressions of a global culture, characterized by parallel invention, complex diffusion and international networks with multilateral flows.”

We could also think of it as a global “great awakening” with multiple, separate, and distinct “burned-over districts.” Yet the parallel only gets us so far, since “the Second Great Awakening” was a national phenomenon with multiple focal points. Pentecostalism, by contrast, is simultaneously global and local. In this respect it is historically unique and unprecedented. It is the historically first and paradigmatic case of a de-centered and de-territorialized global culture.

But how can it be de-territorialized and local at the same time? Because it is an uprooted local culture engaged in spiritual warfare with its own roots. This is the paradox of the local character of Pentecostalism. It cannot be understood in the traditional sense of Catholic “inculturation,” that is, as the relationship between the catholic, i.e., universal and the local, i.e., particular. It is actually its very opposite. Pentecostalism is not a translocal phenomenon which assumes the different particular forms of a local territorial culture. Nor is it a kind of syncretic symbiosis or symbiotic synresis of the general and the local. Pentecostals are, for instance, everywhere leading an unabashed and uncompromising onslaught against their local cultures: against Afro-Brazilian spirit cults in Brazil; against Vodou in Haiti; against witchcraft in Africa; against shamanism in Korea. In this they are different from both, from the traditional Catholic pattern of generous accommodation and condescending toleration of local folklore and popular magical beliefs and practices, so long as these assume their subordinate status within the Catholic hierarchic cosmos, and from the typical sober, matter-of-fact, rational, and disenchancing monotheistic attitude of ascetic Protestantism against magical or supernatural forces or beings, by denying their very existence. The Pentecostal attitude is neither compromise nor denial but frontal hand-to-hand combat, what they call “spiritual warfare.” In David

7 Ríos de Vida (Life’s Rivers), an Argentinian church founded by an Spanish immigrant in 1967 in Buenos Aires is expanding in Latin Europe and the United Kingdom, acquiring a transnational character.
Martin’s (1996:29-30) words, “when it comes to witchcraft, Pentecostals fight fire with fire through exorcism,” and against the power of spirit cults they invoke the cult of “the most powerful Spirit of all.” It is in their very struggle against local culture that they prove how locally rooted they are.

Obviously today I could at best only scratch the surface of the phenomenon. Similar illustrations could be offered from other branches of Christianity and from the other world religions. The dynamic core of Anglicanism no longer resides in England. The Patriarch of Constantinople has re-emerged as a global center of Eastern Christianity. For the world religions globalization offers to all the opportunity to become for the first time truly world religions, i.e. global, but it also offers the threat of de-territorialization. The opportunities are greatest for those world religions like Islam and Buddhism which always had a transnational structure. The threat is greatest for those embedded in civilizational territories like Islam and Hinduism. But through global immigration they are also becoming global and de-territorialized. Indeed, their diasporas are becoming dynamic centers for their global transformation. Ironically, the diaspora religion par excellence, Judaism, forced to become de-territorialized from the Land of Israel millennia ago, has become tied again to the physical Land of Israel in the very age of globalization.

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