the role of civil society in peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and democratization
THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN PEACEBUILDING, CONFLICT RESOLUTION, AND DEMOCRATIZATION

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RUMI FORUM

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE, & WORLD AFFAIRS, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

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RUMI FORUM

Rumi Forum was founded in 1999 with the mission to foster interfaith and intercultural dialogue, stimulate thinking and exchange of opinions on supporting and fostering democracy and peace all over the world and to provide a common platform for education and information exchange.

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BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE, & WORLD AFFAIRS

The Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University, created within the Office of the President in 2006, is dedicated to the interdisciplinary study of religion, ethics, and public life. Through research, teaching, and service, the Center explores global challenges of democracy and human rights; economic and social development; international diplomacy; and interreligious understanding. Two premises guide the Center's work: that a deep examination of faith and values is critical to address these challenges, and that the open engagement of religious and cultural traditions with one another can promote peace

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CONFERENCE
OPENING REMARKS

JENNA LUEDTKE: Good morning everyone. Welcome to the conference: The Role of Civil Society in Peacebuilding, Conflict Resolution and Democratization. I am a program director at the Rumi Forum. This conference is co-sponsored by the Rumi Forum and the Berkley Center.

We have a wonderful set of panels and speakers for you today, so I would like to thank you in advance for your patience and cooperation. So my good friend Melody Fox Ahmed and Erin here at the Berkley Center have been very kind in organizing this event and they will both be here today. The center has various pieces of literature, reports located in various places all over the center, so please feel free to take advantage of them. They are wonderful pieces of literature.

So now, I would like to introduce the president of the Rumi Forum. He is going to say a few opening remarks, Emre Celik is president of the Rumi Forum, Washington DC, an organization dedicated to bringing people and ideas together around the concept of constructive interaction and dialogue. He has a key interest in intercultural and interface dialogue and its significance to society. Emre arrived to Washington, DC, from Australia where he was active in numerous educational and dialogue initiatives for close to 20 years, please welcome him.

EMRE CELIK: Ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the Rumi Forum I want to welcome you all. Today is an important day in regards to analysis of civil society. Irrespective of governments, irrespective of socio-economic situation of individuals, communities or nations, civil society is playing a more critical role. At the core of civil society is the coming together of people to help improve the communities and societies they belong to. At the Rumi Forum, peace building is at the heart of our mission, and we thank each and every one of the speakers today in advance for their contributions. We do hope that such discussion will lead to more productive activities and a greater understanding of the role of civil society. I thank you for your contributions by way of attendance and by way of support of such important initiatives. And of course, I want to thank our partners, the Berkley Center and Katherine for supporting this coming together of ideas and people. I look forward to the fruitful outcome of today and again thank you, and have a most pleasant day.

JENNA LUEDTKE: Now I would like to introduce Dr. Katherine Marshall. Katherine Marshall is a senior fellow at the Berkley Center, where she leads the Center’s program on religion and global development. After a long career in the development field, including several leadership positions at the World Bank, Dr. Marshall moved to Georgetown in 2006 where she also serves as a visiting associate professor in the school foreign service. She helped to create and now serves as the executive director of the World Faiths Development Dialogue. Please welcome Dr. Katherine Marshall.

KATHERINE MARSHALL: Thank you Jenna, thank you Emre. My task this morning is to welcome you to the Berkley Center. And as Jenna has indicated, I hope that your presence here will inspire you to look further. The Berkley Center, it is not a place but a person—missing one “e”—is five years old. It is attached to the office of the president of Georgetown University. And the ideas to bring together the many parts of this Jesuit university that deal with religion in an operational and practical way. We are delighted to be partners in this important conference, because every one of the elements
of this conference is central to the mission, mandate and the work of the Berkley Center.

One of the big questions is how does religion relate to civil society? And how does civil society relate to religion? And in the processes of change that are taking place so rapidly, those are important questions. Our work, and we’ve again collaborated with the Rumi Center but also with the Gulen Movement, in trying to understand globally the role, the very underappreciated and under studied role, of the extraordinary range of institutions inspired by faith. In social change, social justice, what we call international development.

Peace is clearly a very central theme for the Berkley Center; it is one of the major programs. We are looking at case studies of many countries. And my section of the Berkley Center and the World Faiths Development Dialogue are engaged in a very interesting exploration of women, religion and peace. Because religion is often not seen as centrally as it should be. And thinking about the tasks of peace building, even when religion is present, women are often invisible. So we had a conference at a brand new publication, which we can share with you about women, religion and peace. And of course conflict is a part of it, so we look forward very much to a stimulating day. Thank you all for coming. I am delighted to have you here.
PANEL I: CIVIL SOCIETY, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Moderator
Jonathan Landay

Panelists
Angel Rabasa
Joshua Foust
Marina Ottaway

JONATHAN LANDAY: Good morning. Being a journalist, I get caught up in the news cycle and this morning for those of you, who do not know, there was a major arrest today of the world’s most wanted war crime suspect General Ratko Mladić in Serbia. And that kind of kept me going this morning for a little while. I think that the Mladić arrest is a good place to start to examine the question civil society, democratization, and conflict resolution. Because it raises the question to what extent civil society has had a little bit to do with it, but I think it also raises the question to what extent did political expediency play a role in this development. Because one has to ask about the extent of the influence that civil society has had. And not just in Serbia but in neighboring Bosnia, where there has been a rigorous civil society sector; yet it was a country where there was a peacekeeping operation and extensive outside mediation. And yet it is a place that may very well be headed back into certainly political conflict and even perhaps violence.

One has to ask also, I guess there is going to be a lot of discussion here about Afghanistan; they have a very small civil society rigorous though and very active. It has, as we know, 100,000 American troops, 40,000 European troops trying to bring stability to the country and obviously there is a question to the extent of democratization there. Another place where there is an interesting report yesterday from the ICG on the state of affairs in Tajikistan which is known to reassuring and I guess you will talk about that some extent.

ANGEL RABASA: Yes, I would like to start with the subject of my presentation and first of all I would like to thank the Berkley Center and the Rumi Forum and my good friends Emre, Sitki and Jenna for inviting me to participate in this event. I would like to start by saying that this short presentation is based on some work in progress at my institution. Or in fact we just began a couple of months ago on the processes of democratization and transitions from authoritarianism to democracy on different continents in what Samuel Huntington called third way of democratization. With a view to derive lessons as to what were the critical factors in these processes and what led to the success or failure of these efforts at democratization. And what these experiences can tell us to inform policy toward ongoing democratic revolution in Arap world today.
Before developing this topic further, we need to define what we mean by civil society. Everyone talks about civil society, but no one says what it is. And in fact there is no accepted definition of civil society. The World Bank has adopted a definition that refers to the wide array of nongovernmental and nonprofit organizations that have a presence in public life expressing the interest and values other members and others base on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Specifically, the term civil society organizations or CSO for short is used to refer to entities such as community groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), so NGOs are a subset to civil society. Obviously not the whole thing, labor unions, indigenous groups, charities, faith based organizations, professional associations and foundations. And we use the term in our work to refer to all of the civic, social, cultural, and religious institutions and organizations that form the basis of society and operate outside of the state, but within the framework of the law.

A civil society is intrinsic to a well-functioned democratic state. In democratic states, the operations of civil society organizations are complimentary to those of the state and are underpinned by liberal democratic assumptions and institutions.

Conversely, there is an inherent tension between civil society and authoritarian state. Especially for civil society organizations become important actors for the delivery of social services and channels for the expression of popular demands. Here it is important to make a distinction among degrees of authoritarianism in relation to civil society. At the totalitarian end of the scale, for instance the former communist states Burma, Syria, Libya, Iraq under the Ba’ath party, the state controls all organized expressions of society. And this is fundamentally different from the authoritarian states especially those where democratic transitions have occurred including; for example the Philippines under Marcos, Indonesia under Suharto, Spain under Franco, Portugal under Salazar, Greece under the colonels, and Brazil, Argentina and Chile under military regimes. And I would argue Egypt under Mubarak and Tunisia under Ben Ali... And many other cases too numerous to mention here, where the authoritarian regime allowed civil society organizations to operate within certain limitations. For instance, religious and social service organizations were able to function as long as they did not involve themselves in politics or pose a perceived threat to stability of a regime. For instance, in Indonesia Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama the two largest Muslim civil service organizations in the world, with a membership of between 20 and 30 million members each, operated very much without official interference under the Suharto regime. They ran schools, thousands of schools, universities and whole university system on part of Muhammadiyah, hospitals and provided social services and were able to exercise significant influence on political and social issues. The Catholic Church in the Philippines and its leader cardinal Sin under Marcos not only claim its independence, but constituted one of the most powerful political forces in the Philippines and played a critical role.
role in the replacement of the Marcos regime as many of you know.

Another case in point is the Egyptian Muslim brotherhood, although I consider this one as a political rather than a religious or social entity. Although it was officially banned throughout most of the Mubarak regime, the Brotherhood was allowed to function, to run the complex network of hospitals and social services. And brotherhood members were allowed to run for parliament and sometimes be elected as independents of course not members of the organization.

In many, and I would say most cases, authoritarian regimes allowed the independent media, especially the newspapers, because the regimes were usually more concerned about the electronic media that reaches the masses on paper that were generally led by a small elite of a population. Nevertheless they were allowed to operate and they used censorship as a vehicle to control the message. And this is a fundamental point, because censorship does not imply actual control of the media and in some cases opposition newspapers such as Katimerini under the Greek colonels or La Prensa in Nicaragua where I had served in the 1970s in the late Samosa period in the Foreign Service. They actually became the focal points of opposition to the regime. Now you compare that to the situation in Syria today or Iraq under Saddam where no sign of opposition was permitted.

Another important component of NGOs is in the role in building up civil society and promoting democracy. And especially the NGOs are taking role in democracy promotion. Some of them are beneficiaries of international funding. And this international connection has provided NGOs not only with the means to carry out their functions, but also with a degree of protection from the regime, particularly, where that regime receives international assistance and therefore needs to manifest some respect for the values of the donor countries or institutions. Nevertheless, these NGOs operating in an authoritarian environment need to struggle to maintain their

**ANGEL RABASA:** The point is that preexisting civil society institutions and organizations even if operating under severe restrictions, constitute, judging by the history of successful democratic transitions, a key and maybe an indispensable factor in the conciliation of democratic governance.

independence since they are often viewed with suspicion or hostility by the regime. In most cases, the NGOs have to register with the authorities; they have to meet their requirements that the regime might set for registration, clear security investigations, and promise to refrain from activities that the government might object to. The authorities can and do audit operating budgets, infiltrate agents into the major associations, impose arbitrary fines, and could dissolve the group if found to be in violations of regulations. The governments can pressure international donors to cease funding a group that it objects to as in the case of Mubarak and the United States. Or as in the case of Venezuela under Chavez it could prohibit NGOs from accepting international assistance.

Nevertheless, even though they operate under quite severe restrictions, once the transition begins, the NGOs can play and have played a key role in the conciliation of democracy. The point is that preexisting civil society institutions and organizations even if operating under severe restrictions, constitute, judging by the history of successful
democratic transitions, a key and maybe an indispensable factor in the conciliation of democratic governance. A body of scholarly leaders illustrates this point and argues that in democratic transitions around the world, civil societies can facilitate the process by restraining state coercion, increasing the costs of repression, and generating international support for the transition. And according to a story by Freedom House, civil resistance plays a vital role in driving 50 out of 67 modern transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy.

Having said that let me add that there are some objections to this thesis, there are always objections to any thesis. And one relates to the definition of civil society organizations; for instance, whether Islamists can be considered part of democratic civil society. I mentioned earlier the Muslim Brotherhood, the question is whether an Islamist organization such as the Brotherhood supports democratic objectives or whether they seek to use democratic means to impose a different form of authoritarianism. Or at least to capture a share of public space for purposes that are not consistent with liberal democracy; or to get away from the problem of Islamism and democracy. In cases where the obstacles to democracy derive from the political culture itself, whether NGO activities are infected by undemocratic practices. For instance, a scholar of Southeast Asia noted that the behavior of some NGOs in the Philippines has sometimes been shaped by the pervasive patron-client system that operates in that country and this is a system that the NGOs are ostensibly dedicated to change.

So to conclude my presentation, let me say that yes, it is very important especially as the Arab world moves into the state of transition, for international actors, the United States especially, to engage civil society where there is not enough to veil on a government-to-government basis. We must try to engage these nonstate actors that are driving political change. At the same time we have to be careful whom to engage, and I think that as we have noted in some of our other works, there has to be some criteria for the partners that we could have. For instance, do these actors accept the fundamental, liberal democratic values that we share? Do they respect the rights of women, religious and ethnic minorities? Do they renounce the use of violence and terrorism to attain their goals? And I think this is the direction that we should go. Thank you.

JOSHUA FOUST: So I think that was a great introduction on getting us up to speed on the broad topic of civil society. And it is interesting because when you look at Central Asia and this is kind of a pivot point to go into my real comments, you actually see kind of a reversion of civil society groups in the region. Very recently Human Rights Watch was just kicked out of Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan has adopted the tactic of imprisoning journalists and sending them to psychiatric hospitals for opposing the regime. Tajikistan just spent 33 million dollars building the world’s biggest flagpole, which is actually more money than USAID spends in development efforts in the country in a single year. So there is this complete lack of priority towards these regimes and partly we could say that is because of tradition activities. But since the 1990s there has been a rather remarkable regression in civil society activities. Especially with civil society NGOs in the region and that is been accelerating recently. I think last month’s election in Kazakhstan is probably a great example of this. Where the opposition did not even bother to show up despite being very lavishly funded by outside NGOs, because they had no chance in winning and the regime played so many games with the election that they just figured – “What is the point?” Most of them voted for President Nazarbayev anyways.
But when we look at this idea of transition and the role that civil society groups can play in transition and in the fostering of some kind of democratic social system, I think Afghanistan makes for an interesting case for when that does not really happen or when it does not work out. If you want to put it in

**JOSHUA FOUST:** And since then despite all of this outpouring in aid and relief by both NGOs and by the state department and by international organizations, the US military still is the primary civil society actor and the primary promoter of civil society activities inside Afghanistan.

these terms, Afghanistan’s transition happened in about 2002 or so. And it happened when there was no civil society in the country. And it did not happen because of any civil society groups, it happened because of the US military. And since then despite all of this outpouring in aid and relief by both NGOs and by the state department and by international organizations, the US military still is the primary civil society actor and the primary promoter of civil society activities inside Afghanistan - at least in terms of dollars and geographic reach. Taking it a step further, the US military is actually adopted the use of secondary militaries within Afghanistan as its primary means of promoting society. And this causes a whole host of problems that we’ll be talking about today.

One of the most interesting questions: “What actually will be affecting the next generation of leadership that comes up?” I think, and this is just my personal opinion, for all intents and purposes the current generation of leadership in Afghanistan is a lost cause. They are never going to change; they are probably going to be corrupt until they die. But the next round of people, the next generation people in their teens and in their twenties who are currently experiencing this country, they are going to be ones who eventually affect the direction that it goes in. And it is interesting to see the split that arises because of this. Because of the security situations, Pashtuns in the south have a very little access education, to outside groups, to foreigners; whereas ethnic minorities like Tajik, Hazaras and Uzbeks do have a lot of access to education, to foreign networks, to these international organizations that operate in the country. What this ends up is creating over time as you have an uneducated disconnected ethnic majority and an educated connected minority. This is being exasperated by US efforts to train the Afghan National Army, because it is primarily Tajik and Uzbek, and Hazara in ethnic makeup. And because the army is the best and most reliable means that Afghans who join up have of becoming literate. In a way, the ANA is the largest school operating inside Afghanistan. Because of the number of people they train, I think it is up to third grade reading level is what they want adults to have.

So when we look at this broad concept of civil society and how we can begin applying it to somewhere like Afghanistan, where there is a war going on and there is at least a desire by everyone, a stated desire to transition from war to peace at some point in the future. And I think it is important to look then at how were laying the foundation for that transition to happen. In this case, looking at the way were building up civil society you can see it almost as an abuse of the idea of civil society. In a way the United States is creating a military without a state, or a military without a society inside Afghanistan. Part of this is because Westerners in general and I think do-gooders, in a very, very specific way, tend to assume that their own concepts of what experiences of what civil society or what some kind of doing good group means are the best ones. That is why you have the military doing what
it does best, which is creating another military. In the process of creating that they were realizing all of these other secondary effects of having a military without a society. And now they are scrambling to create a society to support the same military.

For a lack of a better way of framing this, then the best way of affecting civil society development in Afghanistan, is to affect the military and the way that the military is trying to develop the civil society. This is where you run into a whole host of problems. And I am coming at this; I spent several years actually working as an adviser for the US Army dealing with social and cultural issues inside of Afghanistan. They have a lot of problems going on. And one of the biggest ones are assumptions about how Afghanistan itself works and I think this is a feature you find in a lot of foreigner based and to a lesser extent foreigner funded NGOs. Especially in Central Asia which are assumptions in a way orientalist assumptions about how these societies work.

The biggest one I think in Afghanistan is this belief that the whole country is tribal in some way. And you hear people talk about tribes all the time –at least in the military. They want to engage the tribes (whatever that means). And when you look at how they try to develop local groups, in particular in the south of the country, they tend to be based on this concept of tribe, and I am putting scare quotes around that for a very good reason. There is kind of universal academic consensus that tribe inside Afghanistan is a completely meaningless concept. It means a different thing to every single person you talk to. It can literally mean anything the person you are talking to cares about at that one point in time. It can mean a community, a village, a family, a school, some kind of other organization they have joined, a Tanzim if they are involved in militia in some way. I mean it is quite literally indefinable, yet that is how ISAF, how NATO, the US military are defining their terms of engagement inside Afghanistan. I think this causes a rather obvious host of problems afterwards. But if you do not understand the group that you are choosing to organize your efforts by, then you do not understand the efforts that you are doing and you are certainly are not going to understand the effects that they have down the line.

So I am giving you two different examples here that I think can kind of drive this home and they are personal examples from ones that I have experienced. One is with this district in Khost province in the east part of the country called Sabari. In this area it is normally described as a tribal place, as an area of great tribal conflict. And this is because there are autonomous communities of people usually organized by village who call themselves tribe who bicker and fight all the time. One of the biggest one is between the two groups called Mangal and the Sabari in the northern part of the district, and it is essentially over a stand of trees. For the first two years that the US army was operating in this area, they could not for the life of them figure out what was going on. They kept trying to send tribal mediators, which we found out later were really just guys they found on the street who said they were tribal mediators to go resolve this conflict. But over the course of several years after actually losing a lot of people from the fighting, both from the army and among the afghan population, they found out it was literally two different clusters of houses fighting over a bunch of trees on a hillside and this conflict had nothing to do with anyone's tribe.

The tribe actually came out after the conflict itself arose. And it happened to be an easy way for these communities to organize their conflict. It happened to be an easy way for them to describe their conflicts to outsiders. It is much easier to say we have this ancient
tribal feud with these other people, than we are bickering over who gets to eat dates this month. It snowballed from there, there was this assumption that this tribe was driving things. And for a very, very long time, the tribe was dictating how the military was trying to respond to this conflict point. I guess we can say way about this briefly, within Afghanistan this small scale local tribal conflicts are probably the biggest driver of instability throughout the country. It is not actually the Taliban, its small groups of people usually fighting over local issues. What happens when outsiders come in and pick sides in these disputes, in this case in Khost, in attempt of conflict resolution, they create winners and losers. The Taliban moves in, talks to the losers, offers to fund and support their fight, then we get in assurgency. That is usually the pattern that follows at least in Eastern Afghanistan.

So what had been happening over the last several years in this Sabari district in this Khost province? Is the United States in its attempt to mediate a tribal dispute was unwittingly creating the conditions  for a permanent insurgency in the district? And this gets back to the idea of fundamentally misunderstanding a society that you are working in, making wrong assumptions about how that society works, and then going ahead and crafting policies based on that wrong assumption.

Another one is this province called Kapisa province, which is just North of Kabul. And this is a much more ethnically diverse area than Khost province. The Southern half of it is Pashtuns, the Northern half is Tajik, and the Eastern part has this sort of unknown group called the Pashai. So in this area again, there is an assumption that the primary conflict like the most of Afghanistan is going to be ethnic or in some cases tribal. And when we were there, the biggest question the military kept asking us, in this case the French, was: Who are the tribes? What are the tribes? We need to map out these tribes and figure out who we need to influence within these tribes.

And that turned out to be completely wrong, what we found out that instead in Kapisa everything is political. So the province had been fought over for several decades; in fact, by rival political parties They are called Tanzeems in Afghanistan, because their political parties also have armies. And one of these armies was the Northern Alliance, the other one was Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, which is an insurgent group. And what had been happening since 2001 is the losers: the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin and in the South is called Harakat-e Islami were losing out. Even though their people had decided to join the government and they decided to lay down arms, they were being frozen out of the political power structure in the province. They were not given positions in prominence; they were not allowed to take over governorships or sub-governorships. And everyone from Jamiat-e Islami which was the main group in the Northern Alliance was being put in charge. The leftover from this political imbalance was fueling a lot of conflict. The losers again were reaching out to the insurgency for support to fight this war. The military was looking at it and assuming that it was just tribes.

So when we examine how the military tries to look at this stuff and in particular how the United States tries to frame these conflicts. What we usually see is a mistake for local politics or for kind of the starters of a civil society being mistaken as some kind of other security issue. So they end up militarizing what would otherwise be simply political issue. I think I am out of time so it is not really a conclusion, but it is kind of where I was going with this.

MARINA OTTAWAY: I will continue this a sort of pattern of skepticism about a civil society that my predecessor has established. I
will start by giving you an anecdote that to me was very telling about how we really need to rethink what we mean by civil society, and how we engage in civil society. There is no doubt that citizens are at the root of democracy. There is no doubt that citizens' participation is what democracy is all about, which is a very different thing from saying, “civil society is what democracy is all about”. At least not civil society in the way you could usually defined particularly in the West at this particular time.

We had good luck; we being the Carnegie with two other organizations have decided last November to hold a conference in April on the role of external actors in promoting change in the Arab world. This was in November; the conference was scheduled for April. We held it in very, very different circumstances from what we had envisioned when we started. And the participants were other than the usual Western suspects including all organizations that support the democratic transformation in civil society in the world and particularly in the Middle East. We had a number of activists from Arab countries that were both: undergoing transitions and not undergoing transitions. And in the course of the discussion, one participant a very well-known scholar from Jordan, but it could have been anybody in the room, said, “Civil society has not played any role whatsoever in the uprising”. Everybody around the room agreed with him. And I was the only one taken back at the beginning because, “What do you mean civil society has played no role, yet you have tens of thousands of citizens out in the streets”. If this is not a civil society - what is civil society?

What they meant is the NGOs that Western countries have painstakingly promoting in these countries. They have been financing, they have been training but there were not anywhere to be seen. And in that sense civil society did not play any role, but citizens did, but not the organizations that they created. Now the question that this leads me to its a real question about, “What are the organizations of civil society on what we have put so much emphasis ever since the fall of the Socialist regime in Eastern Europe, that had become such an important component of the so-called toolkit for democracy promotions that Western organizations used hands on?”

I am going to rely on trying to answer this question on a previous study that I carried out with a colleague of mine, Tom Carothers, also at the Carnegie Endowment. And that was the study of civil society organization of four regions of the world essentially. We looked pretty much across Latin America, Africa. We did not look at the Middle East at that point because this was a study carried out in the late 90s and there was nothing going on in the Middle East. And we looked at some Asian countries. And what we found is that there had been in all these countries hundreds of NGOs that had been set up in the previous years. But only very few were surviving. But there were also tremendous amount, I would say of cynicism in this case concerning these NGOs. I traveled a lot as a part of this and I talked to a lot of people, and I will give you two examples of to me were quite telling. One, I was talking to the leader of one of the NGOs in Croatia. And he was probably a good person and the organization was doing well, it was a human rights group was doing right things. And essentially what these organizations are really doing was to provide jobs for out of work intellectuals. And there was a deep sense of cynicism about it. And I heard the same thing after the fall of Milošević in Serbia. Civil society representatives in the country said, “Okay, now it is our turn”. We are going to have two years in the limelight. There is going to be money coming in and we know very well from previous experience that the money is going to move to the next crisis, to
the next countries and most of the organizations that we are setting up are going to disappear.

Second example, and then I will draw the conclusion. This was in Azerbaijan. And again I was looking at civil society. And in course of a conversation more and more people told me that you really have to talk to so and so. Because he is one of the main drivers in the civil society world, and so on. So I called him up and he said, “Oh you called at the right time. Do you want to come to me tomorrow, I am going to do a training session for civil society activists”. Of course, I said, “Yes”, this is my time and this is my occasion to really look at civil society at work. So I went and we drove on bumpy roads for four hours. And what were the training sessions—I had expected something about community organizing; but it was all about how to write grant proposals for the Western organizations.

You know this is what you are looking for, you also have to look carefully about what of these organizations and to whom they have given grant because there is a way of writing the grant proposals to who is going to read it. So what is the moral for all these stories? Essentially a lot of these organizations that we are creating in the name of civil society are organizations that are not embedded in their society. They are detached. They do talk to the West into the funders a lot more than they talk to their own people.

Let me point out that there is a very pernicious effect of creating these organizations that are totally dependent on the West. Firstly, they do not last because usually they disappear with the last check. And if we are honest with ourselves, we are not going to fund these organizations forever. And as my Serbian civil society, people knew very well that we were going to move on to the next crisis. Who is really deeply involved in promoting civil society organization in the Balkans nowadays? There is a new frontier; there is a new crisis that we have to respond to.

Second, the other issue I think is very important that is now a mandate of all aid organizations, all Western aid organizations, and this is true from the IMF to the World Bank to the most liberal of the Scandinavian groups, that you do not launch a program without consulting with civil society. Because we have to partner with civil society. Who do we consult? We consult the organization that we have set up. So that very often we talk to ourselves, we in the name of consulting the civil society in the end we talk to ourselves. The idea that it is crucial that we talk to civil society is absolutely correct. I fully embrace it, but how do we move from the civil society, which is dependent which is our creation in some way to the civil society that is useful. And that is a very, very difficult proposition.

Because the civil society that is created spontaneously that is genuine is not necessarily something we like very much. The idea that it is not always democratic, we do not know how democratic it is. Who is the genuine civil society in the Arab world right now? It is not the NGOs, it is the protesters. What do we know about the protesters? It is very, very little. Yes we meet some of them, I cannot say that we saw the upheavals that happened coming but we had noticed, that I

MARINA OTTAWAY: Essentially, a lot of these organizations that we are creating in the name of civil society are organizations that are not embedded in their society. They are detached. They do talk to the West into the funders a lot more than they talk to their own people.
hope the CIA had also, that there was a lot of protest going on around the Arab world. There were a lot of strikes, there were lots of youth groups, and we were trying to figure out what was the significance and we met with a lot of people, because that is one of the things to do. We hold meetings; we talk to people and so on. We do not know very much about them, some of them seem very appealing people, they are very interesting people. Some of them are very determined not to take any money from the West. Some of them are very determined not to form NGOs. One thing we got very early on in dialogues with Egyptians was that we are not going to form any organizations.

Why do they use Facebook and Twitter? They did not want to form organizations, and this was very deliberate because they knew that if they formed an organization with a structure, the government would find out who they were and put them all in jail essentially, so that the only solution for them was this networking. There are two cultures here. There are two concepts of civil society that really do not mesh really well at this point. How can the West move? How can they move between these different types of organizations? How can you move creating organizations in some ways in our own image? We create NGOs that are structured along the lines of NGOs that function in Western countries in the 21st century. Whether or not they have anything to do with a place like Afghanistan or they have to do with anything else. We have not given sufficient thought. We have even started, I think, trying to figure out how we really relate to this new civil society.

JONATHAN LANDAY: I am going to use the moderator's prerogative just to throw a couple of ideas out. I am hearing a couple of themes from each one of our panelists. We are hearing about the need to rethink the way the West deals with NGOs and civil society. We are hearing about the need to set criteria up in terms of that kind of a choice. And we are hearing about how we are applying Western concepts to what we think these organizations are and how we need to support them. Let me throw a couple of things out. Just on the other side of the ledger, I would throw out that there are some models, and I want to ask you about this, particularly you raised Serbia. B92, the independent broadcaster in Belgrade, started out as a dependent of the United States Agency for International Development and has transformed itself into a commercial enterprise and is very much a viable commercial enterprise today. I would say the same for Koha Ditore, the newspaper in Kosovo. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Organization is a pretty powerful voice – although small, but very powerful. And it seems to be having a considerable amount of influence in Afghanistan, similarly for the Afghan media. And looking at Bahrain, the Bahraini Human Rights Organization is managing to keep that situation very much in focus. So there are some successful models out there.

On the other side of the ledger, perhaps one of you could also comment on what the other concepts of civil society NGOs are. For instance, in Pakistan, you have Lashkar-e-Taiba, which is responsible for the Mumbai atrocity, and yet it is first on the scene with its social services in both the Pakistani earthquake and the flooding that we just saw, substituting its services for the lack of state services. And similarly, in Lebanon, Hezbollah has done the very same thing. Not only is it substituting itself for state services, but it is a part of the government and it is a beneficiary, at least as far as they have gotten, of the democratization of Lebanon as well. So I am wondering if one or two of you might want to comment on all of those ideas.
MARINA OTTAWAY: I can say a few words on that, perhaps to begin with. There are certainly some successful examples and there are also some dependent organizations that are doing good work. I think there are a lot of human rights groups in various countries that do perform a very useful role in monitoring what is happening in the country, what the situation is for human rights in the countries, and are worth supporting. These dramatic examples of organizations that start completely dependent and then go on to become commercial enterprises – they exist but they are few. I think, by and large, the more typical situation is the organization that disappears after a few years, never to be seen again. This issue of the civil society organizations that are well rooted in the society, they are enumerable – these groups. Certainly all the Islamist organizations around the Arab world have a very strong social service component. It is part of the Islamic tradition. You can say it is partly tradition and partly tactic. I do not think that it is very easy to separate the two. Those are the very complicated ones.

But for one thing, let me give an example that to me is really challenging because the modern Brotherhood in Egypt is not a terrorist organization. They are not going around planting bombs and so on. We will not know Western NGO support program touches the work that the social assistance side of the Muslim Brotherhood does. And they are the ones who are doing probably the most important work. They run clinics all over the slums of Cairo and, since they are smart politically, they serve the Cops as well as they serve the Muslims. They are not stupid enough to discriminate. They are the ones who provide tutoring for the children, who provide the after schools programs and so on. In many ways, they are the conduit to the population.

But I think, just at the last point here, we have to distinguish in this thinking about civil society: service delivery organization. Service delivery organizations are always dependent. Sometimes they are also dependent on the government and so on. But essentially, an organization that provides healthcare is always dependent on somebody else. They cannot possibly raise the money for that. What becomes problematic is when we support the dependent organization in the name of political participation. And that is a totally different issue and that does not work.

JOSHUA FOUST: I think just to follow up on that, the Afghanistan example is interesting. The AIHRC is extremely influential in the West. Inside Afghanistan people ignore it and there are no consequences for that. So when we are looking at actually building up some kind of human rights aware society inside Afghanistan, they do good work and the monitoring that they do is effective. But the reports are written first in English and then translated into Dari or Pashto.

So, just from a basic level, they know that their primary audiences are Westerners, primarily Americans. And I think you see a lot of that too in the media, like Tolo. Tolo TV is a biggest symbol I could think of. It started as a USAID project, but now most of its sponsors are Iranian. Most of the newspapers in Kabul are funded at least in part by Iran.

The West is not doing a good job of supporting things like press. Afghanistan does have a free press. And I’d say that is probably the only functioning part of their public society. But it is not happening because of Western funded NGO civil society groups. It is primarily happening by other people trying to leverage their influence.

When we look at how political organization works, to this day, under law sponsored by the United States, political parties are more or
less banned in Afghanistan. Part of this is because of a desire to tamp down on the malicious. As I said before, the Tanzeems, the primary organizing groups in the 80’s, were combination political parties and malicious. To avoid those malicious, to avoid the return of the dreaded warlords, a lot of those groups are prevented from directly and officially organizing in government.

Because of that, in a lot of ways, their barriers are the basic level of political organization that we found. Then, also the war gets in the way of that too. That is why Hazara is just like being a minority. We are gaining shares in parliament because the war prevented Pashtuns and in some cases Tajiks from showing up to the polls to vote. This isn't really a function of civil society. Flourishing or other people being successful is just what happens in war because things suck and people cannot do what they want to do.

ANGEL RABASA: I would like to make three quick points in response to the comments by the moderator and the other speakers. First, I do agree with Marina that a lot of our money is going to NGOs that are not embedded in the societies and disappear when the money goes away. But it is very important, as I mentioned in my presentation, not to confuse NGOs, especially those that are dependent on international funding, with civil society, which is a much broader thing. Some of these Muslim civil society organizations go back to the base of Dutch rule, long before USAID or anything else.

Now, where the role of international assistance comes in, and this for example in the excellent work that the Asia Foundation has done, which they do not like to be publicized because it can be controversial, but they have funded activities by these deeply embedded Muslim civil society organizations to do really good work, including interpretation of the Quran, where they have gone through it to identify scripture that supports values of tolerance and democracy that these organizations do. So there is a very important role for us. As everyone mentioned, we need to be careful as to who we fund.

That takes me to the second point. Who should be our interlocutors? I am not impressed by the arguments that certain Islamist groups are not terrorists and they are not going around blowing up people. The issue is not terrorism. The issue is what values are these organizations propounding? And if a group is not violent but their agenda includes limitations and restrictions on the rights of women and religious minorities, I think that is not acceptable from the standpoint of groups that would like to be our interlocutors.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Nevzer Stacey. I am the president of HasNa Incorporated, an NGO in Washington DC. I loved what Marina said. I have been working twelve years in Southeastern Turkey and Cyprus and I cannot emphasize that we, the Westerners (I have considered myself since I lived here too long) have really not been honest with the countries we are trying to help. We have not given them the best examples of what a good NGO is. As you see, there are many organizations in this country that lack a lot of the virtues that we'd like to see in these organizations. We do not have many organizations that put up their income on the website. So we do not abide by many of the things that we’d like other countries, other NGOs to abide.

Second, we do not evaluate projects. The point is whenever I seek money to continue evaluating projects, it is not sexy. So they rather start a project, finish, and then go away. Nobody is interested. And if this is what we are teaching them, why are we surprised that those organizations do not last? European organizations have been giving
money to Turkey. It is absolutely appalling that the salaries that they give to people as project directors are totally out of line with what the community can pay or sustain.

So, what is happening is that we are not teaching at all. Out of desperation, out of our inability to work with these countries, we have chosen to set up these organizations. But we are not willing really to teach them what a good civil society organization is. You are right with the values. You are right with the mechanics. It is not raising money. It is understanding what a civil society is and really showing good examples from the United States. We have a long way to go to clean up our act.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I have a quick question. I am Cynthia Voller. In terms of what makes a civil society, it seems like there is a bit of ambiguity still as to what actually comprises a civil society. It is of particular concern right now obviously because the Palestinians are going in September to the UN to get unilateral acceptance as one nation, a separate two-state solution. So people are saying they do not have the predicate civil societies set up that would establish a legitimate state yet. So, my question is: In terms of what kinds of civil society and what types – Facebook is not a civil society. Facebook is like the 21st century graffiti on the wall. It is like show up at the movie tomorrow. That is Facebook. So, what is a collection of civil society sufficient to form a country such that one could be acknowledged or accepted as a separate autonomous political entity? Because it seems like you have got to have various formalized institutions. I very much appreciate the person saying that it operates within the law. If you have no rule of law and you have no autonomous independent judiciary, what sorts of civil societies are filling in the gap that allows Palestinians to go say, “We are now a country and we want you to recognize this”?

ANGEL RABASA: Actually, my own personal view is that the issue of Palestinian statehood is unrelated to the issue of civil societies on other international factors. But I think you have raised a very good question as to what sort of predicate civil society is needed. And I want to say for statehood because you can have a state that is completely despotic with any civil society that functions up to the point when it collapses, and we have seen lots of that.

However, I did say, and I think one of the premises of a presentation that I made is, a robust civil society is a predicate of democracy. And that was a point that I actually was going to the third point that I did not remember. And while it is true, as has been pointed out here, that civil society or civil society organizations may have been nowhere to be seen in the demonstrations against Mubarak or may not have played a role in a variety of transitions are in fact civil society per se, sometimes it plays a role. Sometimes it does not, depending on the nature of the regime and the circumstances of the transition. However, what we did find is that once the transition begins, those societies that are successful in democratizing are societies that have strong civil societies. And I think that is a very, very strong point supported by the literature. Now, that takes us to the question of the Arab world. What will happen to the democratic movements in the Arab world where everyone agrees there are no robust civil societies at least in comparison to other regions of the world? This is one of the points that Huntington made. And I think it is something that should give us pause. We see these strong movements toward democracy throughout the Arab world and yet in very few countries, because of the nature of the regimes that preceded this development, the civil societies are weak, or in some cases, nonexistent. So what does that portend for the future?
MARINA OTTAWAY: Going back to the issue that you raised, I know of no definition of statehood, of no international law, of no legal requirement for the recognition of the state that involves, that mentions civil society. This is just not part of the definition of the state. It has never been a requirement. Now, if you are saying that the existence of an organized civil society, and I think what constitutes a strong and a weak civil society, we really need a lot more discussion. We do not have the time for it. But if you say that that is desirable (the existence of a strong civil society): yes. If you say that it is a condition for statehood, this is a rule that has been made ad hoc, frankly, whoever is stating that.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. Christian Sean. I have a question for Mr. Foust. In Egypt, the military as an institution of civil society was an important driver of governance transitions and, later on today, stabilization. In the absence of credible political partners that you had alluded to that is obvious right now in Afghanistan, do you think a similar path is a viable element of our overall development and stabilization efforts within that country?

JOSHUA FOUST: Yes. I would describe Egypt under Mubarak as something of a praetorian state when the military had a lot of the functions of the government. You can also look at pre-Erdogan Turkey in the same way, where the military took over the government. You could look at Pakistan just shuffling back and forth between the two. I think it remains to be seen in Egypt if the military is actually a force for democratization. They were a force for toppling Mubarak. I have not seen evidence yet that they are actually a force for forming democracy or some kind of civil society. That is completely up in the air.

When it comes to Afghanistan, I know the hope inside ISAF is that building an effective security sector is how they will establish the stability to develop a civil society down the road, especially General Caldwell who runs the National Training Mission. He is very explicit that the idea of educating Afghan soldiers, teaching them to read, teaching them to connect with other kinds of literature and to interact with each other as out of their own communities, is specifically designed to create some kind of national civil identity.

I think it is completely up in the air whether or not that is going to be effective. The Soviets tried to do the exact same thing. They threw a lot more money at it and they did it for a lot longer than we’ve been doing it, and it did not really work. Afghans do have some kind of Afghan identity. They identify themselves as Afghans. You see in the north ethnic minorities that have countries named after them nearby not trying to join them. They actually think of themselves as Afghan to an extent, but the ability of outsiders, especially a military outsider, to impose some kind of society like that is extremely limited, and it is a mistake to think that we can be very effective at it.

It would seem to me that the overall question we are asking dominating the discussion is: Where is us in them? And that is a foreign policy question to me. And the role of civil society in this overall question is actually a very minute component. It is not the bigger problem in the overall scheme of things when it comes to understanding relationships with and throughout these changing times.

And so, I agree with you, Marina. You have to understand civil society as it pertains to them. It is not just the tens of thousands of people on the streets. Egypt has 33,000 NGOs. Most of these groups are not funded by the United States. And as you mentioned, some of them will not accept US funding. Palestinians have a lot of NGOs, a lot of nongovernmental organizations. Some of them are banned terrorists because they support Hamas. And it is the same thing with other Arab countries.
One of the things that have emerged in literatures is that there is a growth even under authoritarian regimes, from the phenomenal growth of NGOs that are operating. And they have been using the language of human rights. And some of those organizations are human rights organizations. Some of them are funded by the corrupt governments and they do not operate very well. But ultimately, they all contributed to this cultural transformation of political life in the Arab world that no longer can tolerate authoritarianism and dictatorship. That is my reading.

MARINA OTTAWAY: I completely agree with that. I would say also I think we need to spend a lot more time really understanding what is going on in this country, understanding who’s driving – I am focusing now on the Middle East because that is what I do for a living. But focusing a lot more on what is driving these changes, who are the groups, how do they differ from other groups that had been supported in the past.

What I see we are doing is it is the usual problem. You have work for bureaucracy. We are under pressure to spend money. We are pressured to do something that we are contributing to do this. The MEPI program, the Middle East Partnership Initiative is ramping up its grains. And when you are in a hurry, to whom do you go? You go to the people you already know because it takes too long a time to try to investigate the new possibility, the new groups, and so on. And also, there is a tendency to go back.

One thing that is making a lot of Egyptians very angry now is the toll that the international organization or the so-called democracy promotion NGOs, the NBIs, the RRIIs, IFAS, the Westminster Foundation, the German Party Institutes, all of them. All of these groups are coming in, telling Egyptians how other transitions have taken place so that they are sending Chileans to tell them about their transitions. And the reaction of Egyptians is very interesting, but what does it have to do with us?

JOSHUA FOUST: I would like to actually follow up on that for a second. When you are looking at it from a strategic perspective, I cannot think of a single case where the United States has intervened in a conflict for the specific purpose of promoting democracy. It is usually to either topple someone we hate or to prevent atrocities. And then afterwards, we fudge our way through some kind of democracy civil society thing. So, just from a broad level policy perspective, I do not think in the government even now, even when the Obama administration is thinking about “What do we do when Gaddafi leaves?” Not only do I not think they have a plan, but they are not thinking about how to develop a civil society. There is an assumption that the government and social things will take care of themselves and will deal with it if things go wrong. But I think you were right in pointing that out that there is not a considered strategic understanding of what it means to promote this concept. We are using our leftovers from the 20th century to impose on a very different era, a very different environmental context, political, geopolitical – We got to stuff it up.
PANEL II: CIVIL SOCIETY, PEACEBUILDING, AND EDUCATION

Moderator
Katherine Marshall

Panelists
Mohamed Nimer
Bilal Wahab
Stanley Kober

KATHERINE MARSHALL: Thank you, well I think we will all remember that the first panel, as a sort of what are we talking about and what do not we know? We are now moving to somewhat more specific issue, which the links between civil society, a peace building and education. We have three panelists as you can see. The first is Mohamed Nimer, who is an assistant professor at the School of International Service at American University. He has works on politics cross cultural communication and is a specialist particularly in Islamic reform movements and he is going to focus on the Gulen movement as one example of what he calls a soft power and the lessons can be drawn from that for the Arab political reform movements. Bilal Wahab from George Mason University is a specialist in transnational movement terrorism; he works on corruption, economic and political transition particularly in petroleum-rich countries. And he has a wide experience including FAO but his focus great deal on Iraq. That I think would be the main topic of his discussion this morning. And Stanley Kober with the Cato Institute. His theme is building peace from the bottom up. He is research fellow has a very broad background in foreign policies studies and he is concentrating on the great deal on the Soviet Union and the transition which have taken place.

MOHAMED NIMER: I will share with you some of my observations, during my visit in March to Turkey and my encounter with it with the Gulen Movement institutions and leaders. And what form of Islam or Islamic activism they represent. And what that means in terms of lesson to the current democracy movement in the Arab world. And so I will get right into it, but before I move I just forgot to mention something in terms of where is the West in those revolutions. I am the adviser of the new project, which is the project of the American Islamic Congress which has an office in Cairo. And their activist has been involved in the current protest in Cairo. And so, even at the grassroots level and those guys are very much involved in connecting with pro-democracy activist in different parts of the Middle East through Facebook and Twitter.

And the most important thing that we just observed that the Arab people are so sick and tired on living under dictatorship. And have realized that freedom and liberation starts from within that they are willing to call international on community powers, powers they oppose otherwise and other important areas of policy, to come and help them get rid of their demons the dictators who rule them who have oppressed them. I think we live in a honeymoon period in terms of Arab-American relation these days. And so it is in that spirit, that I that I look into the topic.

For the Arabs, since the start of Islam, which transformed Arab culture, the idea of power, which is the starting point of my discussion, has always been Muslim versus non-Muslim. Even as power after the Prophet and the first guided caliphs moved into authoritarian form
of rulership with Umayyad Dynasty; the intellectuals at that time chose to be called the fuqaha—the jurists, who started the intellectualist movement in the Arab world, did not ask the question whether it is Halal? or permissible in the Islamic law to gather up support and grab a political power in the state and have this as a form of rule. Well, there are some leaders at the time who rebelled against the Umayyads. And by fifty years later, all those rebellions were quieted and ever since the jurists have been asking the question in terms of what are the qualities of the leader? They have not asked the questions pertaining to the fact that there are power relations among human beings. And it just the way it is that comes with the way we are created as humans.

The earliest person, or the earliest thinker who asked that question was Ibn Khaldun who happens to be a Tunisian. And he called those forms of governance - Willayati Muttagalip - ruled by the victor, the person or the group that basically rules through coercion. In the Arab world, the rulers they owned, they rule, they exercise absolute power. And that is what the Arabs now have come to revolt against. Well, now you have a new big factor, a millions of Arab who taken into the streets and they say they want to topple the regime. They do not want to be ruled by individual, this is the recent slogan in Syria: "No for the individual; no for the family”. This is what they are saying; in fact, in that sense the Arabs are some sort of ahead of Turks in that quest for true democracy. Yet, the Gulen and the Islamic movements in Turkey did ask these kinds of questions. They did not have to face those realities of absolute oppression in order to come up and ask the question of power. What Gulen has theorized and has contributed in terms of Islamic thought is also based on not just the philosophical approach to Islam that he shares with the secularized the culture that is secularized military elite in Turkey. But he has own cultural choices, he happen to be a practicing Muslim and so to him. He thought that the state should free religion. That is the state should not impose the religious choices on people. And in fact the state is doing, the military leaders and its elite is doing its imposing its own choices when it comes to religion on other people, when it comes to the issue of the head scarf or other things. Even in term of teaching religion in schools. They do teach their own religion in school, but they do teach their own interpretation of what religion means. And that is according to Gulen a form of imposing a state and position on people.

These questions are not raised very much the Arab world. The Arab World happens to come from a more of what I called a Fiqhi tradition to Islam, a juristic Islam. Yet, what we seen in the Arab revolution is the major point I am going to make, is that the Arabs as masses are moving way beyond this Fiqhi tradition and they are growing more and more into the philosophical understanding of Islam. The philosophical understanding of Islam is understanding that the organically combines in understanding of reality with what people think of Islamic values are, what the teachings of the Quran and the traditions of the prophet, what they mean in their lives. As opposed to what you call, Orthodox, traditional or conservative juristic tradition that approaches issues with the private and public based first on what has been written on the past on those issues. And so this is why the jurists are now playing a catch up game with the revolts. There has been a raging debate in the Arab world after the masses have taken their decision and came out wanting to depose the regime, wanting to end the dictatorship something that is in progress I should say, and has been pointed out from the previous panel. But the jurists started asking the question: Is it Halal for people to come out against the ruler or is it not Halal to go against them. The Wahabis, for very obvious reason, said "no
you cannot come out you have to listen and obey”. And you get Karadawi on Al-Jazeera, say “well this pertains to stopping oppression, stopping zuulm (oppression) and ensuring adl (justice) are predominant concepts in the Quran”. Karadawi is the top jurist and scholar, and he is very well respected in the Arab world across different Islamic movements, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood.

The people have established by their own feet, their right to make their decision on who should get to rule them and they have decided that governance should be based on popular legitimacy. But who are these people? Well there are a lot of Islamists, secularists, nationalists. In Tunisia it has its own picture of diversity and it includes a lot of those many Christians in Tunisia in Yemen, the same thing in the south and the north of different tribes. But the youth aspect is probably the common element on all these revolutions. Because the youth is to suffer most from oppression. They are not just suffering in terms of lack of political rights, and emancipation. They are also suffering on their own livelihood. They do see bright future for themselves, so that is, and they have associated this with the power structure. And that takes us to the nature of contemporary state. The contemporary state is so intrusive, something that in Islamic tradition has not known, and it is so intrusive in terms of its position of its own institution, own values, its own structures, and its own laws in the various aspects of lives of society.

From your birth to your death you have to go to the state or state systems, regardless whether they are ruled by democrats or dictators.

MOHAMED NIMER: The contemporary state is so intrusive, something that in Islamic tradition has not known, and it is so intrusive in terms of its position of its own institution, own values, its own structures, and its own laws in the various aspects of lives of society. From your birth to your death you have to go to the state or state systems, regardless whether they are ruled by democrats or dictators.

culture, and to them Turkish Islam is the identity. Being Turk and being Muslim is the identity that they have accepted. So the Gulen Movement I should say, have reconciled itself with Turkish nationalism.

In the Arab world, the Arab nationalism was led by authoritarian groups that kind of created some sort of a gap between Islamic movement and the state, especially in the time of Nasser that has been kind of receding. This thing has been receding, which has contribute to the growth of the prodemocracy outlook. Now, what do the Arabs can learn, what do Arabs learn from the Gulen Movement, I think a major thing it that the sophisticated definition of how a social movement relates to the state, how it relates its power play. Gulen has decided by looking at the Islamic tradition that democracy is the best form of political system that can meet the requirement of the Islamic values, the Islamic values of Shura the justice of justice of compassion. When it
comes to the public fear and as such a faith-based social movement does not need, and has to stay above parties and politics, above the contest for power; but a such the social movement can be so powerful. In the sense that, I do not want to say it can be the kingmaker but would say it can frame public discussion. Through those institutions and through those mass media, the Zaman newspaper the largest distributed newspaper.

In the country and Arabs parties and groups has newspaper but they kept down because of oppression, the oppressive regimes. And that something the Turks probably can think the military for. But the fact that Gulen would not endorse any political candidate does not stop him from raising his voice when it comes to systemic issues of public concern. The referendum over the constitutional amendments that relates what the state is and the definition of power is all about. And that stuff relates to the work of social media movements. The Ergenekon trial, the trials of the military leaders suspected to plotting to topple the government. He supported of it because it is a systemic issue. In the Arab world at least the Muslim Brotherhood now can learn it from this and to them. When somebody evokes the Turkish model to them, they refuse it, but to them but it means a military controlled political system. They do not want that, but they want the Gulen-inspired ideas of separating politics from social work. Rashid al-Ghannushi does not give any answer on a political question when he is in the mosque. The mosque is not the place for it, there have been practices and mistakes along the away, probably some of them came out of the media more in the local media than in the international media. We can deal with it but that is part of people learning.

BILAL WAHAB: The role of civil society in a country undergoing transition, like Iraq, is the role of playing another power alternative to the state power and to be able to be a check of accountability of a government.
monopolies, what role is there for the civil society and the new organization that have mushroomed of after 2003? Before talking about three or two themes and maybe to get your morale down about any hopes of civil society, but let me give you a couple of positive examples to close a positive end. I will be talking about dependency, and then as part of that I will be talking about funding.

In terms of dependency, Iraq is the country where dependency defines its international dimension as well as the domestic dimension. Internationally security is dependent on existence and presence of foreign forces, a lot of its politics is dependent on the regional politics, on neighbors, on foreign influences. The politics inside the political party is often seen as stages of powers and interest outside the Iraqi borders. In the same way, this mechanism applies internally to the civil society, a lot of times NGOs have political affiliations. When I was working for one of the US programs, we have to train NGOs. We have to be very mindful of who we invite our sessions. So we have to maintain our political balance, where we invited the NGOs we have to make sure that every political actor, we know that every political actor party have an NGOs or group of NGOs related to them, so we have to be mindful of maintaining that balance, because at the end of the day we represented the American arm of interests and development of work that we want to be politically correct. That wasn't very effective.

Now, in terms of Iraq, and we come to talk about funding, the very presence of this NGOs mushroomed at 2003, mostly as a market response to the available to the funds, rather than pursuing issues. I am not saying that they do not exist, but that was the trend. And this creates the dependency on the availability of funding. Now the first panel discussed how the funding evaporates when the interest vanishes or when there is a more pressing conflict than the focus shifts from one country to the other, these NGOs go home. That does not seem the case of Iraq. Because Iraq has problems and many problems, one that is not a problem is the availability of funding because Iraq has oil. The oil money is concentrated in the hands of the few political parties who have been called, lucky or call it strategically positioning themselves to be able to put their hands on it. And the challenge of transition in Iraq in general, the actors that can manage to stay now or probably going to be there for the long haul.

Therefore, what some scholars have called the resource curse in which a country depends on single natural resource for income tends to have dysfunctional institutions both political and economic. This creates an upside down pyramid or structure of influence in which rather than the government behold down to the people the people behold unto the government. An just to give you some numbers: some 90 percent of the workforce in the Kurdistan region, work for the government. More than seventy percent 70 percent of the budget, is simply distributed the salaries. Basically a social system without the benefits of the independence while creating more dependencies.

So while we apply this on CSOs and how they are going to react on this, we are starting to see with the withdrawal of international funding, the government and the political parties are very happy to step in. And this is a dimension of the Iraqi politics. When you switch on the Iraqi channel, on any sector or any ethnic groups, a lot of times you can hear some hints of ideological and ethnic, but a lot of time that influence; it is about patronage. It is about who is better in the game of controlling others' business.

So according to the National Democratic Institute, in the region of Kurdistan, more than 40 percent of NGOs in the Circle of MBI, get funding from the government. For now, it
is only eight percent 8 percent in the rest of the country. But again, the trend is not going to the direction of Baghdad it is going to the direction of Kurdistan. So with time I am expected to see more and more NGOs in the rest of the countries getting funding form the government. And talking about government intrusion in the previous cabinet of the Kurdistan Regional government, there was a Ministry of Civil Society Affairs. Sounded funny. Well, they got rid of it, but still there are more than one mechanism for the petrodollars in the hands of the government to be transferred to the hands of these NGOs. So right know the dependency will remain, regardless of the funding source, which is detrimental to the influence of the civil society organizations as a check on the government, as the facilitators of dialogue across different groups.

However, despite this cynical introduction, there are elements of hope. Well one, within the NGO community in particular and the generally of the civil society which in Iraq includes the professional syndicates, some of the student organizations, the women organizations, that have been traditionally aligned with political parties. They are starting to see value in independence. Some of them basically got to the habit of being a CSO or being an NGO. It is sort of when you do something for a long time you getting the habit of doing it. And some of them have traveled to other countries they have seen that, and saying “actually, we could do a lot more than being the agents of a political party”.

Another one is that politics in Iraq, and politicians in Iraq, probably elsewhere as well, are increasingly being accused of corruption. So people who have a project, have ideas, have concerns for issues that they want to promote it. And they are sincere about it, and there are a lot of them who are trying to find an alternative way outside the political system of promoting those affairs, those issues, those concerns. And the CSO and the NGO community is increasingly becoming one such venue. They do not want to be associated with the corruption of the government and the politics, so they try to say that we are not affiliated and that creates incentive for more independence. To have a comment on the USAID, the USAID works and the funding that they provide which also has contributed to these negative dynamic. And that is the issue of how USAID is obsessed with measurables, “How many did you invite to your training”.

And we also created the impression for these NGOs, “well, our job is to train you and your job is going to train people”. Therefore, when you ask NGOs , “What do you do?”, they say, “We train”. They do not advocate, they do not see that advocacy is sort of their main concern, main job. Part of it is has positive effects when it comes to education, but that is not the main role of the civil society organizations to do what we are doing to them. Put them in the whole like this and talk at them. Another thing is the over-bureaucratization of again that comes in the mentality of outsourcing it to an NGO. And the USAID’s job is to monitor that NGOs, and monitor from a compound, all you have to look for of some kind of measure. So programs that have long term effect often get missed.

Now I promise that I give you a couple examples of hope. Now, one of them is social entrepreneurship and my example of that is the school I graduated from. It is a school that was built by Hizmet or a Gulen movement of Turkey in 1994. It was a free high school in the beginning. But after it established reputation, because it graduated smart students, it has started to charge for tuition: “We are a good school. We can educate your kids, can teach them English, Turkish, math and science, and these students can go participate in the international scientific
olympiads, and they come back with prizes gold medals, bronze”. A lot of my friends got that. So they are good, they become marketable and once they become marketable (now, my sister has to pay a lot of money to be on that school). But that money is invested building another school in another town. So this process of mushrooming without being dependent to anyone just being self-sustainable, has created a system in which you have an educational system in place that goes from elementary and kindergarten all the way to the university now. And this is also had some of the positive effects on any CSO, I consider universities and education system to be CSOs, to have which Turkey and Kurdistan have always have problems regarding the PKK and the Kurdish nationalism issue. But they brought tens of Turkish parliamentarians to inaugurate the university in Kurdistan—that was ground breaking.

So that is one way to create this dependency on political actors and political government, social entrepreneurship. The other one is media which bites very hard. And the reason, and of course, media was trained mainly by the USAID and the American organizations, but the reason it is more successful than the NGOs, because rather teaching them something which is (I do not want to be tainted), but colored by of Western values norms like gender equality, some of the terms that spare a lot of debate within the Iraqi very conservative community. They have trained them skills, how to investigate, how to write, how to advertise. Skills that are easily applicable and therefore the media have been more active as the check on the government than many of the NGO communities. Finally, an emerging trend on our national NGO rather than regional or local, but national networks of NGO people in this city find people in the South, people in the center that we have a similar concern and we can cooperate on this. And I think is very positive emerging trend. Thank you very much.

**STANLEY KOBER:** In 1941, an American educator Gregor Ziemer, the president of the American Colony School in Berlin published a book about the Nazi educational system, which he had been allowed to study. “Hitler’s schools do their jobs diabolically well”, he concluded. “They are educating boys and girls for death; they are preparing them as a sacrifice for Hitler”. The study of war and its prevention has typically focus on international security arrangements such as the alliances of collective security. The ideas that confronted by the military superior force, the aggressors will back down and peace will be preserved. It makes sense, which is why this is commonly accepted, but history shows that those who initiate wars are not so easily be deterred.

The Second World War illustrate the failure, Hitler was intent on war. “If men wish to live, then they are force to kill others”, he proclaimed in 1929. “When it is either the hammer or anvil, we confess that it is our purpose to prepare the German people again for the role of the hammer”. Ten year later he fulfill his prophecy; two years after that, while still at war with Britain, he attack the Soviet Union, as well as armies are fully engaged in two fronts, he declared war on United States after Pearl Harbor, even though he was under no obligation to do so.

In making this case to the League of Nations, President Wilson told to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “That the great tragedy through we which we have past, never would have occurred if the central powers had dreamed that a number of nations will be combined against that”. But Hitler’s actions proved Wilson wrong, since Hitler willfully brought the Soviet Union and the United States into the war by initiating the conflicts with them. The same is true of Japan. Contrary to what one would expect from the top-down deterrence method of by preventing war. The Japanese attacked us, even though they knew
that we were military superior. "I can guarantee to put a tough fight for the first six months, but absolutely no confidence as what would happened if it went on for two or three years", Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto told the Minister of Japan on the 1940. "I hope at least that you make at least every effort to avoid war with America".

Yamamoto’s assessment was very likely affected by the time he spent in United States. He had been assigned in the Japanese Embassy in Washington, and also had studied English at Harvard. At the very least, we can assume that we are informed by opinion of the military challenge of war with United States. But also raises the question, of whether his time here affected at his attitudes. “Yamamoto’s got no guts”, one naval officer has openly complained, “He is too fond of England and America”.

Yamamoto ultimately obeyed his orders and commanded the attack on Pearl Harbor, but his conflicted situation raises an obvious question about another approach to peace building. One of it is not top down, rather bottom up, focusing not on deterrence and balance of power, but on creating ties among people. To be sure such approaches are not known. In a marvelous letter to Lafayette, George Washington hoped, “Nations are becoming more humanized in their policy, that the subjects of ambition and causes for hostility are daily diminishing, and, in fine, that the period is not very remote, when the benefits of a liberal and free commerce will, pretty generally, succeed to the devastations and horrors of war”. Washington sentiment was elaborated a century ago, by Norman Angell on his book of “The Great Illusion”. Angell argued that financial interdependence had made war irrational, the complexity of modern finance makes New York dependent on London, London upon Paris, and Paris upon Berlin. To a greater degree than has ever been yet to be the case of the history. Angell argue that the consequences that no one can have any interest in the world. “But what is a further corollary of this situation”, he asked “that Germany is to-day in a larger sense than she ever was before England’s debtor, and that her industrial success is bound up with English financial security”.

Unfortunately the World War I broke out, soon afterwards. That war was preceded by an ugly conflict in the Balkans. In the 1913 edition of his book, Angell clarifies in his book of “The Great Illusion”, “it is not the likelihood of war which is the illusion, but its benefits he explained. “It is likely or unlikely according as the parties to a dispute are guided by wisdom or folly ”. Well, yes; but it a little too easy; wars are not only about interest, because human beings are emotional. Wars are not just because of money, because human beings are motivated by other considerations. That is why, for example, our declaration of independence ends to with signatories pledging our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor.

In discussing British behavior at unit, Winston Churchill spoke of the importance of an honor, there is however one helpful guide namely for a nation to keep its word in act accordance to the treaty obligations to the allies, this guide is called honor. At the same time he warned that honor can became abused. Honor is often influence by the element of pride, which plays a so large apart from its inspiration, and exaggerated code of honor leading to the performance of utterly vain and unreasonable deeds could not be defended. However find it might look. It is precisely the exaggerated sense of honor that prompted George Washington to advise the American people to avoid making alliances permanent. He was afraid that the permanent alliances would lead to the creation to permanent antipathies and the people would then be prompt to inflamed trivial incidences into insults an honor that had to be addressed. Antipathy in
one nation against another, disposes each more readily to offer insult and injury. To lay hold of flake causes of unbridged and to be hardy and intractable when accidental and trifle occasions dispute occur. Washington explains, “The nation [meaning the people] prompted by ill will and resentment sometimes impels to war the government contrary to the best calculations of policy”. Thus to address the problem of War, we need to supplement top down with the bottom approaches, we have to address not only interest of state, but emotions of people. Washington made a start of that of emphasizing the importance of ties of commerce, but what we have seen and that is not enough.

The Yamamoto question, however, raises the possibility of whether educational exchanges can enhance commercial ties, and helping to build peace from the bottom up. Put simply, if there are thousands of thousands of people like Yamamoto who had studied in the United States and elsewhere, could Pearl Harbor happened? One of the great blessings in the end of the Cold War, has been the growth of the international exchanges. For someone like myself who’s study in the Soviet Union, but did not meet any Soviet students here and that is undergraduate at Georgetown when I first went to the Soviet Union. It is extraordinarily to see all of foreign students on American Campuses and unlike Yamamoto they are not simply studying English typically their English already good, rather they are here for a serious courses of studies, which means they spend more time and mingle with others students from all over. The end of the cold war also means something else. In those days, it is impossible to maintain a friendships form, it was simply too dangerous. Now those barriers have largely fallen. In addition new media had made it easier to stay in touch. Building peace also concerns the type of education being offered. Zimmer provides the example of the dangers of one type of education. Quoting from a Nazi manual, “the chief purpose of this school is to train make human beings to realize that the state is more important than the individual. That individuals must be willing and ready to sacrifice themselves for nation and Führer”. In contrast of this culture of obedience, American education (I think now) offers a culture of questioning. This is the spirit that is foundation of scientific method, and democracy. As Judge Learned Hand put it “The spirit of liberty is the Spirit which is not to sure that it is right”. It is in that spirit that we hope to realize Washington’s vision of a peaceful world which will laid out in his letter to Lafayette, built from the bottom up in which we are all “Citizens of the great republic, of humanity at large”.

**KATHERINE MARSHALL:** Well, Thank you all very much for three fascinating yet, very different presentations and approaches to the challenge that the organizers have put to us. Two themes that I sense very much are both interdependency and interconnection. And that in a sense is a threaded list that ties the focus on education and on peace building. And the roles, the multiple roles that civil the society will can play.

Stanley, you focused more on the education, but I will be interested if you would elaborate, any of you or one of you more on this theme of education. We focus on youth and the importance of youth, in what is happening in the world today. But how do you see the civil society and education? Whether it is a nonstate education or related to the state?

**BILAL WAHAB:** In the context of overdependency on the state and part of the transition being breaking down into for allowing free enterprise, education is key. Because when I said that the majority of the national budget goes into salaries, well the majority of the salaries are given to educators because of the sheer size. And that is so true
for the United States. But what is different in Iraq where I am most familiar with is that education has been so far being public. Everyone praises the Iraq education system being free, true it is free. But it also public, which is part of the intrusion of the state, and also contributes to the control mechanism. And regardless of who is in power, or whatever, or whoever power with that amount of discretion is going to create negative influence. I mean, obviously of bad governance, let me start to say dictatorships, are not all about intentions and personalities. They are about that the incentives that post themselves to people.

So one trend, one positive trend in Iraq is the emergence of private education, private universities. There are in the infancy in general. Most of them are given opportunities to people, who missed the opportunities inside the public system. But that is a way for breaking the monopoly of the government on education and if Kurdistan again is any point of for shadowing the rest of the country. We can see in Kurdistan models for a private education, where you have an American university, have a university modeled after the British system, you have a Turkish university and I am sure that many other, there is French as well. So, this creates a market for education and of course with each university that has a cultural and national background those create ties with other respective countries. So yes I could have emphasize on education more which I said is one of the successful in roads to breaking state monopoly.

MOHAMED NIMER: I just like to say a few words on the type of education in the Gulen Movement. Gulen’s idea behind those one thousand schools around the world, and ten universities in Turkey is the creation of what he calls a ‘golden generation’. And I visited Samanyolu High school in Ankara. It is meant for the elite students. So, obviously through this form of social work you put yourself into, I mean you step in to the domain of power. Because you are having the brightest minds in the country coming to your schools and learning your values along with learning science and math. And they offer top rated science and math programs. So, education is very important and this way is the indirect way to being very influential social movement in the country.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Ilhan Tanir from Turkish press. I have a question to Mohamed Nimer is there an interest during your study, have you witnessed any interest, I know it is too early from the revolution in Egypt and Tunisia, but have you witnessed any interest that you know about Gulen, some lessons you have you elaborated here. Or have you witnessed any kind of engagement of Gulen to countries where new revolutions taken place. Thank you.

MOHAMED NIMER: The Gulen movement has schools in some Arab countries. Actually the one in Jordan interestingly does not serve elite but it serves the Palestinian refugee camp. But the school in Cairo is the closest thing into a Gulen influence in the political restructuring of the Arab world is probably related indirectly to the Gulen movement through the AK Party. The Gulen movement and Gulen himself does not endorse any party, but it is not a secret that most Gulen members vote for the AKP. You know the Muslim Brotherhood just decided to establish a political party that is completely separate from the organization. Separate by policy, separate by organization, separate by finance completely independent. And some of the leaders who wanted to establish it kind of resigned their post in the Muslim Brotherhood. They call themselves Freedom and Justice party. There are a lot of inspirations from the AK Party in their talk.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My Name is Miller, I teach at National Intelligence University. My question is: education to do what? In the sense that it seems to me that a lot has been going on involving youth in some other country which has a great turmoil right now. They have the education but they do not have the opportunity after the education. Creating jobs, creating the economy, that will in fact absorbed this people once they are educated in addition to the question about education for educating for faith, educating for action, educating for vocation. So maybe one of you will talk about that a little bit.

STANLEY KOBER: One of the reasons I stress the culture of questioning. We live in a now and a post industrial economy basically a knowledge economy which is another saying for creation of economy. It is an economy that is based on change and innovation. The people who will succeed are the people who can adjust to that. We now have machines that can remember stuff. I remember even being in grade school exams are about memorization, okay, that is gone now. If I come to a university now, that is not it. It is not memorization it is more teaching critical thinking. That is the preparation for the future, particularly to the undergraduate level and I think then you can specialize with that knowledge. But a lot of the world have divide on these, not only the language of democracy, the spirit of democracy but is increasingly the attitude and the culture and the people will need in a postindustrial world. And so that is even if they have the degree, if they do not have that culture of critical questioning. And I notice that some of the countries, Saudi Arabia now, has that new university the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology built on and modeled in which they are coming around this idea that they I have got to make this a transition. Education based on questioning and I think it is critical not just how many people have the degrees.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: It seems to me that I am certain that the exception of pluralism and diversity is one of the major sources of anxiety for people looking at change in Islamic world in general.

MOHAMED NIMER: If you just watch what is going on in the Tahrir square - it was a celebration of pluralism. Day after day something that the regime of Mubarak has denied the Egyptians. The Muslims pray and the Copts protect their back; and the same thing, with the Copts as well. The Friday, when the people went to celebrate the success of toppling of Mubarak, the Friday sermon was proceeded by a Coptic mass in which the Muslims and the Christians were party to. I read a statement by one of the youth leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, who had been camping in Tahrir Square. With other youth with other organizations from other trends from the leftist and secularist and including women who do not cover their hair, and he was apologizing to them. He said, "I have just realized that I was the rude person, that I was the uncovered person in my thinking of looking down at you, because of the garment. I saw the person you are way beyond the hijab, we stood together and fought for freedom for all of us". That is what is going on in the Arab world, and it involves education outside the school, on the street for political change. And it is involving appreciation for pluralism that allowed the Muslim Brotherhood now, to sort of establish and endorse of the establishment of a political party, some of the founders are non-Muslim are Christian Copts. And so there is, people are learning, acceptance is happening.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, from the Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia. I happen to be the president and I want to put the question to the civil society because we do to advocacy for women. As you all know that Liberia has been long civil war, and we advocate for women and children especially
those in the rural areas, and will able to manage to general peace in the court; we did the juvenile court, that is how our legacy in advocacy. But my question to you is: what methodology or strategy a CSO can play to ensure that corruption in government minimized and people get most of the benefits from taxes and revenue? Thank you.

BILAL WAHAB: I am writing dissertation on that, so you have to wait two more years. I would say two things. Depending on how independent and powerful the NGOs are, the maximum you can do is to check on the government and be an element of naming and shaming when it comes to corruption. And the CSOs and the media here can actually work together very closely in this process. And a lot of these societies, it applies to Iraq and in lot of the African countries, is that I had come across in my literature reviews, in which the element of shame and honor is still huge, is still important. One of the successes basically of the NGOs and the civil society, even if they fail institutionally, they put pressure in the government in terms of advocacy and advice in proposing legislations and contributing to the public decision making, there been rather than successful in the naming and shaming of officials which is influential.

Another point I want to make in terms of how indigenous the issues are. So you mention women issues. So in the case of Iraq, and this is an example that I gave, we had a political turmoil over the the phrase - gender equality. A lot of the women organizations push for the legislation that calls for gender equality, without people knowing what the gender equality means. A lot of people, you know, stood against it. It strikes the very sensitive nerve in the society. Not only the men, but the women as well. Phrasing it as ‘women’s rights’ would have been okay. So, just the very use of the terminology create a lot of problems, when the terms were changed into education and free education for women, equal opportunity for work, equal pay, which are all components of the gender equality without to mentioning the G word here. It passed smoothly.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you very much I am from the World Bank. I was just wondering and just observing what has been happening so far. Is the very nature of educating not actually changing? Because when I listen to the issue of unevenness of power in lots of conflict, education being one of the possible proactive ways of addressing it. If you really observe on what is happening, we have seen that education as what we know it. The Internet has actually changed everything. Education is less formal now, access to information, access to education, seems to be the one moving the youth, whereby the issue on corruption, transparency is more obvious. So, in a more leveling field, whereby you cannot halt information and knowledge, and use it as power, it becomes more transparent. And I am looking the situation where if we are having better equality in terms of education, and I think I see it plays a big role here. Then the CSOs, the civil society and NGOs will be having information that is nearly the about same as the government or the people in power. And that to me is a big paradigm shift. I just want to comment on this.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, My name is Allison Johnson. I am an international political economist, I wanted to dive into something that Stanley is bringing up around – institutions. And how the example of the USA, and these institutions and these three branches create the whole different dynamic in our society. And to see Bilal and Mohamed can touch on the institutions that are being built in Iraq example and some other examples you have seen in Egypt as that moving forward. Because I would like to see whether we could talk to other folks in the region influencing the building of institution
and the democratic structures that are going to exist in these newly emerging democracies: The influence of Saudi Arabia and Wahabi movement its influence on education across the region? And what other impacts Iran may have in the building institutions across the region? And how that contrasts from perhaps the Western pushing in the democratization process? And finally if it is possible Stanley to just touch a little bit as you push on issues about the rule of law, the importance of our judicial branch, the extent to which that kind institutionalization can be imposed from the outside? In other words, you know the USAID the department of justice they have lots of programs to get bring that institution to the rest of the world. Is it possible or it has something to be in the grassroots from the bottom to up. If you want to have institutions based on similar rules.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: There has been a lot of discussion about a certain crisis in American education. And there are a lot of mistakes Americans are making in terms of Islam, book burning - burning the Quran, voting against the Sharia law without knowing what it is, George Bush did not know that there is difference between Shia or Sunni. So, we are teaching people to do business and technology and medicine and all this other things. But no one wants to find history, philosophy; Americans are very bad about geography. So, you know, who needs humanity, they are not money makers, get rid of them. But it turns out that without studying in humanities we have completely distorted view of Islamic world.

BILAL WAHAB: I am going to comment on the issue of the transparency of one of the solutions to the corruption. Yes indeed, empowering the public is one of the most counter balance to powers of corruption. However, we talking about people that once they know that they can act on it. Transparency assumes that corruption happens because people do not know. And if we let the people know about what their officials are doing they going to do something about it. But in some of the examples that I talked about if the dependency is that heavy, knowledge is not to change much. Knowledge would not to lead to action, would not empower. Naming and shaming would still remain, but other Iraqi officials say that media has the freedom to speak and we have freedom not to listen. It is a challenge therefore relying in on only one tool that is not going to be enough. Yes, in the case of Iraq, there are the right institutions in place, in the appearance. But just in a way that American history has has a power struggle between three branches of the government in which the executive is increasingly has been gaining and wielding more power versus the two others. A patriotism emerging in Iraq as well which is allowed independent commission in the public integrity, which fights corruption, the election commission and right now, the commission that is supposed to be independent and bound to the government fund the NGOs, have all been taking to under the arms of the government, which takes me back to my presentation.

STANLEY KOBER: On the rule of law, when the Cold War was ending, I was really amazed to see these articles in the Soviet press, on the rule of law. Gorbachev described Perestroika as a legal revolution. And he said it was based on the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Well, not the Gorbachev but I saw it in the Soviet literature. In the book that came up at the time was that concept on the rule of law state. And one thing in particular, affected the Russians during that time, was the legislative control over the war power. I began to see articles on that. First of all, the human rights. They began to say that they have been wrong on the issue of human rights that no country today that is domestic situation was immune from the international human right standards. I found it very extraordinary at the end of the
Cold War. They were openly admitting we were wrong. Those days are gone by the way, I do not see that anymore. And similarly on the war powers. I remember seeing an article on a journal of the Communist Party, which was arguing that Russia had nothing, the Soviet Union had nothing to fear from the countries that have a legislative control over the war power. Because the Vietnam war demonstrate, once the war got start at the certain level, the legislature would intervene put a stop to it. Any war against the Soviet Union will be so big. And then you saw this questions about how we get to Afghanistan without the Supreme Soviet. Just a few people starting it. And when Gorbachev was sworn as the president of the Soviet Union, he said from this point onward, the president cannot on his authority send on arm forces outside the country. You know to attack another country will beyond to the legislative control. Those days are now gone. I find this as a great tragedy.

MOHAMED NIMER: I think some institutions exist especially in the case of Egypt. They just need to work right. To tell you I met with the director of the elite Egyptian think tank Al-Ahram Center for Strategic Political Studies, two months before January 25th, where he told me that the National Democratic Party would run, or they are about to run for election. They are going to get the majority for sure, of course they did. But I said even if they are not under the tutelage of the state. He said, “Yeah, they would get the overwhelming majority on their own”. Now this guy, the same person, a nice person, accomplished intellectual, writer and researcher, after the revolution, he turned into a prodemocracy analyst. And so the institutions, the intellect was there, just need to work right, without oppression, without dictatorship they work right. Some institutions need to be established. And the Gulen Movement experience is instructive. Those intercultural programs: Arab groups, again because of oppression they are not able to communicate with each other, they are not able to do cultural programs where Copt and Muslims can meet. Now this is happening, after the departure of Mubarak. A lot still needs to happen.
EMRE CELIK: Ladies and Gentlemen, Thank you for your patience, this is our third panel, and we will be looking at case studies, the importance of civil society. We have on our panel Catherine Cosman, from the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. Alisher Khamindov, from St. John Hopkins University we hope he will be here soon. And Mehmet Kalyoncu, an independent Analyst, will be also speaking in regards to the importance of the civil society and case studies. So, I am going to throw it over straight to Catherine. Thank you.

CATHERINE COSMAN: I want to start with a few generalizations and then go to some specifics on government policies, towards religious communities and not so much. I will not be discussing so much the very wide variety of religious life in the country and the former Soviet Union, because it is a topic of an entire conference itself. Because, you know, many of the world major religions and many of the world’s minor religion are represented in the former Soviet Union. And as far as public influence or influence in the society, a lot of times that depends on the government attitudes towards a given religious group. But of course sometimes the activities of the religious communities in society as a whole obviously also influences the role that it plays. Post-Soviet ideologies, which obviously emphasizes on atheism and carefully control religious life has also left a big legacy in the country on the forms of Soviet Union. And most people in that part of the world, like many were, many other places, are searching for new belief systems, which of course include religion prominently. Post-Soviet governments often view the majority religion as an ally, for example the Moscow Patriarch Christian Russian Orthodox Church, or as potential allies and rivals for example Islam in Central Asia. As a result of all these factors, post-Soviet governments try to control religion in various ways, which is the main topic I will be discussing through registration regulations, religion laws and extremisms laws which also, in addition of each of the major religions they have set up or encourage development of a communities which are officially approve and others which are not.

So it is a rather a large topic and I will try to address as many aspect of it as I can, in a limited time that I have. I will take a couple of countries as examples and that those are Belarus, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. I will first talk about a little bit of registration policies, for example in Belarus the religion laws sets up of three categories of religious groups and sets up in a very complex registration process. The registration process requires that those who want to establish a religious community needs to supply the state with very detailed personal information with the post-Soviet context, gives rise to considerable apprehension. While many groups in Belarus and have managed to register, it is illegal for an unregistered religious community to function at all. In
other words, if you are not, if you have not publically declared yourself to the state, than your activities is viewed as illegal.

In Russia it is a little different, while you can function as unregistered religious group; you have certain rights for example to hold worship services. You cannot own property, hire religious leaders on a formal level and publish literature. If you are registered which you then must do every year and you have much wider rights. Possibly the most restrictive registration procedures that I know of exist in Tajikistan which were established only in 2009. And for example for me, on one of those prominent aspects to that is, if you are among the ten adult citizens founders, you have to present a certificate from local officials that you have lived in that specific areas, at least five years. And during that course of that time, you have always held the same views which have led you to establish this religious group. In the addition the charter must specify all aspect of all your activity and must register every year.

And for all this countries as well, if you are found to violate provisions of the ministry of registration. You know there are various kinds of penalties ranging from fines and some cases to imprisonment depending on the way the legal terms. In Uzbekistan also unregistered religious activity is illegal and if you violate that previsions you may face huge fines, police raids and possible arrest. Kazakhstan, I will not get into but if people have questions about that, I can try to answer that.

In Russia, turning to the practical difficulties of registration, you have to register not only on the local level, but also at the national level and you have to do this every year. And while most religious groups in Russia, have managed to register some have not and particularly they had difficulty on the local level. In some cases there are charges, that the Russian Orthodox Church or whatever is the majority of the religion in a given area puts a pressure on the local officials to not allow in other groups. In Turkmenistan even though the penalties for violating registration were removed from the administrative code to the administrative code, penalties for violating those previsions remain the same; in other words, you can be in prison if you are found to violate those, terms. In

In Uzbekistan, the government has closed down 3000 of the 5000 mosques that existed in the early 1990s, and several mosques in particularly in Fergana Valley, which is the most religiously active area that have been refusing to register even though they meet the legal requirements and, as far as the penalties, for violating various provisions of religion laws. I can give some specific example, for example in Turkmenistan there is a Pentecostal pastor, who last year was sentenced four years imprisonment on false charges on swindling and both his family and members of his congregation were brave enough under Turkmen condition to say in court that those charges were false. In

Uzbekistan, which by the way has the largest number of political and religious prisoners than all other post-Soviet countries combined has estimated 5000 prisoners who have either, most of whom have either not practiced Islam the way the government thinks they should, or are charged on for belonging to an allegedly the extremists group, political group. Some which have religious linkages but none of these charges are not proven nor has it proven that this people advocate or have engaged in violence in the most part, there are few exceptions of course. But as far as the violating, just previsions under the religion law, which do not involve in so called the extremists groups, 49 people were sentenced in last year alone.

For example in April of last year, three women were convicted to minimum 6 year terms for allegedly threatening the constitutional order
and that consisted of them, privately teaching young women about Islam. And other defendants from among group of 30 who are originally arrested, some were reportedly threatened with rape.

Non-Muslim groups are also subjected to very severe restrictions. One of the largest protestant churches in Tashkent was raided and church members were arrested and briefly detained. As far as provision of religion laws, just to give you an idea the legal

Catherine Cosman: In Uzbekistan, the government has closed down 3000 of the 5000 mosques that existed in the early 1990s, and several mosques in particularly in Fergana Valley, which is the most religiously active area that have been refusing to register even though they meet the legal requirements and, as far as the penalties, for violating various provisions of religion laws.

In Russia, the very important trend that Russia help set in motion was to designate certain religions as more traditional in the country than in others. So four religions have been designated in the present religion law, Russian Orthodox, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism. Nevertheless, various Russian officials do not understand the distinction to preference to religion law and the law itself. Therefore they act on that basis and views and suspicion all other religious groups and in fact if you are Orthodox and the wrong variety of Orthodox you can also have lots of problems.

I also wanted to talk a little bit more Tajikistan’s religion law, Tajikistan, which is, you know, Northern neighbor of Afghanistan and particularly on a fragile state as the International Crisis Group, just pointed out yesterday. That for example, the mosques are under particularly on strict regulation. They set population quotas for the various sizes of mosque and if the government thereby decides that there are too many mosques in an area with too few people or too many people depending on the criteria set up, then the mosque is not allowed to be built, and if there are too many mosques and they do not have official approval the government closes them down, or simply tears them down, as it has done repeatedly this year and last year. The law also bans private religious education which is something I should mention as another frequent feature of religion laws in this part of the world or at least very severely restricts that, that is also true in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

I want to also briefly refer to how extremism laws are used in various to this countries. To restrict illegitimate religious activity, one of the key features the extremism laws in most post-Soviet countries is that it does not require advocacy or use of violence or not even the criterion under extremism. Although the various inter state agencies have also ban
and decided various largely Muslim groups are terrorist. Some of them in fact are however, many of them are not, and the criteria for banning is that there are very vague and often easy way for arrest of people on either fake charges or actual charges belonging to these groups. The point being the membership in the banned group is the criterion for arrest. It is not a specific action they are undertaken and also Russia has set up a large list of so called extremists literature which includes the writing of Said Nursi, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Scientologist who were recently removed from this list. There is now ongoing debate is to whether The Protocols of the Elders of Zion should or should not be included on this list. And again you face criminal charges and prison sentence if found to distribute and own this literature. Anyway, there is a lot more to be said and I run out of time. Thank you.

MEHMET KALYONCU: Thank you very much. Well first I am delighted of course to be part of this very important debate. The issue that we tried to address at this conference today is the role the impact of civil society on peace building, conflict resolution and democratization. But I guess we should revise that order as conflict resolution, peace building and democratization. The conflict resolution may eliminate the conflict but the absence of conflict does not necessarily or automatically mean the presence of peace. Today actually sixteen years after the date of agreement, there is no conflict among the Bosnians, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia but there is no peace either. After all peace building is the process that takes place, where all the concerned parties are dedicated and willing to achieve peace. It is the process of building upon that collective deal to achieve the peace. And we all agree that democracy flourish with the state and nonstate institutions that are transparent and open enough to allow their citizens monitoring all and participation in these institutions. Which in and by itself constitutes the core of the functions of a civil society.

Now the question is what if the community does not have the ability to organize in such impression in the first place? What if the community is divided along ethnic-religious alliances, these different ethnic and religious groups have directly or indirectly engaged in conflict or at least have not interacted closely because of the trench of the prejudices among each other? So the question is, the fundamental question is, how you get to functioning in civil society from such ethnoreligiously fractured community. As we all listen today, theoretically the civil society is characterized by the presence of voluntary civic and social organizations, run by the informed citizens and the groups, these non-governmental organizations, assume responsibility for monitoring governmental institutions and for mobilizing the available resources to maintain order and efficiency in these organizations not only the governmental organization but in the society in general. The underlying assumption is that coming together of these citizens around either political or nonpolitical causes is a crucial prerequisite to achieving a functional civil society and strong democracy. So the key is, citizens coming together for a common cause.

The analysis of a Gulen-inspired civil society initiatives of southeastern Turkey and specifically in the city of Mardin, suggest that they have these civil society initiatives or it is called generally as Hizmet Movement. It has been to a certain degree, successful in bringing together different ethnic and religious groups in the city of Mardin. As a necessary first step, towards building civil society. Here I am trying to talk about the process through which the Hizmet Movement is initiating, building the civil society and then
the movement. I mean all these individuals affiliated with this movement. They provided true collaborative efforts of those people, the solid services to address those common problems. As the result, this process which requires individual participations has created a civil consciousness of being Mardinian and the citizen of Turkey beyond their respective ethnic and religious identities. So they have realize, I may be a Turk, Kurd, Arab, or an Assyrian. But first I am a Mardinian and I am citizen of this country. Mardin, is a multi-ethnic city some of you may be familiar with, populated by Turks, Kurds, Arabs and Assyrians on Turkey’s Syrian border. The affiliates of the Hizmet Movement have, through their personal interaction and personal interactions with the local people, first, convinced the local people that the fundamental problem of their community is the lack of education and educational infrastructures in the city. Second, they promoted multi-cultural understanding and tolerance towards the other, other ethnic religious identities. And finally, these local people, as finally the movement got these local people, personally involved in finding resources through local or outside donors and making concrete progresses on the ground.

And so the Hizmet Movement has been able to create a Mardinian civic consciousness among the Turks, Kurds, Arabs and Assyrians living in the city. Moreover, the movement activities in Mardin have centered on providing, educational facilities such as schools to universities prep courses, reading rooms, as well as providing humanitarian assistance such as food and clothing distribution. Of course it is important to understand the security environment, where this activity is taking place. Mardin was heavily affected by the conflict between the Turkish armed forces and two terrorist organizations PKK and Hezbollah. Respectively starting in early 1980s and early 1990s, this conflict deprived the city of basic infrastructure, investment and educational facilities. At the same time, these conflicts sort of deepen the ethno-religious fault lines among these groups. The affiliates of the movement first establish personal contacts with the local people in the late 1980s. Their conversations focus on the necessity of providing modern education to the young generations, which would in turn help them, to be productive citizens and benefit their community. So it is that simple, they just initiated conversations which focus on the necessity of education but not just preaching about necessity of education but also getting those people involve personally, no matter how much they have, no matter how much they can contribute. But getting them personally involved in implementing these projects with the cooperation of this local people from the very beginning, the movement has institutionalize it is also very important.

The moment has institutionalized these efforts by opening university prep courses, schools and reading rooms. It opened the first university prep course in Mardin in city center in 1992 and later in the surrounding counties of Mardin, such as Kızıltepe, Derip, Musaibit, some of which were under the heavy influenced either of the PKK or Hezbollah. These university prep courses, had been pretty much successful in terms of attracting the local youth. Despite the continued threats by both PKK and Hezbollah. The main reason was that these prep courses were pretty much the only means for them to possibly go to the university. And for their parents, to keep their teenage children away from the PKK and Hezbollah forced recruitment. Moreover, the movement establishment the private school, which included all three elements, secondary and high school levels and the construction of these school was not funded by the state but by Mardinian businessman, contacted by the affiliated of the Hizmet Movement and who was living in Istanbul. Beside teaching the
school, beside teaching arts and sciences as well as English as the second language, the school prioritizes the development of its citizens, students to social and physical skills. Throughout the year it organizes many events, including science fairs, art exhibitions and music performances and sports tournaments.

I will give two examples of regarding the impact of these kids on school. At the end of the school year, the students organize a fair where they showcase their yearly activities. The school administration encourages the students to invite as many people as possible to vote on their projects during this contest. And every year it averages about five thousand people and the school administration believes that this kind of practice, these kinds of activities help the students adopt democratic practices such as free and fair relations.

Furthermore, the school organizes public seminars and social gatherings with local people. So it is not just about the students but also connecting their parents or those who do not have kids at school. Through these seminars, the school administration shares its future projects with the local people and seeks their involvement in implementing them. Such a close and continuous engagement with the local people and hence the confidence built in the school, have also changes some of the deep rooted practices such as not sending their daughters or not sending girls to the school. For instance, I talked to a Kurdish mother and she said “I was not allowed to go to even elementary school and was force to get married at a very young age, I did not have much say in my family affairs, but I am quite happy for my daughter Hatice because she is going to school now Balikesir in western city in Turkey.

Finally the Hizmet Movement has established in Mardin reading halls. These reading halls serve as a substitute for the university prep courses by providing the children, the children of school age with reading and study materials. They keep the children and the youth of the streets from where they normally they are found to be recruited by the PKK and the Hezbollah.

MEHMET KALYONCU: So in Mardin, the Hizmet Movement in general have focused on developing human capital of the city and civic consciousness among its residents, so that the different segments of that community can come together, despite of their ethno-religious differences to address their common problem ranging from lack of education, lack of investments to chronic unemployment

So in Mardin, the Hizmet Movement in general have focused on developing human capital of the city and civic consciousness among its residents, so that the different segments of that community can come together, despite of their ethno-religious differences to address their common problem ranging from lack of education, lack of investments to chronic unemployment. The movement has emphasized the importance of human agency and the ability of the society to meet its needs without completely relying on the donors or the state funding or the state itself. Consequently, the necessity of law and order, to sustain and protect what has been achieve through this collective efforts has cultivated their respect and quest of the rule of law and democracy. Because they want to protect, what they have achieve together. In turn, they laid foundation for a sustainable in functional civil society environments.
EMRE CELIK: Thank you. If I may start with the first question on Catherine, over the last few years maybe going back to indicate, what is getting better and is there anything getting worse?

CATHERINE COSMAN: Well, certainly people from Russia are allowed to travel, you know to foreign countries a lot more freely. And there is in general much greater freedom of expression at least on the internet and to your friends and then in public. There is a greater variety of religious groups, which are jostling for membership and you know, and public visibility. But unfortunately I think increasingly the government, the governments of this part of the world as they are coming to terms of civil society and see that perhaps very restricted laws did not manage to curtail as much as they would like. And at the same time, I think also something that probably should be mentioned that the Soviet system, out of which all the leadership comes, was very suspicious of religion put it mildly. And so the leaders still have that kind of suspicion but also instrumentalize religion as a way of harnessing notion for national identity. And therefore they play to the majority religions. Although they also keep that religion within the restrictive laws that I have described. So it is very complex picture: some groups such as Jehovah’s Witnesses are increasingly being viewed as extremist throughout the part of the world, and other religions viewed as new, such as evangelical Protestants often have a lot of problems. So it is a very complicated picture because we are talking about in the case of Russia ten time zones, so obviously it is a little hard to generalize and the picture as far as Russia is concerned, varies a lot from region to region. And a lot of it depends on how liberal or not the governor is and what are the particular kind of political pressures put on some cases, religious pressures put on the local government. So, I do not want to sound entirely negative, because obviously there is a lot of positive stuff going on as well. But unfortunately, you know the governments do not want to lose control, so I think that is the major negative.

EMRE CELIK: And one question to Mehmet. Regarding the PKK I remember the news item that said that they saw the Gulen Movement as a major threat to themselves and to recruitment and you specifically spoke about of course Mardin, but is it replicated in other areas in southeast Turkey, northern Iraq have you able to elaborate on the specific to that particular city.

MEHMET KALYONCU: Well it is not specific to that city. Martin is pretty much representative of southeastern Turkey and I believe that Mr. Bilal could vouch for that, it also represents the region in general, because there are actually, Kurds, Turks, Arabs, and Assyrians living in vast geography in that area. And I read also that news that PKK views the Hizmet Movement initiatives as a threat to itself. Normally because they stand for everything that they are against actually against those people raising up to its possibility to addressing their problems by themselves through cooperation, cooperation with each other instead of blaming for everything for every problem. Blaming the state, and of course the more people are educated the less they are prone to manipulation. I guess that is the reason why they are viewed as threat to this organization.

MEMBER OF AUDIENCE: Hi My name is Karl, I work in the Department of State, and I just have a question in the scope of the June 2010 violence in Kyrgyzstan between the ethnic Uzbeks and ethnic Kyrgyz. You talk a little bit of the role as the mosque as the mitigating factor for such violence or conversely if you think that kind of resurgents of Islam in Central Asia, is serving as driver for conflicts, to some groups that Uzbeks are more religious historically than the Kyrgyz..
CATHERINE COSMAN: I did not talk about Kyrgyzstan particularly. Kyrgyzstan, under the previous government, adopted very restrictive religion law probably as restrictive in many ways as being Tajik law. Although the Kyrgyz law is more against missionaries from afar, both Muslim and Christian. So in fact I just talk to Kyrgyz parliamentarian and proposed that they reform that law, and he said yes. Nevertheless to be fair, they say after the October parliamentary elections, this law would be reconsidered as far as the mosque being the meeting ground, I suspect, I am not positive of this, that mosque were divided among the grounds, that Kyrgyz went to one mosque and Uzbeks to another and as you correctly observed, Uzbeks are more traditionally more observant than Kyrgyz, so that is another complicating factor. But I would use this opportunity to say that I am very concerned about the situation, potential for future violence in the Fergana Valley as a whole which is split up among Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

MEHMET KALYONCU: There is something I could add. Well Kyrgyzstan, I haven't studied that in detailed yet, but I am developing an interest in Kyrgyzstan because it presents a very unique case. For the model that I talk about because as you know Kyrgyzstan is you know, the capital almost in northern border and Osh is in at the bottom of the country, and the country is divided by huge mountain lines. The capital almost has no control over, or not even ability to serve to the southern part of country which is densely populated by Uzbeks and the sort of frictions or tensions between these groups are also further exacerbated by this political situation both problems between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. But recently, the Kyrgyz prime minister opened a kind of school that I mention, the Gulen inspired school in Osh, on actually April 17, he said that, “We recognize the problems we are facing due to our diverse multi-ethnic structure. But we need more and more this type of initiatives because, this initiative bring together our people, Uzbek origin or Kyrgyz origin”. So it is a unique case.

BILAL WAHAB: Thank you very much for this very interesting presentation and I have a question for each of the two. Cathy if I may start with you, you mention how the government tries to put a religious group and denomination into a box, I wonder what is the rationale you think behind this, is it because that they are too easy to marginalize and the other is to bigger political influential, that they cannot fight against everyone? Basically why does the government think of such policy and then the reverse on that is how do this religious groups react, what kind of recourse do they have against government intrusion and restrictions? And a question for Mehmet, that was fascinating case study from Mardin and I agree that Mardin demonstrates a representative case, but Turkey has deep historical grievances when it comes to its Kurdish population. There are processes of openness like calling for a constitutional reform, there is a government sponsored Kurdish TV, radio, media, cultural access, all of that are progresses that we have witnessed of the almost later part of the last decade. But the grievances run deep, because the constitution, which still does not recognize the large portion of the population. Against this background and given the Gulen movement's excellent approach to dialogue across ethnic groups and religion, what role do you think that nationally, or the Gulen-inspired intellectuals, the schools, the education system, to really cleans the Turkish system of its main flaw that is also a breeding ground for the insurgency. Thank you.

CATHERINE COSMAN: Well, why does the government try to control religious groups, because I think I somewhat indicated, it wants to control as much as it can. They cannot totally control what people and how people are summoned to the spiritual world. But I
think that is one of the most disturbing things actually about the Russian banned books list, I did not really know. That list began back in 2007, with 14 titles, now it is over 800 and the procedures such any court anywhere in Russia can declare a work and video etc. These books or materials are banned throughout ten time zones and if you are found in possession etc., trying to distribute, then you face extremism charges. So I have talked to one Russian lawyer, who actually said that he thinks this is the beginning of going back to attempts to thought control. I think that is high probability, I hope but nevertheless, it think does not reflect that any kind of instinct. And how do religions react? In varying ways, for example the Russian Orthodox Church, manages to convince the Russian government. It manages to get the Russian government to agree to amend that law in ways that it applies to religious organizations so they do not have to submit all the details, kinds of information about membership list, etc. that NGOs that still have to do. So in that sense it did make use of its political authority with the Russian government as far as the Russia’s largest religious minority, which are Muslims, they have successfully protested the fact of theological books or materials on the banned books list, the largest are the Muslim. And they manage to get the government to name, an advisory council within the justice ministry to give to advice from a more knowledgeable perspective as to what kind of material do constitute extremism. But you know it is an ongoing debate, I heard with some people with official connection say that they want to amend the extremism law, so that not just any court in anywhere in Russia, but it have to be the supreme court that would deem the materials of extremism or extremist, So, that would be at least an improvement. Of course in an American perspective, this entire exercise is objectionable. But many European countries do have similar system in place. As far as how groups outside Russia respond where in the situation in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and sadly now Tajikistan or much worse. Basically by going underground and even then that is no guarantee not being arrested of course. And that of course from a security perspective is exactly constitutes to a danger itself, when people were going underground then you know all kinds of things can happen.

MEHMET KALYONCU: Thank you very much. In a view of the short time, I will be as concise as possible. First of all thank you very much for the excellent question. As I mention during my presentation, what happened in Mardin was simply people basically wanted to, wanted to protect, what they achieved by strengthening the rule of law and institutions and hence, they adopted a democracy and its institutions. People of very different walks of life, very different world views, different ethnic or religious views are all commonly trying to reinterpret their new history, understand each other and in this due process people are realizing how much ethnic Kurds have been oppressed in the country. But they are also realizing that it is not just the Kurds who have been oppressed this is also non-Kurdish women who have been deprived of their right to education, they are also oppressed. And people who have been denied their rightful place in many state institutions just because of their religious convictions or way of life. They also are oppressed. So now, in general there is understanding that is not Kurds versus non-Kurds. It is an anti-democratic, authoritarian groups within the state the apparatus in the society in general and in the rest the majority, who are oppressed by this anti-democratic group. There is a judicial process, political debates going on and hopefully it will bring an institutional change. Good afternoon, welcome to our panel discussion on regional energy networks and their policies. This is the last panel for today. My name is Michael Cain
and I am director for the study of democracy at St Mary's College of Maryland and have worked about eight years on energy issues. And I am absolutely delighted to be chairing this panel of this distinguished senior politics analysts and I am looking forward to interesting discussions with you all on this.

And I would like to make three basic points. One point and I think this is much of the discussion where we really focus on the supply side of the energy of Turkey. I will make a few points about that and two other points that I would like to talk about is that the institutional side of the energy, the importance of an energy reform as well as the main side of the energy consumption in the region. I did not need to tell you all about the strategic and geographic significance of Turkey as building regional energy networks. It is geography makes it a crucial and important regional actor. And an important partner in building security reliable networks in the Black Sea region, in the energy community and of course for the EU members. Turkey's proximity to large gas suppliers in the Middle East along with its crucial location to gas supplies make Turkey an important strategic partner for the EU's long term goal to achieve energy security by allowing greater supplies to European gas markets. And much of the discussion is here we have experts, who can talk directly to the issue of those infrastructures and gas distribution.
CLOSING REMARKS

Jennifer Windsor

Well, thank you so much. First of all I would say, this is a huge topic, to say, to talk about the role of civil society and democratization and just alone we could have a whole conference, in fact the whole course, let alone did peace building and conflict resolution. So, but it does not mean that it is not important. So, a few things, one is that, I wanted to share the most recent findings of Freedom House. Probably many of you do not know that 80 percent of Freedom House’s work and money goes into program, working with human rights defenders and civic activist in the fields. So it is an interesting organization trying to be both an analyst an advocate and helping action on the ground. So, looking back since Freedom House started doing this kind of assessments, roughly early 1970s, the trend of course has been remarkable progress over all, in terms of increase respect for political rights and civil liberties and Freedom House looks at those issues, mindful that there are whole range of other rights, economic, social, cultural rights that are just so important. But the focus of most of the work is on political and civic liberties and those come directly from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in terms of the areas that are most important. So there has been a lot of progress, except for perhaps the Middle East and maybe after this year, we can talk about gains in the Middle East. And if you step back and say, what have driven most of that progress with respect to rights is not elites in government.

We know that there are good people within governments and trying to do the right things. Typically all governments resist change, especially change that reduces the power of either themselves or an important political economic elites that they depend on where have linkages too. So it has been civil society broadly conceived that brought about change they done with it in a variety of ways perhaps those obvious way is a popular movements that we have just recently seen, in Middle east, But civil society has also brought about that change in less obvious ways whether it is pushing for a change in a particular law, working at the grassroots level, to make sure that the local governments actually and national governments actually design projects and produce social and economic institutions that serves the interest of the people. And the important role that I think, several have mentioned of civil society as a way to educate the population to become more tolerant of diversity and pluralism. You know, civic groups can serve as incubators and educators where you could try different governance styles much more easily than governments which tend to, again, resist change. So, again I am making sweeping generalization from thirty-five years. But, so where have the gains that we have made? Well in the electoral area, elections much better run than they ever been. The proliferation of the associations, the freedom of assembly has clearly increased and I would also say the free flow of information. It is very hard now to restrict information flows, and which does not mean that that the people are not going to try, we talk about that but it is harder to repress one portion of the population without others knowing. Maybe the only country that we really have no idea about inside is North Korea and even North Korea there is extensive, there is more and more information that is coming out. So this information flow that civil society also helps to perpetuate is a critical role, Now where the countries, where the worlds has made less progress is in significant institutional reform in terms of change in justice systems, in terms of eliminating corruption, the abuse of public funds for private gain and civil society in is the more difficult, it is a harder issue that to push on it, in term of changes because it is not just a passage of a law, allowing this action etc. It is a long term process. Basically some people subject to justice and some people do not, depending on what group you are from etc. So, we have seen real difficulties in that areas that in some ways understandable because the justice system is in fact the epitome of
social contract between the government and the
governed, and that underlying power relations in
countries do not change fast. Somebody said
previously, well, you always have right to express
opinions, but we have the right not to listen,
exactly right. So rule of law reform governance
reform is actually about governments, those in
governments being forced to actually listen to the
voices and do something to respond. That is going
to take a longer time; that is going to take
sophisticated effort from inside the country to
push for those changes.

The last five years, of record between 2005 and
2010, which how Freedom House does it, has seen
actually more regression in terms of respect for
political rights and civil liberties and the
regression is partly in the area that I have
discussed, the rule of law and corruption. So that
would include organized crime in the corrosive
impact that has had on countries in the Americas,
in Mexico, which has recently been downgraded
by Freedom House because of the degradation of
the ability of the state to actually keep its citizens
safe from nonstate actors that are intent on
infringing on human rights and democracy. And as
well as the citizens, vigilante groups, which are
what emerges often times when the state failed to
keep the justice systems. Then citizens just
engaged in mass violations and take matters into
their own hands. But the two that I would like to
say and what I think in particularly pertain to the
topic that you have been all been discussing today,
are the raising restrictions in terms of the ability
of the freedom to associate, and as well as the
restrictions on media, including both new
media and traditional media. And this
bears directly on the future ability of the civil
society to try engaged and try to play the role that
we know that they have, and I should play in the
future. Just two points on that, the restrictions on
civil society tend to be a lot more sophisticated
then in the past—of course we will still have the
mass murderers, murderers of human rights
defenders in Russia, in Uzbekistan, we still have
direct oppression—but governments have become
a lot more sophisticated; one of the things that
they worry about is the funding flows to nonstate
actors in their countries. And they have, I would
sort of point out the big countries like China,
Russia, Iran that have been particularly sort of
forefront of this, they realized that their own civil
society has gained by connecting to larger
international civil society movement.

There has been sharing of some information; it
clearly happens. Of course, all civil society is local,
but those local groups can actually become more
effective faster, because of that transnational
exchange of knowledge and outside support. So
governments are making it more and more
difficult for NGOs, for civil society movements of
any type to get money, any kind of money from
outside. That leaves basically two options right?
Voluntary contribution, which we know it is not
necessarily part of the cultures in a lot of these
countries. So, I think that his whole issue of
funding and the restrictions on the association
have can creep up in terms of their impact, and I
do not think we, as an international community
have done a very good job of identifying how to
stop that.

And I think it is going to be a big problem for us
and the future. The second area I would point to
is freedom of expression, and we all have seen the
role of the flow of information, whether it is
moving from faxes, to internet, to Facebook, to
cellphones. So you have seen the ability of
nonstate elements outside the state to be able to
use information flows. But you have also seen,
really the increased sophistication of governments
and tying to restrict that. No one thought it was
actually possible to cut off all access to internet in
Egypt, no one thought it was possible, and they
were able to do that. Now, I happen to think that it
was counterproductive move because it led
Egyptians actually gets out from behind the cafes
which they were like to write and send emails and
post on Facebook pages, and get out on the street.

I will just make one point which is civil society
is a broad element, but there is a role for
government organizations. But they are also roles
for organizations that have no mass following at
all. And you know, coming from a group that sees
itself as a human rights defenders group, most human rights defenders groups have no ability and will never have an ability to get actually get a popular funding. It is a usually a group with very highly motivated individual, sometimes because members of their families and friends, or others have been killed, or somehow have their human right abused. And this set of actors plays a very, very important role. It is a very important role in the democracy as advanced as the United States, when it plays an important role in countries as repressive as Uzbekistan and North Korea. So, I mean when we think about civil society we should think that there is a role for groups that play that role.

And finally, I just made a few observations for the last twenty years in my career, was really trying to focus on trying to get the US government to take the promotion of democracy, governance and human rights more seriously. I find myself now, wondering whether the explosions we have seen in terms of the foreign interest on this as well as the amount of money flows going into this governments including the United States government has an in some ways led to a very difficult situation, which is when governments puts a lot of money into topics, they want to control and so you have seen this encroachment of government on in terms of controls, in terms of measuring results, in terms of identifying exactly where the money goes, who it goes to. The groups like Freedom House have received US government money but only under an arrangement, which means that the US government cannot tell Freedom House what to do. We know that the US government and others have played an important role, in proving resources to groups that literally would not be able to get them otherwise, and those groups have done good things. Has that era come into an end, and what are the implications for the future spread of democracy and human rights? Thank you.