Part 1B: Religion, Monitoring, and Negative Externalities
By: Anthony Gill
October 22, 2014
In my previous post, we noted that socially deviant behavior can be harmful to social flourishing and that Adam Smith thought small religious sects could actually help impose some rigor into human behavior and avoid such harmful consequences.
An important addendum is warranted here. Smith never defines what he considers to be “low profligacy and vice.” It was probably well understood in his times what that meant. Likewise in our time, we have an understanding of what deviance means. In general, social deviance is behavior that departs from socially-accepted norms of proper behavior. Given that social norms change over time, it might be difficult to set upon a standard set of things that qualify as “low profligacy and vice.” Of course, there are some behaviors that everybody would agree are socially deviant, such as murder and other forms of violence against persons. But other behaviors may be viewed differently at different points in time. For example, smoking was once considered a normal activity, but times have changed and it is now viewed as a vice. Baptists once viewed dancing as a rather suspicious activity, but now you can catch a few of them kicking up their heels to a catchy George Strait song.
From a standpoint of understanding whether religion and religious liberty can enhance social flourishing, it might be more useful to think about social deviance as a violation of social norms that imposes significant costs upon others. Murder? Well, that does impose a pretty significant cost on others, so we probably can keep that one in the socially deviant column. Smoking appears to impose damage upon others as well, and it is not surprising to see that as we have learned more about the health costs of this activity it has moved into the category of “profligacy and vice.” Dancing? Well, unless it is the unsightliness of short, fat political science professors doing a jig that causes much psychological distress to other partygoers, that activity does not seem to really impose much harm on others. It is not surprising that the “no dancing” norm has been tossed on the wayside without much regret.
This discussion does not imply that there are no moral absolutes. Nor is this a defense of cultural relativism. Rather, when it comes to thinking about the linkages between religion, religious liberty, and social flourishing, I merely point out that it is important to think about how certain norms promoted (or discouraged) by religious groups affect how social costs are imposed on society. While much of our discussion about moral issues (e.g., same-sex marriage, abortion) focuses on ideological absolutes, it is also beneficial to consider how different forms of behavior impose costs upon other individuals and society as a whole. From the vantage point of Adam Smith, he saw that religious groups would often prevent people from undertaking costly behaviors that were widely-recognized as harmful, and, as a result, society actually was able to benefit.
This is Part 1B of a blog series written by Anthony Gill on Adam Smith and religious freedom, which were originally written for the Religious Freedom Project's Cornerstone blog.
From a standpoint of understanding whether religion and religious liberty can enhance social flourishing, it might be more useful to think about social deviance as a violation of social norms that imposes significant costs upon others. Murder? Well, that does impose a pretty significant cost on others, so we probably can keep that one in the socially deviant column. Smoking appears to impose damage upon others as well, and it is not surprising to see that as we have learned more about the health costs of this activity it has moved into the category of “profligacy and vice.” Dancing? Well, unless it is the unsightliness of short, fat political science professors doing a jig that causes much psychological distress to other partygoers, that activity does not seem to really impose much harm on others. It is not surprising that the “no dancing” norm has been tossed on the wayside without much regret.
This discussion does not imply that there are no moral absolutes. Nor is this a defense of cultural relativism. Rather, when it comes to thinking about the linkages between religion, religious liberty, and social flourishing, I merely point out that it is important to think about how certain norms promoted (or discouraged) by religious groups affect how social costs are imposed on society. While much of our discussion about moral issues (e.g., same-sex marriage, abortion) focuses on ideological absolutes, it is also beneficial to consider how different forms of behavior impose costs upon other individuals and society as a whole. From the vantage point of Adam Smith, he saw that religious groups would often prevent people from undertaking costly behaviors that were widely-recognized as harmful, and, as a result, society actually was able to benefit.
This is Part 1B of a blog series written by Anthony Gill on Adam Smith and religious freedom, which were originally written for the Religious Freedom Project's Cornerstone blog.
Opens in a new window