Part 2A: Small Religious Sects are Weird!

By: Anthony Gill

October 23, 2014

In our previous posts, we noted that Adam Smith saw an important role for small religious sects in helping to monitor and prevent socially deviant behavior that could prove costly in terms of economic growth. One might imagine that Smith would welcome such spiritual organizations with open arms. But wait! Smith also thought that some of these religious groups were just plain weird! 
“The morals of those little sects, indeed, have frequently been rather disagreeably rigorous and unsocial” (Wealth of Nations, V.i.g., paragraph 12). 

Disagreeably rigorous and unsocial?! Who is Adam Smith to say what is disagreeable and unsocial? Alas, he never gives us a list. In his times (the mid-eighteenth century), though, there were plenty of religious groups that shook and quaked in ways that shocked the more educated elite. Some of these groups became known as the Shakers and the Quakers. There were undoubtedly other groups at that time engaging in all sorts of activities that seemed odd to contemporary eyes. Historically speaking, numerous sects engaged in public flagellation or prompted individuals to wear strange clothing. Even today we have people who speak oddly, handle snakes, refuse to pledge allegiance to the flag, and avoid coffee. Many of these folks have been considered outcasts and have suffered immense persecutions for their behavior.

But is “weirdness” necessarily socially deviant? Laurence Iannaccone, a scholar working from the “economics of religion” perspective, has discovered that the most successful religious groups often begin with (and sometimes continue) behavioral requirements that seem “disagreeably rigorous and unsocial” from the outside, but have an important internal logic. By requiring unique wardrobes, special dietary restrictions, or other behavioral traits that separate members of a religious community from the general culture at large, these groups can control what economists call “free riders,” people who join a group for the benefit but refuse to participate in any of the costs. By requiring some “sacrifice or stigma,” the group weeds out anybody who is not likely going to be an active participant. Just as God tested Abraham by asking him to sacrifice Isaac, so too do small groups require new members to pony up some burnt offerings to signal the strength of their commitment. And by promoting behaviors that set these groups aside from the general culture, they are tied to a community that is much more capable of monitoring their behavior and potentially keeping them on the straight and narrow.

This is an important point, and one where the present author tends to find mild disagreement with Prof. Smith. In a country where religious liberty reigns, religious pluralism is likely to increase. Such religious pluralism will invariably come with groups that engage in practices that look strange to those of the mainstream culture. This is where our earlier emphasis on the social costs of deviance from cultural norms becomes important. To the extent that religious groups with different norms do not impose any social costs on others in society (beyond someone’s personal annoyance), a commitment to religious liberty will require us to tolerate those differences. Tolerance is the price of liberty, but one that is not too great if the result is an overall level of economic and social flourishing within a nation.

Of course, strong commitments via adherence to non-mainstream norms also can be used by those with nefarious purposes. Eli Berman, in his book Religious, Radical, and Violent, notes that some groups use the methods of “sacrifice and stigma” to create the collective discipline necessary to undertake terrorist attacks. As such, Adam Smith may have had a legitimate concern with these “disagreeably rigorous and unsocial” sects. The question again comes down to the social costs imposed on others.

The lesson here is that there is no guarantee that strong religious communities will promote social flourishing. Religious groups can provide the discipline to keep us sober and limit our violent tendencies. Smith saw this with his man of “low condition” who would be monitored by his sectaries. But religious groups that are disciplined can also impose costs on society, something else that concerned Smith and a situation to which he provided a few solutions.

Reference: Iannaccone, Laurence. 1992. “Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives.” Journal of Political Economy 100: 297-314.

This is Part 2A of a blog series by Anthony Gill on Adam Smith and religious freedom, which was originally written for the Religious Freedom Project's 
Cornerstone blog.
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