Berkley Center

The confluence of religion, politics, and society serves as a useful lens through which to examine and understand a core aspect of mode of operation. The complex relationship among these three concepts proved a fascinating, but ironic phenomenon during the Soviet Union. The Soviet government’s official policy endorsing atheism meant that precisely the absence of a policy endorsing a specific religion in the government’s political agenda rendered the role of religion in society that much more salient and, ultimately, significant as a subject for scholarly analysis. Indeed, the absence of an explicated policy towards religion—in this case, Judaism in particular—in the political agenda of Vladimir Putin’s government has again rendered religion a significant aspect of Russian politics. In the case of Putin’s policy towards Judaism, religion serves as a vehicle through which to explicate the extent to which Putin, though utilizing several Soviet-esque policies, ultimately seems to shape his policies with regard to power maximization rather than to adhering to a specific ideology.

In the late 1930s, Joseph Stalin introduced anti-Semitism as an official state policy, thus barring Jews from holding any positions within the officialdom. In addition, media, literature, and film presented Jews almost exclusively in a negative light. Stalin’'s successors continued his policy of anti-Semitism, until it became perceived as a core element not only of government policy, but also of the Russian mindset. Even Mikhail Gorbachev, though not openly endorsing his predecessors'’ policies towards Jews, did not condemn those policies either, instead shying away from involvement in the issue and refraining from appointing any Jews to significant government positions.

When Vladimir Putin came to power in 1999, and in particular when he began an anti-United States campaign in earnest in 2005—a sentiment which historically in the Soviet Union had been associated with anti-Semitism, given the large population of American Jews—many expected him to naturally adopt anti-Semitism as a core element of his policies. In addition to his launching of an anti-United States campaign, Putin’s declared affinity for elements of Soviet traditions, and his professional background in the KGB, a bastion of anti-Semitism, served as factors leading logically to a revival of strong state anti-Semitism.

However, contrary to virtually all expectations, Putin has not only acknowledged the anti-Semitism of his predecessors—a statement that no previous Russian leader has made–—but has adopted a policy explicitly supporting Jewish issues and leaders. In 2005, Putin acknowledged the Holocaust and urged other nations to consider the lessons learned from that and other catastrophes derived from anti-Semitism and intolerance in general. No other Russian leader even indirectly mentioned the Holocaust. Putin also became the first Russian leader to visit and, in 2007, met with the chief rabbi to discuss the building of a museum for tolerance towards Jews.

Despite such surprising inroads, however, Putin has not condemned Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, both declared anti-Semites. This glaring hole in his policy suggests that Putin’'s decision to open positive relations with Jews in Russia and elsewhere stems less from moral compunction than from Machiavellian political maneuvering.

Such a motivation, while unfortunate from a moral point of view, logically follows with what seems to be Putin’'s general motivations regarding his international political decisions. Putin seems to be generally fashioning his policies to support maximum flexibility in foreign relations. Maximizing the economic potential of significant natural resource reserves—and, by doing so, maximizing his personal power by exponentially improving ’Russia's economy—seems to be Putin’'s ultimate goal. Therefore, perhaps Putin’'s motivation in taking some steps to support Jewish issues represents an overture towards a demographic group overrepresented in elite international business circles, just in case he wishes to pursue more intimate relations with such people in the future.

Indeed, in pursuing flexibility above all else in his political policies towards religion, Putin could avoid the Soviet Union’'s ultimate downfall: an inability to adapt due to an inordinate loyalty to a specific ideology and economic model. Though it is ultimately too early in Putin’'s reign of power—which will almost certainly continue unabated into the administration of his likely successor, Dmitri Medvedev—to confidently declare him a success or failure, the flexibility that Putin seems to be pursuing with regard to Judaism and foreign policy in general could prove a stroke of genius that allows post-Soviet Russia to succeed where Soviet Russia failed. However, regardless of his apparent endorsement of flexibility, which distinguishes him from his predecessors, Putin’'s willingness to fashion religious policy with an eye to power maximization rather than moral compunction places him firmly in line with his anti-Semitic predecessors.