The Islamic Republic of Iran is not about to implode. Nevertheless, the misguided idea that it may do so is becoming enshrined as conventional wisdom in Washington.
—Flynt and Hillary Leverett, The New York Times, January 5, 2010.
I can't think of a foreign policy op/ed that has provoked more heat than that of the Leveretts. Employing their characteristic, in-your-face style, they have done their utmost to discredit the idea that the Ahsura protests that broke out some three weeks ago signal an eminent fall of the Iranian regime.
I am not going to venture an analysis of the Leverett piece. Their many critics and few tepid supporters have been at it for weeks. But whatever their views, I suspect that the most important reason why the article has touched a raw nerve is this: it points to the capacity of autocracies to survive, not merely by using brute force, but also by protecting key constituencies. Hard-line Shi'ite ideologues in Iran, Alawites in Syria, Berbers in Algeria, and secularists in Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia all rely—to one degree or another—on autocracy to defend them. The regimes that rule their fractious societies are nothing less than protection rackets that use (and magnify) the fears provoked by the uncertainties of democratic politics to maintain their power.
The Arab and Iranian protection rackets are mirror images of one another. Many Arab regimes are controlled by elites that offer protection to those segments of society—the military, women's groups, businessmen, labor unions and human rights organizations—that want to keep Islamists at bay.
By contrast, Iran is ruled by a coalition of clerics and security elites who are determined to repress "counter-revolutionary" secularists. This policy does have organized support, even if it is among a small plurality of the population. Thus, even if most Iranians who have gone to the streets to demand political change still prefer to reform rather than dismantle the Islamic Republic, regime hard-liners view their quest for religious and political freedom as a first step towards regime collapse. Indeed, in a bid to isolate its opponents, the regime has used the state media to beam one deadly message to the wider populace:"between us and the opposition stands chaos!" Like it or not, in today's divided Iran this message may be working for the regime.
How then to undermine this protection racket in a manner that advances domestic peace-making and reconciliation? In Iran, the violent stand-off between regime and opposition—one for which the regime is primarily responsible—is undermining hopes for a compromise. But I would still predict that the most likely outcome—one that may be years away—is a negotiated solution that brings both sides back from the brink.
In the Arab world, opportunities for negotiating a different political future remain alive in some states, while they may be dying in others. Yemen—and perhaps even Palestine—could be slipping into the near-hopeless category. But in Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, and Kuwait, a new generation of political activists is looking for an exit from the cul-de-sac of autocracy.
The Muslim World Initiative at the United States Institute of Peace has been working to help Arab activists envision this exit strategy. Indeed, during the week of January 18-22, the MWI will hold two public events that highlight opportunities for promoting political dialogue and consensus.
The first will take place on Wednesday, January 20, when USIP joins forces with the Project on Middle East Democracy and Georgetown University's Center for Democracy and Civil Society to host a remarkable meeting in the U.S. Congress—one that will showcase the aspirations of a new generation of Arab political activists.
The second will take place on the morning of Friday, January 22, when USIP will launch Pursuing Safety and Freedom: Reform and Security in the Greater Middle East. This exhaustive USIP Study Group Report calls upon the Obama administration to innovate policies that encourage oppositions to forge a common vision of democratic change, and regimes to pursue reforms that promote the free exchange of ideas across the ideological divide.
If this sounds like a PR plug for USIP—so be it! The issues the Institute will raise at the two events are too important to be left to the polarized arena of competing op.eds and blogs. What is at stake is nothing less than need to forge a long-term strategy for mitigating the sectarian, ideological and religious strife that autocrats count on to sustain a clenched fist.
This is first and foremost a task that the citizens of the Middle East must undertake. But if they lead, then surely Washington can help by encouraging genuine political dialogues—particularly in those Arab states whose rulers assume that their geo-strategic relations with the U.S. provide a blank check for sustaining the old protection racket.
Daniel Brumberg is an associate professor of government and director of democracy and governance studies at Georgetown University. He is also a senior nonresident fellow at the Project on Middle East Democracy. His work focuses on political, social and economic change in the Middle East and wider Muslim World.
