"It would be better if the administration focused on the regime's instability and ignored the nukes. This ought to be the goal of the "crippling" sanctions the Obama administration has threatened. Sanctions will not persuade the present Iranian government to give up its nuclear weapons program....But the right kinds of sanctions could help the Iranian opposition topple these still-vulnerable rulers."
—Robert Kagan, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
"Sanctions would not affect the government but would impose many hardships upon the people, who suffer enough as a result of the calamity of their insane rulers."
"The government will say that critics of their policies are doing the foreigners' bidding" and will use sanctions as a pretext to silence opponents."
—Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Ali Shakrouri-Rad, Iranian Opposition Leaders, Tehran.
You've got to hand it to Robert Kagan. Sitting at the virtual front lines of the struggle for democracy in Iran, he would have the Obama administration substitute a policy of regime change for diplomacy. Sound familiar? This is a somewhat lighter (and for our young soldiers, far safer) version of a policy pursued in Iraq by the previous administration. No, Kagan would not have us invade Tehran. Instead, he hopes that Iranians will take to the streets, shocking and awing the regime until it collapses.
Neo-conservatives of the world unite: you have nothing to lose but your computers!
But what about the Iranian people? What would they lose, and what would they gain if the Obama administration followed Kagan's advise? Indeed, if his vision of a mass insurrection provoked by "crippling sanctions" had the unintended effect of strengthening the regime, would Washington's efforts to prevent Iran from building (and delivering) a nuclear payload be further delayed or even perhaps even aborted? Then, of course, everyone loses (including the Iranian people).
These cautions might explain why the leaders of Iran's opposition have repeatedly warned against the use of crippling sanctions. Mir Hossein Mousavi and his colleagues don't have the luxury of offering up their countrymen as fodder for testing what is (at best) an alluring hypothesis.
The are many problems with the punishing sanctions+opposition mobilization=regime collapse=a compliant Tehran formula. It is not merely that Iran's Revolutionary Guard leaders would probably find ways to circumvent an embargo on imported refined petrol, or that in doing so they would enrich their own coffers. Beyond such technical points is a basic question: what kind of political struggle will secure a brighter political future for the Iranian people?
On this score I believe that continued, non-violent resistance to the regime is both likely and necessary. It is likely because millions of Iranians, including many conservatives, will never forgive the electoral coup of June 12, 2009. It is necessary because only by denying the regime any shred of legitimacy can the opposition hope to compel Iran's rulers to retreat from their drive for absolute power. When the estrangement between the state and society is complete, a basis for moving beyond the status quo might emerge.
Such a prolonged struggle would not be unique. Consider Communist-era Poland, where after eight years of military rule, elements within the regime reached out to Solidarity. Judging from their statements and speeches, Iran's opposition leaders envision a similar struggle. They are not advocating revolution. Instead, their goal is to revive and redefine, rather than repudiate, many of the institutions and doctrines of the Islamic Republic.
For these purposes, Mousavi and his allies are waging a sophisticated campaign to broaden their ranks by making common cause with political leaders who are still loyal to the regime, but who are profoundly disturbed by its repressive actions. Such a complex campaign is unlikely to produce a democracy, but in time it could invite a process of political liberalization that would be far preferable to the consolidation of a post-Islamic Republic despotism.
If Iran's opposition leaders believe that tougher sanctions will undermine such a long- term strategy, many do agree with Kagan in one particular sense: the U.S., they argue, should boycott the current regime in Tehran. Talks, they claim, will only seal the victory of a junta whose right to rule the vast majority of Iranians have clearly denied.
While morally justifiable, in the long run a diplomatic boycott of Tehran would probably do more harm than good. Indeed, the struggle for a freer Iran will have little hope of success if the Iranian-U.S. cold war continues. Rather than provide the excuse they need to pummel their opponents—and, the same time, keep Iran at safe distance from the global community—Washington should keep Iranian hardliners off balance by offering full diplomatic relations. In return, Tehran would have to accept the strict system of nuclear safeguards and international supervision that Iran has long tried to evade.
If a diplomatic strategy begins to bare fruit, some of Iran's hardest hardliners might try to sabotage any deal with Washington. They support engagement, but not at the cost of realigning Tehran's foreign relations in ways that could benefit the country's democratic forces. This by itself is a good reason for pursuing the intricate poker game upon which Washington has finally embarked.
Daniel Brumberg is an associate professor of government and director of democracy and governance studies at Georgetown University. He is also a senior nonresident fellow at the Project on Middle East Democracy. His work focuses on political, social and economic change in the Middle East and wider Muslim World.
