Dean K. Lieberman is a student in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He serves as the Scripting Director for The God Vote.
One of most prominent questions facing international commentators today: are Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya (if Qaddafi falls) going to become the new Irans? Professor Samer Shehata, this week's guest on The God Vote with Sally Quinn and Jacques Berlinerblau, asserts Egypt is not going the way of theocracy. The year 1979, he says, is a false analogy to what just transpired in Egypt. Why? Islamist parties have emerged into new entities in recent years. Shehata points to their acceptance of the idea of citizenship as one example of this process of embracing modernity.
Shehata's argument underscores the case that many analysts have made: We must move away from a monolithic view of protests in the Middle East. Unfortunately, this one-size-fits-all view is far too common. When comparing today to the Iranian revolution, for example, the particulars of the 21st century must not be ignored.
In this vein, Olivier Roy, a prominent European scholar on Islam, has said that these protests cannot be deemed fully "Islamist" because the young generation fueling the movements are not flying the religious flag. He finds the young generation to be better educated and more pluralistic than their predecessors. He sees a weak connection to Iran and little need for concern.
By generalizing the causes and effects of each individual protest movement, we overlook the particulars at our own peril. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is distinct from the al-Nahda party in Tunisia, which has quite different aspirations than the Muslim leaders in Libya calling for a removal of Colonel Qaddafi based on humanitarian grounds. And the role Islam plays in these countries is in contrast to Bahrain, where intra-Muslim (Sunni/Shia) tensions have emerged. While all these countries do share many unifying factors, commentators such as Shehata carefully distinguish between them. Political Islam is bound to enter into a give-and-take with each of the countries' political systems--with highly varied results. Acknowledgement of this multiplicity, these experts say, is key.
While the question of whether political Islam will be a force for or against genuine democracy is still undetermined, it is clear that Islam will, at least, be one force of many. So, as we watch the events unfold in real time, beyond the headlines is a constant tug-of-war between liberalism and conservatism, new and old, between East and West, secularism and Islam, and more.
Are fears about the role of religion in these revolts well-founded? Or do Americans need to re-interpret these events through a fresh lens?