Mariel Reed on the Search for Religion in China

By: Mariel Reed

October 10, 2008

Harbin is not your typical Chinese city. Most historians accept 1898 as the year of its founding, when the spot was selected as the future headquarters of Russia's Trans-Manchurian Railway Project. Over the course of the last century, Harbin has been managed by a veritable string of powers: Russia, a coalition of Allied Forces, Chinese warlords, Japan, the USSR, and, since 1946, the Chinese Communists. The "Paris of the Orient" is now a major Chinese city and industrial hub with a population of over 10 million. Its cityscape reveals its unconventional history; onion-shaped cupolas of Russian style churches peek out from behind skyscrapers. One of Harbin's most famous buildings, St. Sophia's Cathedral, is at the heart of the city and is now a museum.
Despite an abundance of religious architecture, “studying” religion in China has not been as simple as entering a museum. Religious practice in China is like the city of Harbin:— various structures dot the social landscape, but the prevailing presence is one dominated by the new, developing, and “atheist” China.

In speaking with students and teachers about religion, the common (and simplified) explanation is that though religious freedom is guaranteed, religion is unimportant. In general, religion is seen as a trivial aspect of Chinese society. Consequently, people who “have religion” exist along the margins of society, either as members of China’'s many minority groups, or because they are simply “bu zheng chang” (not normal).

A professor from the Government Department here at the Harbin Institute of Technology—and a member of China’s Communist Party— gave me an introduction on religion in China. One of her key points was that the study of religion in China is “mei you yi si,” or, to put it bluntly, —meaningless. When I asked what she meant, she responded that, given China’'s immense size and population, the number of people who are religious or adhere to a certain faith is small enough to be considered insignificant. Translation: it’'s not worth looking into.

In China, the state is everywhere. Like a parent, the state manages China'’s economic and social growth— and monitors the activity of its citizens. Unsurprisingly, regulation of religious activities falls within the state’s jurisdiction. Legally, the Chinese government guarantees freedom of religion. Under Article 36 of the Chinese Constitution, all Chinese citizens “enjoy freedom of religious belief.” Yet, the Chinese government officially allows five religions: Buddhism, Catholicism, Islam, Daoism, and Protestantism.

As it was politely explained to me, our “Western religions” and their equivalents in China are not quite the same. Part of this “localization” has to do with changes in the organizational structure of religious groups in China.

Fear of foreign influence and control affects limits on organized religion here. Historically, China’'s territorial integrity has been violated by foreign powers. This history informs China’'s current policies. As students of politics well know, in the international political arena, China champions non-interference and territorial sovereignty. Similarly, China is careful to guard against ideological “invasion,” or the development of beliefs that could threaten an individual’'s commitment to his or her own country. Accordingly, organized religious groups must register with the state. The state'’s regulation of religious organizations results in a different “flavor” to these religious groups. For instance, Catholicism in China is a bit different because the role of the pope is perceived as a threat to the power of the state. As a result, the Vatican does not have the right to appoint bishops in China.

Where the political and religious interact in China, the state dominates. The role of religion in China is closely related to the ideological development of Communism and the rise of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The CPC is atheist and requires that its members be atheists as well. From an ideological standpoint, the development and achievement of economic prosperity eradicates the need or “purpose” for religion.

Since even before the CPC came to power, belief in economic and social development began to replace more traditional religious beliefs. In reading about Harbin’'s history, I came across an article written by Harbin resident Wang Wen. At the age of 14, she began studying revolutionary theory at the Harbin People’s Night School. The year was 1928. She later wrote of her experience: "“I had been a Buddhist since childhood, and in that period everyone, rich and poor alike, believed in Buddhism.… In those days Harbin had the Temple of Extreme Happiness, and I was taken along every year …to prostrate myself and pray to Buddha. In 1928 I was still a believer, but in 1929, after receiving education, I stopped believing and no longer went to kowtow to Buddha to improve my fate.”" 

Similar views regarding the relation of religion and economic development are still very much present in today’'s Harbin. Another student suggested that widespread religion is something he’'d expect to see in either very poor or rich societies. According to him, “"Religion is something that people use when they're suffering and life is hard. Especially since 1978 reform and opening, the lives of Chinese have improved, so we don'’t need religion.”" In his view, religion is also something for the very wealthy. Given that they no longer have to worry about making money or surviving, they turn to religion out of boredom and curiosity. The “function” of religion as a tool to give direction and meaning to life is, of course, not a new theory. Religious doctrine and practice provide guidelines for how to live.

Yet, on a large scale, in Chinese society the state, not religious organizations, provides these guidelines and goals. Religion is perceived as unimportant because it is not necessarily useful. One student commented, “"If you don'’t have beliefs, your actions have no meaning.”" Yet, he continued to explain that “religion” in China plays a relatively small role mostly because the CPC gives meaning to people'’s lives. The government sets economic and social goals and guidelines for behavior.

The result is impressive: among Chinese citizens, there exists a powerful faith in economic development and the ability of Chinese society to work toward a more perfect world. This faith is not just belief in the government and the state, but in the power of economic development and hard work to rapidly transform the individual and society. The Beijing Olympics is a symbol of the “miracle” of industrialization and economic development, and a promise of what the future holds for China and its people. Isn'’t this promise something everyone can believe in?
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