Berkley Center

Qatar is a small peninsula off the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia, with a population of about two million. Among the residents of Qatar, only about 13 percent are citizens; expatriates and migrant workers comprise the vast majority of the country’s population. Qatari citizens are fortunate to receive a portion of the state’s enormous revenues from oil and gas production. According to a January 2013 BBC report, the per capita GDP of Qatari citizens is almost $700,000, which corrects the figure the Qatari government reports by excluding expats and migrant workers. The infusion of massive amounts of wealth in the latter half of the twentieth century into this Wahhabi country has produced a fascinating society. In this blog post, I will discuss my observations of Qatar to better elaborate on the dynamics of Qatari society with regard to religion and politics.

But first a few words about the Wahhabi doctrine. Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab was an eighteenth century religious revivalist who rejected religious innovations of any sort, and he derided his neighbors in the Arabian Peninsula for having become corrupt in their faith. Believing that Islam was a way of life, Wahhab was acutely concerned with orthopraxis (morally/religiously “correct” behavior), and he wanted to restore the area around the peninsula to “the land of Islam.” When purifying the land became difficult, Wahhabi areas often secluded themselves. Thus Wahhabi doctrine and its corresponding history has led most observers to consider Wahhabism an ultra-conservative strand of Islam. Since the production of oil took off in the 1970s and brought economic development, Qatar has been forced to engage with others, introducing notable complications into the country’s Wahhabi identity.

We can see Qatar’s departure from its strict Wahhabi identity most clearly in the religious laxity present in order to accommodate non-Muslims. Consumption of alcohol and pork is forbidden in Islam, yet both are available in Qatar. These items are available at one location in the country, the Qatar Distribution Company. Non-Muslims who are employed in the country can receive vouchers for 10 percent of their monthly income to purchase alcohol and/or pork for personal consumption. Five-star hotels in the West Bay also serve alcohol, making them a popular spot for expats. Without passing any judgment, we can see that Wahhabism’s careful attention to fortifying the “lands of Islam” with zealous doctrinal purity is not felt as strongly in Qatar after its integration into the world economy. From my understanding, this should be considered an affront to Wahhabism. But the tolerance of these exceptions highlights the negotiation of religious values and practical considerations in Qatar. The country is also scheduled to host the World Cup in 2022, which will bring many enthusiastic soccer fans, who are generally equally as enthusiastic about alcohol consumption. How Qatar further negotiates its practical and religious interests will be curious and provide additional insights into the country’s priorities.

The clothing of some Qatari women also allows for a discussion about the country’s socio-political identity. While the female students at SFS-Q may not be a representative sample for Qatari women, they certainly represent an important demographic of the population, and they offer an indication for the future trajectory of the country. As far as I know, all Qatari female students wear the abaya, but many of them wear it so that it is more of a cloak, rather than a loose-fitting dress, which allows it to show their form-fitting designer clothes. Most Qatari female students also wear the headscarf, but it begins after showing an inch of two of their hair. These modifications to Islamic dress suggest that their clothing is more cultural rather than religious—perhaps a fashionable abaya and hijab, instead of an Islamic abaya and hijab? Thus it seems that a desire to be a part of the global fashion trends, which is only possible now that Qatar is part of the world economy and that Qataris can afford the items, has introduced another challenge to the conservative values of the country.

How Qatar will continue to negotiate these competing interests with regard to other topics will remain to be seen. Because Qatar’s history did not include a powerful merchant class that challenged the ruling family, as was the case in Kuwait for example, Qatar’s ruling al-Thani family has limited concerns about dissent, which could come in the form of a religious revivalist movement. And in any case, a religious revivalist movement is also unlikely, if only because the luxurious Qatari lifestyle serves as a strong disincentive. Accordingly, Qatar will continue to be an interesting case study for competing political and religious interests, though I would argue that any change from the status quo seems remote.