We have just passed the 30th anniversary of Douglas Johnston’s landmark Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft. The Berkley Center commemorated the twentieth and thirtieth anniversary of the book, and it is fitting that this new platform for strategic religious engagement (SRE) conversation is titled, The Missing Dimension. I will summarize one of Johnston’s key observations on the need for institutionalized structures for religion and religious literacy in U.S. foreign policy and then consider the disappointing level of progress in recent years.
Johnston’s edited volume demonstrated the rich religious landscape that most people around the world inhabit, and the contributors focused attention on a number of ways that religious actors, leaders, institutions, and movements contributed to peace and the common good, from efforts at Franco-German reconciliation at the end of World War II to the work of Desmond Tutu and religious actors in conquering apartheid and undergirding transitional justice in South Africa.
But what was lacking, in all of this, was an institutionalized approach in U.S. government agencies to understand and engage the multi-dimensionality of religion in global affairs. Indeed, the situation was, and is, paradoxical. The United States is the most religious society in the Western world, and yet its foreign policy elite have deliberately avoided studying and engaging religion in their professional lives.
Former Secretary of State Madeline Albright testified to an aversion to engaging religion during her career: “Diplomats trained in my era were taught not to invite trouble. And no subject seemed more inherently treacherous than religion.”
One might observe that it was on Secretary Albright’s watch that Congress imposed the International Religious Freedom Act (1998) on a reluctant Clinton administration. This powerful piece of legislation has made advocacy for the religious freedom of all people an important component of U.S. foreign policy. It also created some enduring and important institutions, such as the International Religious Freedom Office within the U.S. Department of State led by a Senate-confirmed ambassador-at-large for international religious freedom and a free-standing U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom.
Importantly, the re-authorization of the IRF Act, known as the Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act (2016), recognized the fact that most diplomats were receiving zero training on how to implement the IRF Act and the larger constellation of religious freedom issues. Thus, the Frank Wolf Act amended The Foreign Service Act of 1980 “to require the Director of the George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center to conduct training on religious freedom for all Foreign Service officers and all outgoing deputy chiefs of mission and ambassadors…” and to share that curriculum “with the Armed Forces and other federal agencies with overseas personnel.”
Nonetheless, even this important training module on international religious freedom is far different from training all of America’s diplomats to have a baseline of religious literacy and investing significantly so that some diplomats, humanitarians, and military personnel develop deep professional acumen on religion and culture. This is what Johnston and others such as Tom Farr, Paul Marshall, Nina Shea, and many others, have been advocating for.
Let me be specific about what a true religious literacy—a professional religion competency—would look like. When I worked with Jeremy Barker, Andrew Bennett, Tom Farr, and others at the Religious Freedom Institute, we developed The Diplomats’ Toolkit that focused on five areas of religious literacy suitable for those representing the government on the international stage.
- Identify critical religious factors in a given country or region, including history, cultural assumptions, sacred places, religious communities, victims of persecution, political, cultural and economic power centers, calendar milestones, etc.).
- Understand the sources and representatives of religious authority in a given nation or region (scripture, religious elites, etc.).
- Recognize the important intersection of religion and economic development (economic dynamism stirred by religion, humanitarian assistance, faith-based civil societies).
- Understand the value of religious freedom to human flourishing: as a fundamental human right, a source of individual and social flourishing, a cornerstone of many successful societies, and a driver of national and international security. Understand national and international commitments to religious freedom (e.g. local constitution and statutes, UN Declaration of Human Rights, Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
- Understand trends at the nexus of religion, peace, and security.
Knowing what needs to be known is different from knowing what needs to be done. What needs to happen in the way we develop and train those who represent us abroad so that they can act from a foundation of religious literacy? As I argued in my book, Politics in a Religious World: Building a Religiously Informed U.S. Foreign Policy (2011), there are four basic things that need to happen to lay the groundwork for institutionalizing a religion competency in American statecraft:
- Clarification from senior leadership on the appropriate domain for engaging religious factors in U.S. foreign policy;
- Expansion of the knowledge resources available to foreign affairs specialists;
- Investment in an improved array of assets and capabilities, and
- Implementation of a political strategy for U.S. foreign policy in highly-religious contexts.
I will focus specifically on the training gap, but first let me note that when it comes to senior leadership clarifying the domain, there has been considerable seesawing on this matter when it comes to different presidential administrations. George W. Bush published clear guidance on the USAID website about engaging with faith-based actors abroad, but it was taken down and then problematized during the Obama administration. Indeed, on two occasions I sat in on trainings conducted by contractors for U.S. State Department personnel during the Obama administration, ostensibly to define the boundaries when it came to foreign assistance. In both instances, the staff were told that most “entanglement” with religion was unlawful and could cause them to go to jail. In one of the trainings, a signature State Department program that had won plaudits around the world was depicted as “illegal,” though this was simply untrue. This demonstrates not just a lack of understanding, but an antagonistic view towards engaging the religious environment where most diplomats, humanitarians, and aid specialists work when abroad.
The seesaw continued, with significant efforts—usually criticized along partisan lines—by both the Trump and Biden administrations. The Trump administration refocused attention on international religious freedom in its National Security Strategy, with strong efforts by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Ambassador Sam Brownback. The Biden administration released and promoted a thoughtful USAID policy on Strategic Religious Engagement, which was vigorously championed from the very top by USAID Administrator Samantha Power. At the end of the day, however, it remains unclear down the ranks of foreign policy professional staff as to the appropriate domain for engaging religious factors in U.S. foreign policy.
Second, when it comes to “expanding” and “investing” in resources, this simply has not occurred. Although the State Department did set up a strategic religious engagement office during the Obama administration, and although there were various localized initiatives on these matters such as within the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, nonetheless nothing systematic has changed in how we educate and prepare our diplomats, military officers, and humanitarians. During the Trump administration, International Religious Freedom Ambassador-at-Large Sam Brownback led a successful effort to institutionalize religious freedom efforts through an annual ministerial-level event, various regional round tables, and an International Religious Freedom Summit. But, none of these changed the problem of lack of training and expertise, particularly on religious literacy more broadly.
Johnston called for training and for there to be religion-specific expertise, perhaps as a sub-track for a cadre of diplomats. To be specific, we have never had required training for all diplomats at the Foreign Service Institute to develop religious literacy appropriate for work abroad. The same holds true for our war colleges and military officers. Even in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, no such requirements were imposed, despite the massive deployment of U.S. personnel to Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. The situation was so bad that seven years after 9/11, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates lamented the lack of “religion and ideological studies” preparation for U.S. national security personnel.
Little has changed. Thus, in 2025, we are unlikely to see some new structures for religious literacy emerge in the preparation of our diplomats, aid experts, and military leaders because the institutions of preparation have resisted all attempts to widen the scope of education and training to include rigorous preparation for engaging the “missing dimension.” That being said, it is not hard to imagine change. Younger diplomats, humanitarians, and military personnel can seek to change the incentive structure especially within the Department of State but also other agencies. Growth in knowledge of language, religion, and culture should be prioritized from the very beginning of the process: how we recruit the next generation of foreign-oriented public servants. Fortunately, America’s diverse population provides a wealth of human resources to be tapped into for next-gen recruitment. At the same time, creating a religion and culture subfield within the foreign service would allow diplomats to attain deeper knowledge, and should be focused on developing deep regional and cultural expertise. At the end of the day, a major part of diplomacy is demonstrating utmost respect for one’s interlocutors so that meaningful conversation and trust can develop. Adding the “missing dimension” will allow those who represent the United States abroad to better understand, demonstrate respect, and build trust with not just foreign governments, but with the citizenry they represent.
