Whither European Integration?

By: Mina Pollmann

October 21, 2013

On Week 0 (pronounced noughth), thousands of “Freshers” and about 500 visiting students began an exciting new life at the venerable colleges of Oxford University. Part of the initiation was a one-hour marathon through the Examinations College, battling long lines and poor heating, defending your e-mail address from the hundreds of upperclassmen who were recruiting for their clubs. Welcome to Fresher’s Fair.

Making my way through the dense crowds, I started mindlessly accepting brochures as a strategy of evasion. After surviving the frenzy of the “Politics” section, I had quite a hefty collection with, much to my innocent surprise, a pamphlet for the Marxism Discussion Group at the top. Laughing at the European-ness of it, and the American-ness of my gut reaction, I flipped through to my other souvenirs, like a flyer for Young Independence, the youth wing of the UK Independence Party (UKIP).

This rang a bell. Just the other day at the famous Turf Tavern (where Bill Clinton allegedly “did not inhale” whilst smoking illegal substances), a British friend had given me “Politics 101”: in Great Britain, there are the Labourites, the Conservatives, and recently the UKIP is replacing the Liberal Democrats as the major third party. UKIP is most notable for advocating the United Kingdom's exit from the EU. Their potential electoral threat has recently forced Prime Minister David Cameron to pledge an in-out referendum by 2017.

As a young liberal institutionalist, I was particularly drawn to the European Union and its goal of “[making] war not only unthinkable but materially impossible.” When currency union happened decades after the European Coal and Steel Community was established, it was seen as a natural and positive extension of European integration. As one member state after another joined, it appeared as if the EU and the Eurozone were here to stay. Institutions are hard to change—and when they do, it is often in incremental and path dependent ways. Institutions reflect not only relative prices of doing business a certain way, but also tastes and preferences; an institution’s legitimacy is often intimately related to the normative values people infuse it with.

However, ideas can and do change, and when they do, can lead to changes in the institutions that they uphold. Cognitive research stresses the importance of the availability bias and representativeness bias in changing ideas: more immediate and vivid stimuli are remembered more clearly and are more likely to shape people’s opinions. Crises can spur changes that rupture the slow evolution of institutions, and the Eurozone crisis of 2009 offers just such an opportunity. At one extreme, there is the possibility of fiscal union, at the other extreme, dissolution. While dissolution is still hard to believe, the exit of key member-states from the EU/Eurozone has become increasingly likely, as disgruntled euro-skeptics have started exerting pressure on their elected representatives.

While UKIP is now a decade-old party with a larger platform (the pamphlet I received dealt solely with economic and educational issues), the anti-euro Alternatives for Germany (AfD) is still a relatively new phenomenon. In Germany’s federal election this past September, they failed to enter the Bundestag but did very well for a party that is still less than a year old. While Angela Merkel avoided discussing any foreign policy issues during her reelection campaign, the wide acceptance of this party indicates that many Germans are fed up with the bailouts. The immediate, financial costs of the monetary union appear to be outweighing the less tangible benefits of European solidarity. Unlike UKIP however, AfD is pro-EU, and AfD party leaders have made it clear they do not intend on cooperating with other euro-skeptic parties.

From a political and policy perspective, AfD’s impact will most likely be minimal. Yet the AfD, along with UKIP, is contributing to a more open dialogue on an important issue for all Europeans. By criticizing the Eurozone and the handling of the crisis, the AfD highlights problems, and hopefully such attention will lead to improvements in the future. Now—while the memories of the crisis are still fresh—may be the best opportunity the EU has to make dramatic changes. If such debate is conducted with respect and rationality, in the liberal democratic tradition that the West has such good reason to be proud of, not only the United Kingdom and Germany, but also the EU will be better off for it.

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