From Gaza to Damascus: Lessons for the Region

By: Daniel Brumberg

January 7, 2009

"(Israel's)... acts made me reflect on some of the commandments given by God to the 'Chosen People': Thou shalt not kill. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house. No one could be chosen by God to annex the land of other people and kill them."

Among the many statements I have read regarding the tragic situation in Gaza the above caught my attention. Penned by a Palestinian professor of American literature, it reminds us of two facts:

First, whatever the deterrent effect that Israel's actions may (or may not) have on Hamas, the loss of civilian life and destruction of non-military targets in Gaza will only deepen the desire of Palestinians to seek violent retribution. Second, in the eyes of many Palestinians, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict pivots around a religious struggle in which the "Chosen People" are violating God's commandments.

This thinking forms the very basis of Hamas's ideology. For Hamas the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a continuation of the Prophet Mohammed's battles with "duplicitous" Jewish tribes that resisted God's message. To accept any permanent peace with the modern day expression of those tribes—the Israeli state—is to sign away the inalienable rights of the entire Muslim community or umma.

This view was once adhered to by a minority of Palestinians. That this perspective has become mainstream is not merely a tribute to the allure of radical Islamist ideology; it is also a consequence of deep rage born of years of conflict, particularly in the Gaza strip. The one million plus people in that territory have not only endured economic destitution, hunger and violence; they have also suffered isolation from the entire world. Under these desperate conditions a siege mentality has only intensified. Thus it is hardly surprising that many Palestinians seek refuge in an ideology that sees their struggle as epic battle with "the Jews."

I don't doubt for a moment what a threat this world-view represents for Israelis in general, including Israelis—who are probably the majority—who favor a two-state solution. But if there is ever to be such a solution, the very idea of a sovereign Palestinian state living along side with Israel must have some prospect of realization. That idea has been dying a slow death for a long time. In its place we have another notion—utopian, fantastic and ultimately irrational—of a pan-Islamic struggle led by vanguards of the "dispossessed." Such thinking has taken root in a myriad of Islamist movements, each of which sees its particular struggle—be it in Lebanon, Palestine, Afghanistan, Pakistan or Indonesia—as part of a worldwide battle.

Paradoxically, Israel may have contributed to this outcome through its unilateral withdrawals from Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005. These actions removed the burden of occupation that both Israelis and Arabs were shouldering. But they also rewarded radical Islamist movements who were joined at the hip, not only by their antipathy to Israel, but also by their ambivalent commitment to the very idea of the state itself. For Hamas and Hezbollah, Palestine and Lebanon are but partial vessels of a global entity that exercises sovereignty of behalf of God. No negotiation, no election, no leader or state can appropriate that role without violating the ultimate Sovereign.

How can this growing tide of anti-state, utopianism be halted or slowed down? The answer is the return to a process of negotiation that rewards or strengthens sovereign states and their leaders. In a region where the disease of weak or failed states is spreading, Washington must mobilize Arab leaders in a concerted diplomatic campaign to demonstrate the logic and concrete benefits of state-to-state peace agreements.

That cannot be done with a fragmented Lebanon or, for the moment, with a Palestinian community ripped apart by internal and external struggles. The only remaining candidate is Syria, a country whose leaders over the last year have reportedly been re-exploring prospects for peace agreement with Israel.

If such a peace is to happen Damascus will have to abandon—or considerably reduce—its support for radical Islamist movements such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Syria cannot assert its "sovereign rights" to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, while allying with forces that reject, on principle, Syria's right to make peace with any state it chooses. If Syria's leaders can defy such objections and take the plunge, they will make it easier for Palestinian leaders to sit down with their Israeli counterparts in a sustained bid to forge a permanent and just peace.

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