Whether the results can be interpreted as a rejection of the BJP’s majoritarian ideology on the part of the Indian electorate remains to be seen. The ideology of Hindutva or Hindu nationalism espoused by the BJP holds that India is fundamentally a Hindu society and that Indian identity is synonymous with Hindu identity. Regardless of the outcome of the election and the nature of future developments, the BJP under the leadership of Narendra Modi has significantly reshaped global Indian public culture over the last decade. It has done so through radically altering the role and significance of its version of Hinduism in Indian public culture and succeeded in establishing a more than a modicum of legitimacy for it abroad as well.
Fashioning public culture according to the tenets of Hindu nationalism is not a new goal for the Hindu Right. Hansen has argued that historically Hindu nationalism has not focused on a narrowly defined political or religious sphere, but rather on transforming “the broader realm of what we may call public culture—the public space in which a society and its constituent individuals and communities recognize themselves through political discourse, commercial and cultural expressions, and representations of state and civic organizations.” Since the BJP swept to power in a comprehensive election victory in 2014, the Hindu Right has used a broad range of measures and strategies to capture public space, discourse, institutions, and, indeed, the Indian public imagination itself to imprint its vision of Hindu and Indian identity on Indian society.
The Hindu Right’s project of remaking of Indian public culture and refashioning India’s image at home and abroad rests on recalibrating the relationship of religion and public culture through the exercise of hard and soft power. The 2024 election results and subsequent constraints of governing as part of a coalition may temper the aggressive and violent expressions of Hindu nationalism that India has witnessed over the last decade, including mob lynchings of Muslims, anti-Muslim riots, disenfranchisement of minorities through discriminatory laws, and repressive measures against opposition leaders and critics. The BJP’s soft power strategies, though, appear destined for a long shelf life. These strategies bridge the national and global domains, taking their cues from political culture and practices in the United States and reflecting the interests of conservative Non-Resident Indians (NRIs). The BJP’s initiatives feed and appeal to the conservative overseas Indian dream of India as a strong Hindu nation, while influential NRIs tirelessly, if somewhat paradoxically, promote Narendra Modi as a global statesman and frame his vision for India as aligned, variously, with Western, global, democratic, and universal values.
One key soft power initiative is the use of think tanks to influence public perception of the BJP and the Hindu Right and to challenge established wisdom pertaining to the economy, culture, history, and foreign affairs. Two important think tanks, the Vivekananda Foundation and India Foundation, have deep links to the BJP and RSS. Think tanks have also been crucial in influencing government policy during Modi’s tenure. Combining the illusion of technocratic legitimacy and autonomy, on the one hand, with a clear Hindu rightwing ideological agenda, on the other, these organizations have burnished Modi’s credentials on a range of policy initiatives.
The extensive network of diasporic Hindu Right groups that has grown steadily in size and influence since the 1960s—and includes, at present, the Overseas Friends of BJP (OFBJP), the Vishwa Hindu Parishad of America (VHPA), the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh (HSS), and the Hindu American Foundation (HAF)—has worked steadily over the last two decades to make Hindu nationalism more politically palatable to U.S. policymakers. Studies that have comprehensively analyzed the extensive Hindu nationalist network in the United States reveal that it includes cultural, academic, and philanthropic organizations, some of which focus on India, while others seek to impact local and national-level politics in the United States. A few months after his victory in 2014, Modi spoke at a packed event for his Indian-American admirers at Madison Square Garden, a gesture whose symbolism was lost on no one given that he was earlier banned from entering the United States.
A second set of initiatives has focused more narrowly on the realm of cultural events. The BJP and the Hindu Right have succeeded in wresting space for their ideologues, apologists, and members of Hindu Right organizations at Indian and international cultural and academic events, including the Jaipur Literary Festival, which is held in India, the United Kingdom, and the United States; the India Today Conclave; and the student-led India Conference at Harvard University. The ever-expanding presence of the Hindu Right at such events, including figures known for their extreme views, compelled several participants to withdraw in protest from the Jaipur Literary Festival 2022 satellite event in New York. Since the Modi regime came to power, mainstream English-language publishers like Bloomsbury India and Penguin Books India have also been much more amenable to publishing the work of Hindutva ideologues like J. Sai. Deepak, which typically promotes chauvinistic and sectarian versions of Indian history.
A third initiative has to do with the weaponization of the Hindi-language film industry or Bollywood to promote the ideology of Hindu nationalism and the cult of Modi himself. This has been achieved through the systematic harassment of actors and filmmakers by the government and Hindu Right organizations, a fate that has also befallen streaming platforms in India. While the policies of the Hindu Right have created new tastes and audiences for its ideology, Bollywood has willingly become an instrument for promoting Hindu nationalism at home and overseas. A number of Bollywood films released in the last decade have focused on nationalistic military themes while others present wildly inaccurate Hindu nationalist versions of historical events and mythology. A third category of cinema consists of outright anti-Muslim propaganda like The Kashmir Files (2022) and The Kerala Story (2023). The BJP actively promoted The Kashmir Files through tax breaks and voluble endorsements from BJP leaders including Modi.
Supplementing these soft power initiatives is the Modi government’s use of celebrities and prominent Indians at marquee events to add luster. Film actors, cricketers, and industrialists are expected to attend Modi’s signature achievements, such as the inauguration of a new parliament building in 2023 and the Ram Janmabhoomi temple in 2024. Well-known Indians are also enlisted or pressured to publicly praise Modi’s policies, whether demonetization or the Indian prime minister’s alleged intervention to stop the Russia-Ukraine war for the purpose of enabling trapped Indian students to be safely evacuated. Though aimed primarily at the domestic base of the Hindu Right, these strategies also reinforce Modi’s image in the diaspora as a strong global leader. Foreign leaders and businesspersons feel compelled to respond and affirm Modi’s image of himself as a great leader, a fact routinely noted in the Indian media.
Though foreign, primarily Western, governments have periodically raised public concerns about minority rights, attacks on critics and dissidents, and the erosion of democratic norms in India, they have also largely embraced Modi, as have Western corporations and investors, eager for a larger share of India’s markets. Arguably, the stance of foreign governments is motivated by realpolitik and the need to cultivate India as a counterweight to Chinese influence rather than by any belief in the Modi government’s somewhat contradictory endorsement of India both as a Hindu nation and as a democratic, pluralistic state. Other foreign leaders like Russia’s Putin or Italy’s Meloni have signaled that they see Modi as a kindred spirit given historic relationships between the countries or common rightwing political leanings.
The months and years of Modi’s third term as prime minister may see a softening of Hindutva hard power, though interspersed with periodic assertions of might to appease core Hindu nationalist constituencies and the voter base. However, the heavily mediated, spectacular promotion of Narendra Modi and his policies is unlikely to diminish. And, until an equally radical reimagining and reworking of Indian public and political life that is rooted in a powerful alternate vision of Indian identity manifests itself, the soft power initiatives of Hindu nationalism seem guaranteed to reap dividends for the BJP and Hindu Right for the foreseeable future.
Editor’s Note: This publication was written as part of the Geopolitics of Religious Soft Power project, a research initiative of Georgetown University’s Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs. This article arises from a partnership between the project and the United States Institute of Peace focused on understanding how the geopolitics of religion shapes peace and conflict dynamics in particular regional and country settings. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the respective author(s).
