Berkley Center

A. "Mr Sharif has a long history of...pretending to be principled," said the spokesman. "As someone who ordered his party supporters to storm the Supreme Court in 1998, his claims to fight for judicial independence sound so hollow."

B. "Mr. Zardari...is destabilizing the nation," said Mushahid Hussain, a...former aide to Sharif. "Just a year ago, we believed it was the dawn of a new democratic era, but our leaders seem to be back in the old mind-set of tearing each other apart."

Here's a multiple-choice test: Who is right? The spokesman for President Asif Ali Zardari, or, the disillusioned supporter of opposition leader Nawaz Sharif?

Answer: Both are right.

The great tragedy of Pakistani politics is not Jihadist Islam. In the country's 2008 elections, Islamist radicals lost decisively to the two political parties attached to Zardari and Sharif.

In contrast to much of the Arab world, where voters face a polarizing choice between ruling regimes and Islamist oppositions, Pakistani voters have more options. Their choices include leaders such as Zardari, who advocates secularism, and Sharif, who used Islam for political purposes when he was prime minister in the nineties, but who is not an Islamist. If these two leaders could cooperate, they could lead Pakistan forward. Instead, they are "tearing each other apart," Sharif's former ally succinctly stated.

Zardari was brought into office after his wife, the very popular Benazir Bhutto, was assassinated. He then worked with Sharif to oppose President-General Musharraf, but within weeks of the elections Zardari and Sharif were squabbling. Today, Zardari's repression of the opposition makes him look a lot like Musharraf. Something about Pakistani politics transforms today's fickle democrats into tomorrow's willing autocrats.

It's an old story. In Pakistan, a toxic brew of pervasive corruption, weak political parties, and petty, personalistic rivalries has repeatedly set the stage for a return to military rule. Will the same happen now?

If the odds seem pretty good, some experts argue that the military does not seem eager to take over. The army is busy with the Taliban and has no solutions for the country's dire economic situation.

Moreover, the Obama Administration has responded quickly to the crisis. Our ambassador in Pakistan has urged Zardari and Sharif to put aside their differences and focus on the common threat. U.S. special envoy to Pakistan, Richard C. Holbrooke, held a videoconference with Zardari, which he followed with a phone call to Sharif.

Did they get the message? Perhaps. But, even if these two gentlemen stand back from the brink, their rivalry will probably rekindle down the road. If a military intervention is to be avoided, stronger medicine is needed.

Part of the solution may lie in holding new elections, but for this to happen, there must be a vote of no confidence backed by some of Zardari's allies. What is more, Zardari would have to stop clobbering the opposition, and perhaps reverse the High Court's decision to ban Sharif from contesting elections—a decision taken by judges appointed by Zardari (who else?!). In short, Zardari would have to take democratic institutions and laws seriously. (The same applies to Sharif, one of Pakistan's richest men, who probably would not hesitate to use his wealth to gain, buy or cajole political supporters!).

Real Democracy is the message that Washington must send Pakistan's leaders. We, and our Western allies, have to back this message with the prospect of an enhanced aid package that includes assistance to Pakistani civil society groups pushing for political reforms and effective governance. Otherwise, the military's struggle against the Taliban will not secure the popular support it might otherwise garner from a firm alliance of elected leaders who speak credibly for a majority of the Pakistani people.