There is a reason why neither the U.S. intelligence community nor the UN-backed International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could find any evidence the Iranians were actively developing a nuclear weapon. In all likelihood, they were not, owing to their need to strike a workable balance between three conflicting pressures.
First and foremost, among these pressures is a fatwa (religious edict) issued by the country’s Spiritual Leader, forbidding the development of weapons of mass destruction because they are inherently “un-Islamic.” They kill the innocent as well as the guilty. Such a fatwa was issued first by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini after taking over the country in 1979 and later repeated by his successor, the recently deceased Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The importance of such edicts in a theocracy should not be underestimated.
Consistent with the spirit of these fatwas was Iran’s refusal to respond in kind when they lost more than 50,000 troops to poison gas attacks by the Iraqis during their decade-long conflict in the 1980’s. Although Iran is not known to have chemical weapons of its own, such weapons are relatively easy to obtain or even straightforward to make when given sufficient priority.
Second, is a requirement to conform to the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), under which its 191 signatories have pledged not to develop nuclear weapons. Iran became a signatory under the Shah in 1970. Rather than abandoning the treaty when Khomeini took over, the treaty, among its other provisions, provides convenient license for developing nuclear programs for civilian purposes.
Working in the opposite direction is the third pressure, a perceived need to deter potential adversaries that already have nuclear weapons. Because of its longstanding grievances with the United States and the fact that it is surrounded by five nuclear-armed neighbors, including Israel, Pakistan, India, China, and Russia, this perception is quite strong. Adding to it is an observation made by the Indian Foreign Minister during the first Gulf War (as the world watched smart weapons maneuvering their way through open windows) that the only way for any country to avoid similar attacks in the future would be for it to develop a nuclear weapon—advice that didn’t fall on deaf ears.
In light of these competing pressures, the best Iran could probably hope to do within the confines of its religious mandate is create a degree of deterrence by keeping the world guessing as to how far along it is toward having a nuclear weapon, without actually crossing the line. How many years have we been hearing Israeli and U.S. observers say Iran is only weeks or months away from having such a weapon? This approach, however, would require that any progress toward developing this capability be kept secret, lest they be perceived to be violating the terms of the NPT.
The Iranians probably could have developed a nuclear weapon long ago, but if they had such a weapon and ever chose to use it, they are fully aware that their country and its storied culture could be decimated overnight. Ari Larijani, the late head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, recently threatened to, in fact, develop a nuclear weapon if the U.S. ever attacked his country. So, at this point, all bets are off.
None of the above is to deny that Iran has sponsored heinous acts of terrorism around the world or that it brutally suppresses dissent from its own citizens—only that the nuclear argument is highly suspect. Although one has seen occasional mention in the media of the Spiritual Leader holding back on the nuclear front, few in the West have given it any credence. Iranians take their religion much more seriously than we do when it comes to policy decisions; and that becomes a bit of a blind spot, one we would do well to recognize if we are to minimize the occasions in which we send our sons and daughters in harm’s way.
