Nepal, a small land-locked republic with 30 million people, has witnessed protests over the last year calling for the return to monarchy. This comes two decades after the monarchy was abolished in 2006. A salient aspect of these protests has been the Hindu right-wing orientation of the protestors and different parties involved within the events. This is a departure from the usual source of political mobilization in the country—though the country’s national identity has long been characterized as Hindu by its elite classes, most political protests and calls for actions are often caste or ethnic based in nature and not religious.
The new calls for a monarchy interspersed with a Hindu right-wing ideology mirror the calls of India’s right-wing groups for a Hindu rashtra (state). A closer look at the impact of India’s right-wing ideology on the Nepali political landscape is thus warranted.
Land-locked Nepal has often had to rely on India for economic prosperity, leading to a largely unequal relation between the two over the last 50 years or so. India and Nepal have deep cultural, linguistic, and religious ties. Citizens of both nations have the right to live and work in the other nation freely, and Nepali Gurkhas serve as elite units within the Indian army. In addition, both countries often work in tandem in various multilateral engagements in the United Nations as well as in region and sub-regional initiatives in areas like South Asia. Nepal has also been backing India’s bid to become a permanent member in the UN for a few years now.
Despite these close ties, many tensions also exist in the relationship between the two due to several factors. Firstly, India has frequently sanctioned and embargoed Nepal, thereby alienating the local populace. India has also signed many treaties with Nepal, which are seen as unequal by Nepali politicians and citizens alike and an attack on their sovereignty. Lastly, the two nations have had several territorial disputes in their 1,800 kilometer-long shared border. In recent years, these tensions between Nepal and India have led to the former balancing its foreign policy by also engaging with China more closely, which has been competing with India to build influence in Nepal.
Regardless of the differences, a common aspect that India and Nepal have had is the political use of Hinduism to accrue more mass support. Since the eighteenth century, rulers in Nepal unified different smaller kingdoms under the larger banner of Hinduism to protect themselves against both the Muslim Mughal empire and the rising Christian British empire. In the post-colonial era, Hindu rulers in Nepal had deified themselves as reincarnations of Hindu gods to give themselves further credibility.
This concentration on Hinduism in the political sphere also facilitated a positive relationship between Hindu monarchy supporters in Nepal and Hindu right-wing groups in India, with organizations like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and others establishing links and helping set up several pro-monarchy organizations in Nepal such as the Vishwa Hindu Mahasangh.
With the abolition of the monarchy in 2008, Hindu right-wing groups in India expressed their consternation towards this development but were unable to do much more. Meanwhile, the Nepali political party Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), formed in 1990, continued its efforts to restore the Hindu monarchy. By 2024, the party had made some headway in electoral politics, increasing their vote share in the parliament and turning kingmaker in many parts of Nepal. This also coincided with a growing discontent among the Nepal populace regarding the economic situation in the nation and the government’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic between 2019 and 2022, leading to protests calling for the restoration of the monarchy.
While the older forms of Hindu politics in Nepal was distinct from that of India’s Hindutva, the newer forms have adopted many policies from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) playbook, including a new non-toleration of eating beef and of targeting Muslims. Observers note that India has had some influence on the Hindu right-wing landscape in Nepal. According to U.S. State Department reports, the BJP had disbursed finances and ideological support to parties including the RPP—a charge that the RPP firmly rejected. In addition, the BJP has also directly influenced another local party called Nepal Janata Party (NJP), formed in 2004 with the same flag and colors as the BJP. Its leaders have declared that they were inspired by the BJP and have engaged quite frequently with members of the RSS and the BJP with the stated aim of establishing a Hindu rashtra in Nepal. Nepali Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal even visited several temples in India, despite not visiting some of the most prominent temples in Nepal at that time and having destroyed many temples in Nepal during his time as a revolutionary. Thus, his visit to Indian temples was seen as a bid to curry favor with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, displaying the influence of Hindutva at the foreign policy level.
The RSS, too, have a very large number of branches and cells in Nepal suggesting a strong influence in the country. Apart from this, Hindu right-wing schools established along the shared border of Nepal and the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh welcome Nepali students and are known for infusing their curriculum with Hindutva ideology. Lastly, conspiracy theories targeting Muslims in India have also been shared extensively in the Nepali online space thanks to linguistic overlaps. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Indian right-wing social media accused Muslims of spreading COVID-19 by, among other means, spitting on different items. This claim also circulated in Nepal, leading to local cases where Muslim women were accused of doing the same. Clearly, then, there is a strong impact of Hindu nationalism from India which in some cases is seemingly exported into Nepal.
Hindutva in Nepal has polarized communities in the nation, with some amount of violence and discrimination against different castes and communities such as Christians and Muslims being reported. For example, Christians have reported several difficulties getting government support on many issues, as do Tibetan Buddhists, who have experienced limitations on their ability to celebrate their festivals. Moreover, in October 2023, vitriolic speeches by Nepali Hindu influencers online led to Muslims reacting physically, which in turn led to Hindus threatening Muslims, almost leading to a riot. At least for now, there are some limitations to these sorts of incidents. Government and security agencies have responded to such threats with some tact, often stopping potential riots in their tracks. Moreover, despite a growth in the presence of parties like the RPP and NJP, they still don’t offer a coherent vision for Nepal beyond discussions of a monarchy.
In addition, given that the BJP’s seats in the Indian parliament have been reduced following the 2024 elections, there are chances that its influences could slightly wane, although not too much since the RSS networks are still active. In addition, China has been courting Nepal’s new government strongly and has promised several incentives in exchange for more influence within the political space. These two factors can play a strong role in curbing India’s influence in Nepal and by extension on the Hindutva aspect of society.
Ultimately, for India, the deployment of Hindutva is both an end and a means to increase its influence in Nepal and prevent China from establishing a foothold in the small nation. This has had some level of success, but the fact that the political landscape in Nepal is complex and ever-changing means that a long-term effect of the ideology is still to be seen.
Editor’s Note: This publication was written as part of the Geopolitics of Religious Soft Power project, a research initiative of Georgetown University’s Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs. This article arises from a partnership between the project and the United States Institute of Peace focused on understanding how the geopolitics of religion shapes peace and conflict dynamics in particular regional and country settings. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the respective author(s).
Mohammed Sinan Siyech is a full scholarship doctoral candidate at the Islamic and Middle East Studies Department at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland. He also teaches politics at King's College London and at School of Oriental and African Studies. He has written and spoken extensively on security, foreign policy, and religion in South Asia and the Middle East.
