Berkley Center

"It's a crucial condition if we want to move forward," said Deputy Foreign Minister Daniel Ayalon... "Realistically, we need to keep Iran at bay... Until that happens, the Israeli government will largely limit itself to matters such as trying to improve the Palestinian economy and strengthen its civil institutions. The Iranian clock should be measured in months," he said... By contrast, the timetable on Palestinian statehood "is open-ended."

Let us thank Iran's President for making Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's job easier. Grandstanding, Ahmadenejad told the UN conference on racism that "Zionists" had "penetrated into the political and economic structure including their legislation, mass media, companies, financial systems...to the extent that nothing can be done against their will." In an apparent bid to soften his outrageous remarks, Ahmadenejad dropped a line in his speech repeating his denial of the Holocaust.

Some consolation! Who can blame Deputy Foreign Minister Ayalon for arguing that Iran must be prevented from 'sabotaging" Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking?

I agree with the notion—accept for one crucial point, and that is this:

Ayalon's position suggests that any event, trend or development—be it a calculated insult, a Hamas rocket or a failure to force Tehran to renounce enrichment—can and should stall talks. Yet linking Palestinian-Israeli peacemaking to the vague goal of "keeping Iran at bay" puts Tehran in the driver's seat.

This does not mean that the challenge posed by Iran should be ignored—far from it. But the link that really counts is the reverse of that suggested by Ayalon. If Tehran's leverage has increased, this is partly due to Israel's military campaigns in Lebanon and Gaza. Whatever the justification, these actions had the unintended effect of strengthening Iran and its local allies. This development points to one clear lesson: The most effective way for Israel to undercut the region's radical forces is by committing itself to a serious, substantive and relentless effort to achieve peace.

Indeed, this is precisely why in January 2009 Saudi leaders made the case to a USIP-Stimson Center delegation that Washington should first address the Arab-Israeli issue and then engage Iran. Otherwise, Arab leaders fear that Tehran will enter talks with overbearing negotiating leverage.

Why do some Israeli leaders make the opposite case? First, I would guess that some Israeli leaders want to stall talks on a Palestinian state. Second, some may want to discourage Washington from pursuing a deal over the nuclear issue that might be unacceptable to Israel (and to many Arab states). Pushing for a fast-paced negotiation could limit Washington's room for maneuver as it stiffens Tehran's position. This dynamic would then open the door to further sanctions, or perhaps even an air attack on Iran's nuclear facilities.

To avoid this scenario, Washington must make it clear that the linkage Tel Aviv proposes is unacceptable and dangerous; unacceptable because it could undercut our negotiating stance, and dangerous because it makes the peace process itself hostage to Iran's whims. Moreover, Washington should politely reject Ayalon's assertion that the timetable for Palestinian statehood is "open ended." If anything, American diplomacy must reflect the hard reality that the window for creating a politically and economically viable Palestinian state is closing fast, and indeed may already be shut.

If that window has been sealed, Iran will be the big winner. If it has not, or if can be pried open, then the US, the Palestinian National Authority and Israel should get to it. Secretary of State Clinton put it succinctly to a Congressional committee: "For Israel to get the kind of strong support it is looking for vis-a-vis Iran, it can't stay on the sidelines with respect to the Palestinians and the peace efforts. They go hand in hand."