For a fleeting moment in the immediate post-Cold War period there was heady optimism about the “end of history” and the global triumph of liberalism. And for its part, religion was supposed to gradually recede from the narrative of global affairs. Per the assumptions of secularization theory, under modern conditions religion tends either to be abandoned entirely or is radically privatized and relegated to the margins.
But it didn’t turn out that way. The gods refused to die, and instead of a perpetual liberal-democratic and secular peace, the post-Cold War period quickly witnessed particularistic identities roaring back into prominence, often violently. Instead of the universalization of liberal order, a dangerous disorder erupted in the forms of cultural and political balkanization, polarization, and demonization—often aided and abetted by various forms of politicized religion.
Scholars and policymakers in international affairs were generally not very well prepared to deal with the resurgence of religion in global public life. And as David Brooks once astutely observed in The Atlantic, many foreign affairs elites have exhibited a “secularist habit” leading to blind spots and sophomoric analyses of the role of religion. According to Brooks, such elites:
…go for months ignoring the force of religion; then, when confronted with something inescapably religious, such as the Iranian Revolution or the Taliban, they begin talking of religious zealotry and fanaticism, which suddenly explains everything. After a few days of shaking their heads over the fanatics, they revert to their usual secular analyses.
There were, however, some early exceptions to this pattern. None were more prominent—and none more enduringly beneficial—than Douglas Johnston, Cynthia Sampson, and their colleagues who produced Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft in 1994. The book met the moment, helping address a gaping hole in the literature and an urgent need vis-à-vis the prevailing discourses and assumptions in international relations. Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft quickly became a widely-cited and foundational resource utilized not only in university courses but also in specialized training of diplomats, for example, courses at the U.S. Foreign Service Institute. It also helped create momentum leading to the creation of the International Center for Religion & Diplomacy (ICRD) in 1999. To this day, ICRD is a pioneer and leader in faith-based diplomacy, religion and peacebuilding, and educational initiatives around the world.
The book was particularly impactful with respect to its analysis of the interrelationships between religion, conflict, and peace. It persuasively challenged simplistic zero-sum thinking, instead modeling and encouraging nuanced understandings of the complex and contingent dynamics in play. Johnston understood that religion, conflict, and peace operate at multiple levels and involve interrelated social, political, and institutional fields. The causal arrows point in multiple directions, and much depends on contextual factors that are themselves never static.
To bring the significance and timeliness of the book into even sharper relief, consider this counterfactual thought experiment: What if Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft had not been published until after September 11, 2001? What would that have meant for the state of academic and policy discourse about religion and world affairs in the 1990s and early 2000s? For starters, we can assume that Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis would have sucked even more oxygen out of the room. Problematic assumptions about religion and security would likely have been even more commonplace.
Fortunately for all of us, we have had Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft as a benchmark and reference point since 1994. When the book first appeared, there wasn’t much of a field of religion and international affairs, but in short order it helped catalyze and inspire many new research projects and publications. Indeed, by 2012, the literature had matured to such an extent that Johnston and I were able to co-edit the Baylor University Press volume Religion and Foreign Affairs, a compendium of 58 works by key figures shaping the intellectual terrain of the field.
Moreover, by articulating a compelling case and generating scholarly, nonpartisan credibility for the nascent field, the book had a path-clearing effect for later institutional innovations and investments supporting valuable work at the nexus of religion and world affairs. Examples abound across civil society, academia, and philanthropy. A very partial list would include:
- World Faiths Development Dialogue (1998)
- Institute for Global Engagement (2000)
- International Center for Law and Religion Studies (2000)
- Center for World Religions, Diplomacy, & Conflict Resolution, George Mason University (2003)
- Center for the Study of Religion and Conflict, Arizona State University (2003)
- Religion and International Affairs Initiative, Henry Luce Foundation (2005)
- Religion and International Affairs Project, Social Science Research Council (2005)
- Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, Georgetown University (2006)
- Religion and Foreign Policy Initiative, Council on Foreign Relations (2006)
- Center for the Study of Democracy, Toleration, and Religion, Columbia University (2006)
- International Religious Freedom Roundtable (2010)
- Religion and International Relations Section, International Studies Association (2013)
- Transatlantic Policy Network on Religion & Diplomacy (2015)
- Covenantal Pluralism Initiative, Templeton Religion Trust (2019)
Further evidence of this positive legacy can be seen in the fact that when the International Studies Association’s Religion and International Relations Section launched its annual Distinguished Scholar Award in 2015, its first recipient was Doug Johnston.
Of course, despite the gains, much work remains to be done, and there are always competing priorities and agendas that threaten such work. But I’m confident the field will continue to both broaden and deepen if it follows the pattern that Johnston and others set three decades ago, in two key respects.
First, as the book modeled, the field should continue to have one foot in academia and one foot in the realm of practitioners and policymakers. While upholding rigorous standards in academic research, the field should also be oriented to practical application—to both theorizing about problems and solving them. That is, if we are to bring religion back into statecraft in a way that does more good than harm, we must combine robust understanding of the ways religion can be part of the problem with equally robust understanding of the ways it can be part of the solution.
Second, the field should emulate the intellectual discipline, humility, even-handedness, and sense of proportion that suffused Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft. The agenda was never one of special pleading, apologetics, or promoting religion, nor was it about merely instrumentalizing religion. Rather, it was simply about balanced understanding and strategic engagement of religion. The religion and international affairs field should continue to aim for the kind of constructively critical approaches found in the book. Put differently, as Peter Mandaville has argued, the field should aim for “right-sizing religion.”
To be sure, none of this is easy. Religion is a complex and delicate subject, with attendant risks. As Father Bryan Hehir of the Harvard Kennedy School once quipped, bringing religion into international affairs is like brain surgery—necessary, but also dangerous if not done well. Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft and the related efforts of Johnston and other like-minded innovators have helped inspire and equip generations of leaders prepared to act as adroit “surgeons” at the critical intersection of religion and international affairs.
