When considering the religious rhetoric of the Iranian leadership, one has to take into account the fact that the Iranian state draws its legitimacy from democratic structures on the one hand, but more importantly, from the ideology of the Islamic revolution. Any major policy shift must therefore be legitimized through at least superficial reference to Islam or the Islamic revolution. Whether this rhetoric is purely legitimizing realpolitik or its ideology-driven does not matter because, in order to legitimize its action as Islamic, the majority of the actions has to be framed in a way that it can be sold to religious sections of the Iranian society and supporters abroad. Yet, other sections in Iran are more secular; therefore, a mix of secular and religious motives can be found.
Another important point is the impact of social media and the proliferation of language skills. The fact that anything said abroad can be known domestically in a matter of minutes and anything said at home will be known abroad in hours or days is important because it means the message in regard to the nuclear deal has to be consistent no matter the audience. While therefore the boundaries between the domestic and the foreign audiences blur, they do not disappear in the sense that the language used is tailored to meet the audience’s need. A speech in front of western students will tone down its Islamic rhetoric, while references to Islam will be prominent in front of domestic clerics. Yet, the message still needs to have consistencies, otherwise foreign policy strategies will crumble.
I have previously argued that the consistency in the Iranian rhetoric since the death of Khomeini has been that Iran is attempting to becoming a respected country in order to normalize its relationship with other countries, to “legalize” its regional power status, as well as to harvest the economic benefits of an end to the sanctions. The fundamental shift in these last decades was one from the ruling Islamic clerics’ rhetoric and aspirations being supported by realpolitikal actions, such as Iran accepting Israeli support against Iraq, to Islamic rhetoric being used to legitimize realpolitik in the eyes of supporters.
Whereas Khatami’s religious language surrounding his dialogue of civilizations aimed at getting respect from the West, Ahmadinejad’s hostile rhetoric equally aimed for respect of anti-imperialist countries and the Arab street; both aimed at respect and creating soft power.
Yet, interestingly the Iran nuclear deal was sold domestically by citing the huge economic opportunities an end of the sanctions would open up. That it did not inhibit Iranian rights to nuclear power also fulfilled the long-held Iranian desire to become a respected state with equal rights.
The fascinating thing about Rouhani and his government is the development of language used after the deal was ended. Beforehand, Rouhani called upon Trump to be rational about the situation and realize that it is not wise to end the deal. Then, the legal aspect was used that this was a contract negotiated in good faith by both sides. The leadership then tried to get the EU powers involved to save the deal. Yet, the EU, while willing to maintain its end of the deal, was not willing to go to any lengths to defy the United States.
And now, Iran's leaders emphasize Islam in the ongoing confrontation with the United States. Why this step now?
Several explanations can clarify this shift. The sanctions targeting the supreme leader are, from an Iranian perspective, an attack on the leader of the Islamic world. Not to emphasize that fact would make Rouhani look weak and as though he has abandoned the Islamic foundations of the state.
A more speculative answer might be that Iranian offers for going back to the deal, underpinned by religious rhetoric, are an attempt to play into Western stereotypes of Iran as a country run by religious fanatics. By making a religious case, Iran hopes to show sincerity in Western eyes.
To make this speculation a bit more qualified some remarks are necessary. Iran, by its very constitutional order, is anti-imperialist. Therefore, the leadership doesn't need Islam to defend its position of not caving in to the United States, but it needs a strong case for talking with the disrespectful American leadership.
Likewise, the conservative circles are most likely willing to take the economic hit, while the more secular circles will not be convinced by the Islamic rhetoric of the leadership. The increase in Islamic rhetoric is consequently best explained by Iran’s needs to legitimize negotiations with the United States and the person of Donald Trump to conservative supporters of the regime at home and abroad.
David Marcel Sip is a lecturer at Leiden University. He received his research M.A. from Leiden University and his B.A. from Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. His work mostly focuses on Iranian foreign policy, especially the role of the revolutionary guards and the relationship of Iran with its proxies. Further interests are the Middle East in the interwar years—especially the spread of nationalist ideas, revolt, and military reform in Syria and Iraq.
