By: John Williams
April 8, 2019
Just War vs. Responsibility to Protect: The Ethics of Military Intervention
Military intervention in Venezuela–unilaterally by the United States, multilaterally through suitable international organizations, or via a ‘coalition of the willing’–threatens the integrity of whichever of two principal ethical frameworks would likely provide ostensible justification. Neither just war theory nor the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) appear capable of proving persuasive, even acknowledging the diversity of methodological, ethical, moral, and political stances within those two overlapping yet commodious ideas.
My skepticism stresses the denial of Venezuelans’ agency implied by intervention on the most commonly proposed grounds. There is a familiar objection to humanitarian intervention, typically linked to J.S. Mill, but my version is somewhat different. Mill’s argument is summarized in the necessity of winning freedom for it to be valued and secure into the future. That’s inappropriate: Venezuelans won their freedom a long time ago, possess meaningful political institutions, and have a history of using, protecting, and recovering them from authoritarianism that must not be ignored. So far, those institutions–elections, judiciary, the constitution, and the military–have been strained but not decisively broken. Maduro’s denial of crisis, his misrepresentation of international concern as pretexts for neo-imperialist or Yankee intervention, and repression of opposition through electoral fixing and thuggery are deplorable. They do not meet the justifiably high bar for military action. Just war and R2P typically pose four questions, answerable in some combination, for that bar to be cleared.
Firstly, concepts of just cause are malleable, but not infinitely so. Major population outflows to neighboring states do not present actual or imminent threats to the territorial integrity and political independence of another state. That is the most clearly established basis for just cause, and legal entrenchment reflects powerful ethical reasoning. Neither does the Maduro government yet represent a genocidal threat to Venezuelans. Their suffering is severe, clearly, but R2P offers an account of rescue that also emphasizes actuality or imminence of intentional large-scale harm. The situation is grave, but not, yet, so grave that wrenching control from the hands of Venezuelans is clearly necessary to prevent catastrophe.
Secondly, authority for action is lacking. Venezuela’s opposition has not requested armed intervention. There is no prospect of political consensus for military action within either the UN Security Council or a suitable regional body such as the Organization of American States. It seems implausible that the U.S. Congress would back action, even if initiated by presidential decision. The international coalition condemning Maduro is substantial and diverse, but would disintegrate if asked to ‘go military.’ Consensus is not the source of moral authority. Different just war accounts locate authority differently, of course, but publicly testing claims is not simply politically expedient, it assesses validity in a tradition that draws its power from awareness of the implications of past debates on current reasoning, and of current reasoning on future potential. Constructing an argument for the moral authority for military action in Venezuela must be cognizant of past uses of such arguments and how they may be used in future. Consensus is a useful heuristic.
Thirdly, military intervention is fraught with risk. Success is ill-defined and consensus beyond the immediate alleviation of humanitarian suffering and fresh elections largely absent. But military intervention inevitably precipitates far more than short-term intended outcomes. The unintended and unpredictable effects of high explosives, large calibre ammunition, and foreign military forces imposing political change cannot be set aside, discounted, or wished away. Consensus on the permissibility of intervention is lacking, consensus on prospects of success even more so. That is true for prospective interveners; even more importantly it is probably true amongst Venezuelans.
Finally, just war theory and R2P are not abstract hypotheticals, although those techniques can refine argument, test logic, and promote intellectual innovation. The legacy of European empire, U.S. hegemony, and past intervention in Latin America matters. Maduro may play this card for cynical reasons, but the card’s existence and effectiveness are not expunged by his cynicism. The intentions behind intervention matter, most especially unilateral U.S. intervention led by a president with Donald Trump’s record of characterizing Latin Americans and of seeing military intervention as having to pay its way by facilitating U.S. economic nationalism. A pure altruism is a damaging counsel of perfection, but skepticism about U.S. motives is appropriate.
The systematic application of organized military force by the armed forces of states to problems in other states should be a last resort. Both just war and R2P stress that. Venezuelans need help, without doubt, but it is insufficiently clear that help must take military form. Most importantly, it isn’t clear to Venezuelans themselves, and that judgment should weigh heavy.
John Williams is professor of international relations at Durham University in the United Kingdom. His research looks at the implications of new military technologies on military ethics and at the challenges for international ethics of diverse ethical perspectives. His most recent monograph is Ethics, Diversity and World Politics (2015).
