Berkley Center

The twentieth anniversary of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA) on Northern Ireland should be a time to reflect on the very real progress achieved. Unfortunately on this key anniversary there is a fear for the future, given the inevitable negative impact of Brexit on the economy of the island as a whole and on the political stability of the North. This fear is being compounded by the current British government’s reliance on the parliamentary votes of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) of Northern Ireland, which has led to the destabilizing of politics in Northern Ireland by privileging one side of the community divide.

The GFA deserves to be celebrated as an imaginative solution to a violent, decades-long inter-community political conflict. It set up institutions enabling political cooperation in day-to-day governance, transformed the policing service so that it is now broadly acceptable to both communities, and opened the border. The agreement equalized the political recognition of both nationalists and unionists without requiring that either side give up their aspirations on the future identity of the polity. It was ultimately successful as it changed the nature of the public sphere in Northern Ireland, resulting in an open border that has increased economic development and the free flow of people. The GFA was also premised on Irish and U.K. membership of the European Union, which facilitated the open border and provided the context in which the all-Ireland cross-border bodies operate. 

The major academic criticism of the GFA is that it has not brought the two major communities closer together. This thinking is premised on the idea that the division was a social one that could be eroded by greater familiarity and the experience of cooperation. This perception views the conflict as a religious and therefore cultural divide, which obscures the fundamental political division which produced and then fed the conflict. This political divide over whether Northern Ireland should be part of the British or the Irish state is as sharp and as relevant for communities in Northern Ireland today as it was in the 1990s. The visibly reduced role for senior church figures in public life is not an indication that religion is a less salient factor than it was in the pre-GFA period; rather, it is a reflection of a move to the more typical political party-dominated discourse of a post-conflict society. 

A key element of the GFA was to postpone a decision on the future status of Northern Ireland to an indeterminate future time and to focus on an agreed level of cross-community and cross-border political cooperation. These factors mean that maintaining the political balance created by the GFA requires constant commitment. This balance is currently being undermined by the actions of the British government both through its support for the DUP and its hard line on Brexit. Northern Ireland voted to remain within the European Union, but it was split on party lines that reflected attitudes to the national question, with 88 percent of self-defined Irish nationalists voting to remain in the EU, while 60 percent of self-defined unionists voted to leave. As a party, Sinn Féin supported EU membership, and the DUP, the largest unionist party, supported Brexit. As well as reinforcing political divisions, Brexit poses a challenge to Northern Ireland’s weak economy. The most serious challenge, post-Brexit, is the introduction of customs and security installations along the 500-kilometer land border on the island of Ireland. The practical economic and symbolic damage of a closed border will allow opponents of the peace process to present it as a sign of failure, creating the conditions for the possible re-emergence of armed conflict. 

The British government has not exerted any pressure on the DUP to agree to a program of government with Sinn Féin that would restore the power-sharing executive, as it needs the DUP’s support in the British Parliament to maintain its majority. DUP leaders vetoed a draft deal to restore the power-sharing executive in February, and there is no confidence that it can be rescued. The DUP ideologically is comfortable with the possibility of a closed border and has no ideological commitment to the GFA. A regression on the part of the British government to support for the hard-line unionist position of the DUP will inevitably lead to a crisis. A joint inter-government approach based on ensuring an open border post-Brexit and a commitment to the values of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement can still avoid that outcome.